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ABSTRACT

GOOD PRESS, BAD PRESS: A 25-YEAR COMPARISON OF ARGUMENTS AND TRENDS
IN AMERICAN NEWS COVERAGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE OZONE HOLE
by
Dave Howland
The University o f New Hampshire, May, 2006

This study uses an original content analysis categorical system to seek out and compare
the substance o f arguments in a quarter century o f American news coverage about the ozone hole
and climate change. Findings from an examination o f more than 1,000 news articles written by
The Associated Press, United Press International and The New York Times are combined with
interviews with members o f key stakeholder groups in both cases including scientists, politicians,
industry officials, environmentalists and news reporters. The analysis illuminates the social and
political processes at work - that is, those captured by the press - in the evolution of the Montreal
ozone and Kyoto climate treaties. The study concludes: 1) The timing and structure o f arguments
in American news coverage o f the ozone hole has paralleled the policy success o f the Montreal
Protocol in the United States over the past quarter century; 2) By contrast, the landscape o f
arguments about climate change is still very much a battleground - reflecting the mixed fortunes
and current failure of the Kyoto Protocol in America; 3) Over time, the climate change debate has
shifted from one about the legitimacy o f global warming science to one about what policy action
should be taken. This is underscored by state efforts to address climate change in absence o f
federal action; 4) Uncertainty about the climate change phenomenon has been a hallmark o f
climate change news coverage in the 25-year sample and one that has buffered calls for policy
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action. It seems to have derived from a combination o f deft lobbying by industry, reporters
attempting to “balance” coverage o f a confusing, controversial issue, and scientists unwilling or
unable to place their work in context. There are very recent signs that this is changing. The study
includes a critique o f news coverage and recommendations for news reporters, scientists and
readers to enhance their communication about and understanding o f these critical environmental
problems. It concludes with an evaluation o f the research model and its future potential.
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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The Topic o f and Justification for this Study

This dissertation is a case study comparison o f nearly a quarter century o f American news
media coverage of two o f the most intractable environmental problems o f modem times. The
efforts to understand and address the twin environmental threats o f stratospheric ozone
destruction and climate change - which hold potentially profound consequences for the
environment, human health and the economy - comprise a tale o f scientific, social and political
struggle, success and failure. Indeed, the media itself - as agenda setting research on the press
and policy has repeatedly shown - is an important part o f the story. By choosing what issues to
focus on and who to quote, news reporters and editors play a major role in shaping the course o f
events. Their work both reflects and influences public opinion and policymaking (Jamieson and
Campbell 1988; Nelkin 1995; Trumbo 1995). This study, rendered in five chapters, examines
how news coverage o f the ozone hole and climate change problems has unfolded in the American
press over the past 25 years. It takes stock o f trends in a dizzying array o f economic, political,
social, scientific and environmental arguments in those reports, and explores what they can tell us
about America’s role in the very different outcomes o f international treaties forged to address the
issues. This dissertation’s findings are relevant to anyone interested in how the ozone hole and
climate change played in the press - what arguments and whose arguments were emphasized
when, and what relevance they had to the treaties that emerged. The study was accomplished with
the help o f an original categorical content analysis system designed to identify and sort arguments

1
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in news stories. Combined with some exciting and powerful analytic frameworks, it offers a
unique approach for understanding how the important tales o f our time are told.

Two Problems. Two Outcomes

In the ozone case, the U.S. media told a story o f how chlorofluorocarbons - versatile,
inexpensive, non-flammable, non-toxic chemicals with myriad industrial and commercial uses became a threat to the planet. It reported the work o f future Nobel laureates who discovered that
the chemicals, knows as CFCs, could potentially shred the delicate veil in the stratosphere that
protects the Earth’s surface from harmful ultraviolet radiation. The media chronicled the polar
expeditions, number crunching and warnings o f scientists that a growing hole in the sky
threatened to spread skin cancer and destroy the food chain. And it documented the social and
political response: environmental protests, tales o f blinded livestock in South America, industry
resistance , Washington infighting, and, ultimately, the emergence o f the Montreal Protocol treaty.
This landmark pact limited, then banned the production o f ozone destroying substances
worldwide (UNEP 2000). Despite scientific uncertainly, the United States recognized the
seriousness of the ozone problem and generated the political will to forge a global solution.
Quoted by The Associated Press, meteorologist Peter Usher o f the United Nations Environment
Program explained the stakes: “Without this treaty, we were on a crash course for disaster. Life
on Earth was at risk within a century” (Bradley 1987). Industry on both sides o f the Atlantic has
since produced economically viable substitutes to replace CFCs and has successfully marketed
them. Indeed, the Montreal Protocol, which underwent a series o f revisions to toughen its
restrictions, seems to be having a positive effect on the atmosphere (Revkin 2003; UNEP 2005).
The story o f climate change is remarkably similar - to a point. It too, begins with
growing warnings from scientists about another human-made threat - the buildup o f fossil fuel
emissions in the atmosphere which trap heat from the sun. This problem comes with its own set

2
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o f frightening potential consequences for the planet: melting glaciers, rising sea levels, violent
shifts in weather and possibly even a sudden ice age (IPCC Group 12001; IPCC Group II 2001;
Capozza 2002; Broecker 1997). The story also includes a concerted resistance led by the oil and
automotive industries, their political backers, and scientists wary o f the economic consequences
for limiting fossil fuel consumption. But inspired by the successful response to the ozone crisis,
world leaders used the convention/protocol process that led to Montreal as a guide to develop a
treaty to address the climate change problem. Ten years after the Montreal Protocol,
representatives from 150 nations including the United States, signed a pact in Kyoto, Japan to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (United Nations 1997). But here is where the two tales diverge.
As o f this dissertation’s publication, the U.S. has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and is
unlikely to do so in face o f persistent domestic opposition (Cushman 1998; Heilprin 2004)
grounded in arguments that the treaty does not include the growing nations o f China and India,
the science it is based on is too uncertain, and the emissions cuts would cause too much pain to
the U.S. economy. It is a complicated environmental problem and a complicated treaty. But these
and other concerns were overcome overseas and the protocol went into effect without the United
States when Russia ratified it in November, 2004.
The gulf o f difference between the ozone policy success and efforts to win U.S.
ratification of Kyoto treaty has not been lost on the American news media. Three national
environmental news reporters interviewed for this dissertation emphasized the intractability o f the
younger policy effort. “On climate change, climate change asks you to totally rethink your entire,
almost your entire energy structure, which has much broader implications, much broader costs,
much broader upheaval o f what’s going on,” said Josef Hebert, a veteran environmental and
Congressional reporter for The Associated Press. “So I think that when you say that ‘Why was
one [policy] successful and one’s still struggling?’ to a certain extent that’s because climate is a
much more difficult issue to tackle than dealing with the ozone.”

3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Media’s Role

Media scholars and key participants in both the ozone and climate change regimes agree
that the news media has played a central role in presenting these twin issues to the public, but
they give mixed reviews on its performance (Benedick 1998; McComas and Shanahan 1999;
Stamm, Clark, and Eblacas 2000; Ungar 2000; Zehr 2000). “The media is absolutely a critical
component o f the debate for several reasons,” Robert Watson, chief scientist for the World Bank
and former chairman o f the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said in an
interview for this dissertation. “If we live in a democracy - which I would argue we do in the US
- then public opinion is absolutely critical for policy formation by government. It’s also critical as
a message to the private sector as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in the products
they produce. The media played a really important role to be able to take the information we
gained such as the Antarctic ozone hole and spread it across America. They got the message out
that we were decreasing ozone and it would lead to skin cancer or potentially lead to skin cancer.”
However, on climate change, Watson said “the media is almost silen t... compared to the media
in Europe.” He added that the American news media has confused the public about the issue by
giving almost equal play to skeptics o f climate change as scientists in the mainstream majority
who say the problem is real and growing. On climate change in particular, the news media has
come in for a wide range o f criticism. Echoing Watson’s argument, a recent analysis of news
reports on climate change claims the media’s traditional quest for balance has biased its coverage
against mainstream science, particularly the efforts o f the IPCC (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004).
Layzer notes that climate change skeptics took advantage o f this “balance” norm to boost their
impact (2002). Other studies suggest the news media focused too heavily on science. In separate
articles on climate news coverage, Wilkins and Zehr conclude that the news media covered
scientists to the exclusion o f lay views, diminishing the role the public could potentially play in a
solution (Zehr 2000; Wilkins 1993). By contrast, some climate skeptics charge that the news
4
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media was complicit with environmental groups in stirring up public fear about climate change
with “apocalyptic” messages “to sell newspapers and television time” (Layzer 2002, 221).
McComas and Shanahan report that early news coverage o f climate change effectively cried w olf
by overplaying potentially dire consequences that never materialized (McComas and Shanahan
1999). Ungar notes that fundamentally different characterizations o f the ozone and climate
change problems have led the public to fear the former and basically ignore the latter (Ungar
2000). A critique o f the content analysis methodology employed by these studies can be found in
the Methods chapter.
What is certain is the importance o f the media’s role in informing the public about these
twin global environmental problems. Less understood is what role, if any, the U.S%news reports
played in their starkly different outcomes in America. This is a critical question, again, because
agenda setting research has demonstrated that what is written in the newspapers shapes public
opinion and also policy making. But before the answer can be grasped, a systematic apples-toapples comparison of news coverage o f both policies is required. This dissertation sets out to
perform that comparison by examining a sample o f more than

1 ,0 0 0

articles written about the

ozone hole and climate change during the past quarter century by The New York Times, The
Associated Press and United Press International. The task is aided by an original content analysis
categorical system developed for the study and used by human coders. The results are placed in
context by interviews conducted by the author with key stakeholders in both problems, and an
analysis o f scholarly literature on the cases. The results are scrutinized and reported with the help
o f the powerful policy sciences analytic framework geared to make sense o f complex policy
problems (Clark 2002; Brewer and deLeon 1983; Lasswell 1971). Two overall research questions
drive the study: How have the sources, structure and content o f arguments carried by mainstream
American print media about the ozone hole and climate change evolved from 1980 to 2004?
What do the trends in social and decision process emerging from this analysis reveal about the

5
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relative success o f the Montreal Protocol in the United States versus the failure o f the Kyoto
Protocol?
The remainder o f this chapter is split into three sections. The first, Historical, scientific
and political context, discusses the evolution o f science and policy o f the ozone hole and climate
change problems and explores some o f the literature comparing the two cases. The second,
Theoretical Frameworks, explains this study’s research approach and the literature that supports
it and then explores - in two sub sections - literature on a wide range o f competing economic and
environmental philosophies for conceptualizing and addressing environmental problems. The
third section, Research Products and Questions explains what products will come o f the study
and lists the many questions that will help derive them.

Historical. Scientific and Political Context

Before evaluating the news media’s coverage o f ozone depletion and climate change, it is
necessary to understand some basics o f the science that underlies both problems (including a little
atmospheric chemistry and earth system science), the political processes that evolved to grapple
with them, and their relative strengths and weaknesses in the eyes of scholars that study them.
This section is intended to cover these areas, giving readers a general frame o f reference for the
further exploration o f these issues in the chapters ahead. The summaries o f ozone and climate
change science to follow draw on several texts and papers, but especially the work o f Kump and
colleagues, whose book, The Earth System, served as an excellent, accessible reference to the
scientific fundamentals o f both cases. To place this work in context, this section opens first with a
brief history o f human impacts on the environment.

6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Humans and Environmental Change

Humans have affected the environment around them in significant ways for millennia
(Steen 1999). Researchers suspect a combination o f overexploitation o f water, the exhaustion o f
soil organic matter and salinization from irrigation, caused the decline o f ancient Jericho (8000
BC). Equipped with new tools made o f copper, bronze and iron, the Babylonians, Assyrians,
Greeks and Romans “devastated forests through heavy grazing, wood collection for copper and
iron manufacturing and ship building, as well as through burning for land reclamation, hunting,
war and sheer carelessness” (Steen 1999,368). In many cases, resource exploitation has hastened
the decline or outright demise o f entire societies, most famously the population o f Easter Island
which denuded its forests and with it its wildlife and crop yields in what biologist Jared Diamond
described as “as close as we can get to a ‘pure’ ecological collapse” (2005, 20). Diamond also
includes in his analysis the Maya, who succumbed to a combination o f environmental damage,
population growth and climate change, and the Greenland Norse who failed to adjust their
lifestyle to a changing climate. The point o f these examples is to underscore that throughout
history, societies’ environmental resource management choices have had real consequences for
their survival. In a chapter on o f the globalization o f environmental problems, Held and
colleagues note that before European modernity, plagues and ice ages were essentially the only
causes o f global environmental change (1999). They report the pace o f environmental
degradation picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with colonial agriculture and
intensive hunting in Asia and the Americas to meet European demand, which led to some species
extinctions. “Nonetheless, despite these loops o f cause and effect between continents and
economies, most environmental degradation was caused locally, impacted locally” (1999, 391).
The Industrial Revolution raised the intensity of environmental damage within nations. But it was
not until the middle o f the last century that environmental impacts o f human activity began to

7
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take on truly global dimensions. Held et. al. report that this emerged with the marriage o f Western
capitalism and Southern industrialization (1999, 391):

When these forces were combined with the immense transformative power and ecological
risks inherent in many modem technologies - new chemicals, industries, mass transport
systems dependent on fossil fuels, nuclear technologies - environmental degradation acquired
a decisively global form. No historic parallel exists for the contemporary levels o f
transboundary pollution, environmental commons problems and resource squeezes. Nor
unsurprisingly, is there any significant historical comparator for today’s environmental
movements, treaties and international agencies.

Arguably, stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are exhibits A and B in the
categories o f unprecedented global pollution and policy efforts to address it.

Stratospheric Ozone Depletion

The Scientific Basis. In the upper layer o f the stratosphere, which stretches from 10 to 50
kilometers

(6

to 30 miles) above the earth’s surface, an unstable form o f oxygen called ozone is

perpetually destroyed and recreated in a process that scientists believe played a critical role in the
evolution o f advanced forms o f life on Earth and continues to preserve it today (Kump, Kasting,
and Crane 1999). Ozone ( 0 3) - comprised o f a stable molecule o f oxygen ( 0 2) bonded loosely to
a third oxygen atom - shields the planet surface from three forms o f ultraviolet (UV) radiation
that range from relatively harmless to lethal. It absorbs UV radiation with wavelengths ranging
from 200 to 400 nanometers (nm). These include UVA (320-400 nm, which causes tanning of
human skin), UVB (290-320 nm, which causes sunburn and skin cancer), and UVC (200-290 nm,
an extremely harmful range, absorbed almost entirely by ozone) (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999,
8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

279). The basic photo-chemical process by which ozone is created and destroyed is represented in
the four-step Chapman mechanism, represented in the Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. The Chapman Cycle

1. 0 2 + UV photon -^ O + O
2. O + 0 2 + M -» 0 3 + M
3. 0 3 + photon -> 0 2 + O
4. O + 0

3

-> 2 0 2

(Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999,283).

Lines 1 and 2 depict the creation o f ozone. In line one, two single oxygen atoms are set loose
when a stable oxygen molecule is split by a UV photon in a process called photolysis. Next, in
line two, a single oxygen atom attaches to an oxygen molecule with the help o f another molecule
- an extra oxygen or nitrogen molecule, for example —which is needed to carry o ff the excess
energy o f the collision between the O and O2 molecules, enabling them to adhere. Lines 3 and 4
show two ways ozone can be destroyed: first by photolysis, which, again, is the UV absorption
that protects the planet surface, and second by joining with a loose oxygen atom to create two
stable oxygen molecules.
In addition, nitric oxide (NO), chlorine (Cl), and bromine (Br) - from both natural and
man-made sources - can catalyze the destruction o f stratospheric ozone. These radicals play a
critical role in the formation o f the ozone hole. Their role in that will be discussed after a brief
explanation o f their basic function. Figure 2 below shows how chlorine and nitric oxide catalyze
ozone destruction.

9
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Figure 2. The Chlorine and Nitrogen Catalytic Cycles

->cio +o2
CIO + O -> Cl + o2
CI + O 3

NO + 0 3

N 02+ 0 2

N 0 2 + O -» NO+ 0 2

(Fellenberg 2000, 64; Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999,285)

Nitrogen makes its way to the stratosphere as nitrous oxide (N 0 2), a byproduct of bacterial
dentrification on land and in the ocean, which can be enhanced by fertilizers. It can be injected
directly into the stratosphere as a byproduct o f combustion from supersonic jet airplanes.
Chlorine is introduced naturally into the stratosphere by the compounds methyl chloride (CH 3C1),
from ocean plankton, and hydrogen chloride (HC1), from volcanoes. But the greatest source o f
stratospheric chlorine today is from man-made chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) - also called freons —
used as coolants in refrigerators and air conditioners. Freon-11, or F-l 1 (CC13F2) and Freon-12, F12, (CC12F2) are the most common (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999,286; Fellenberg 2000, 35).
Separately, bromine is released from naturally-occurring methyl chloride (CH3Br), which
is also used as a commercial soil fumigant. Bromine also diffuses into the stratosphere in manmade chemical compounds called halons, used in fire extinguishers. The most common forms are
halon 1211 (CF2 ClBr) and halon 1301 (CF3Br) (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999,288). The
nitrogen, chlorine and bromine ozone-destroying cycles are regulated by reactions that also
remove them from the stratosphere. For example, N 0 2 reacts with a hydroxyl radical (HO) to
form nitric acid (H N 03) which drifts downward and is rained out o f the atmosphere. Chlorine can

10
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react with methane (CH4 ) to create HC1, which also drifts downward and washes out Bromine is
rained out as hydrogen bromide (HBr) (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999).
The potential danger posed to stratospheric ozone by man-made compounds was reported
first in 1974 in two key scientific studies. Mario Molina and Sherwood Rowland at the University
o f California, Irvine, hypothesized that CFCs rose into the stratosphere and released large
quantities o f chlorine when broken down by solar radiation (Molina and Rowland 1974). Also
that year Stolarski and Cicerone of University o f Michigan described in a paper how chlorine
from rocket exhausts could catalyze the destruction o f stratospheric ozone in the stratosphere over
decades (Cicerone, Stolarski, and Walters 1974). The discovery o f the ozone hole was first
reported in 1985. That year scientist Joseph Farman and colleagues from the British Antarctic
Survey published a study o f measurements taken since 1957 o f ozone above their Hailey Bay
station in Antarctica (Farman, Gardiner, and Shanklin 1985) that showed that starting in 1976 the
stratospheric ozone layer had begun thinning and fraying each October and then healed (Kump,
Kasting, and Crane 1999). Studies show that by 1985 the “ozone hole” had grown bigger than the
United States. And it was getting worse. Average stratospheric ozone concentrations, measured in
Dobson units (DU) - equivalent to a 0.0001-cm-thick layer o f pure ozone at the surface dropped by about half between 1957 and 1991 from the neighborhood o f 325 DU to around 150
DU (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). The 1985 study came as shock to the scientific community
and world leaders already considering a plan to cut back on CFC use. Wrote Benedick, the United
States’ chief negotiator in the Montreal Protocol process:

This unexpected revelation was quickly confirmed by Japanese and U.S. scientists rechecking
their own data sets. Interestingly, it was discovered that U.S. measuring satellites had not
previously signaled the critical trend because their computer had been programmed
automatically to reject ozone losses o f this magnitude as anomalies far beyond the error range
o f existing predictive models (Benedick 1998, 19).
11
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Figuring out how the ozone hole formed was a daunting task because scientists needed to take
into account a huge number o f dynamic variables including temperature and weather patterns,
solar forcing, budgets o f myriad chemical compounds present in the atmosphere and the
innumerable ways they could interact in the sky. The ozone hole appears in the polar spring, in
September, when the sun begins to shine on Antarctica, and lasts through October. Scientists had
established that CFCs have a long atmospheric lifetime (60 years for F-l 1 and 130 for F-12) and
were able to measure their atmospheric concentrations using electron capture detectors coupled
with gas chromatographs (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). Many suspected that chlorine from
CFCs broken down by solar radiation, were to blame for the hole. But other theories persisted credible and otherwise - attributing the ozone hole to weather patterns, volcanic activity, sunspots
and even “snowballs from space” (Siegel 1987; Benedick 1998). Intensive, internationally-funded
research provided more breakthroughs. Writes Kump and colleagues (Kump, Kasting, and Crane
1999,9):

The definitive evidence was provided in 1987 when a NASA research plane flew directly into
the hole. One o f the plane’s instruments measured chlorine monoxide, CIO, which was
thought to be a main culprit in ozone destruction; another instrument measured ozone.
Outside the hole, ozone concentrations were at their normal stratospheric level and CIO
concentrations were very low. Inside the hole, ozone values were more than a factor o f two
lower, and CIO values were about 15 times higher, than the respective values outside the hole.

Subsequent research established that a seasonal circumpolar vortex - essentially giant whirlpool
o f wind that isolates much o f the air above Antarctica - and previously unknown polar
stratospheric clouds, conspire to respectively trap the chlorine compounds and serve as a platform
for chemical reactions that unleash ozone-eating reactive chlorine when the sun’s energy hits the
12
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continent in the spring. These polar stratospheric clouds enable heterogeneous reactions (those
that occur on solid surfaces, as opposed to gas-phase reactions) that break chlorine down from
more stable to more reactive forms. Kump and colleagues cite the following cloud-surface
reaction, represented in Figure 3, as important:

Figure 3. Polar stratospheric cloud surface reaction

1. C 10N 0 2 + HC1 -» Cl 2 + H N 0 3
2. Cl2 + photon -> Cl + Cl

(Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999, 289)

In line 1, chlorine nitrate, which is not reactive with ozone in the atmosphere, is converted on the
cloud surface to a chlorine molecule and nitric acid. Chlorine nitrate is the product o f a reaction
between nitrous oxide (NO 2 ) and chlorine monoxide (CIO) that under normal conditions in the
stratosphere keeps chlorine concentrations in check. The chlorine molecule created on the cloud
(line 1) sits high in the Antarctic darkness until the sun hits it, shown in line 2, and it splits it into
two reactive ozone-destroying atoms. When the polar vortex breaks down at the end o f October,
new nitrogen and ozone flow back in and the hole is repaired.
Finally, to the further alarm o f scientists and policymakers, satellite measurements
revealed decreases in midlatitude stratospheric ozone o f about 4 percent per decade between 1979
and 1991. This was determined after ruling out sources o f natural variability, including sunspot
activity and volcanic eruptions, which can influence ozone production (Kump, Kasting, and
Crane 1999).

13
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Ozone Policy Evolution. Painstakingly, scientists discerned the physical and chemical
mechanisms that formed the hole in the Antarctic summer, confirmed the responsibility o f manmade compounds for the problem, and charted the drop in stratospheric ozone at mid-latitudes. In
both the ozone and climate cases, international scientific, environmental and government
organizations, as well as individual national governments, each played roles in the process o f
drawing attention to the problems and drumming up political support to confront them on a global
scale. The policy debate over stratospheric ozone began in earnest in 1974, the year o f alarming
findings published in the Molina and Cicerone papers. The international chemical industry wasted
no time and “quickly mobilized their own research and public relations efforts to cast doubt on
the theory” that CFCs could harm the ozone layer (Benedick 1998, 12). Breitmeier (1997, 101),
summarizes the U.S. role in the ensuing two years:

The United States very early politicized ozone depletion internationally. By 1975 it had
already experienced a lively domestic CFC debate, and a consumer boycott had led to a
temporary decrease in sales o f CFC products. A 1976 NAS (National Academy o f Sciences)
report supported the CFC hypothesis and in 1977 the Environmental Protection Agency
announced a ban on “nonessential uses” o f CFCs in spray cans.

In 1977, the U.S. and United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) convened an
international science meeting in Washington on ozone depletion that produced the World Action
Plan on the Ozone layer, essentially an agenda for further research. The UNEP quickly
established a Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer, which issued annual scientific reports,
laying crucial groundwork for future policymaking based on the latest available science. In 1981,
the UNEP created a body called the Ad-Hoc Working Group o f Legal and Technical Experts to
negotiate a framework convention on research monitoring and data exchange which became the
1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection o f the Ozone Layer (Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001) 14
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the framework agreement for what would soon produce a binding protocol for reducing CFC
emissions. The convention, which was signed by 20 countries and the European Community,
called on member nations take “appropriate measures ... to protect human health and the
environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which
modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer” (UNEP 1985, Article 2, Section 1) but did not
define them (Benedick 1998). Nonetheless, writes Benedick (1998, 45), “The Vienna Convention
was itself a considerable accomplishment. It represented the first effort o f the international
community formally to deal with an environmental danger before it erupted.”
In the two-year run-up to the Montreal Protocol, the U.S. and UNEP pushed the case for
strong international controls on CFCs, sponsoring large scientific expeditions to study the
Antarctic ozone hole and organizing educational workshops (Breitmeier 1997). U.S. negotiators,
who had unsuccessfully pressed for cuts in CFC emissions, rejected a European Community
counterproposal for a production cap as insufficient (Breitmeier 1997). The U.S. teamed up with
an existing coalition o f nations called the Toronto Group —including Canada, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland - which sought global CFC cuts and a ban on its use in nonessential spray cans
(Wettestad 2002). On the other side, resisting control efforts, were European nations including
the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain - all large produces o f CFCs. This led to bitter
disputes with other EC members as they tried to stake out a unified negotiating position
(Benedick 1998). But the U.S. and UNEP kept up an intense lobbying effort, coordinating the
work o f diplomats, scientists and environmental organizations. A key development clearing the
way for cuts in CFCs came with the collapse o f the CFC industry’s “transatlantic united front”
when a collation o f 500 U.S. CFC producing and using companies, the Alliance for Responsible
CFC Policy, “unexpectedly issued a policy statement supporting international regulation o f
CFCs” (Benedick 1998, 32). In October, 1986, DuPont announced its support for global control
measures, in a move “hailed by Natural Resources Defense Council, as ‘the biggest
breakthrough’ since the U.S. ban on use o f the chemicals as aerosol propellants in 1978” (Darst
15
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1986). Breitmeier writes that after DuPont’s statement “it became clear to other multinational
companies that the global CFC market would change and that the ability to produce substitutes
was necessary to maintain market shares” (1997). Wettestad notes that as alternative gases had
been identified for CFCs, the development o f substitutes “was largely a question o f the right
market incentives” (Wettestad 2002, 156). As the year wound down, both houses o f Congress
endorsed a call for tough international controls and bills were introduced for further unilateral
domestic CFC restrictions barring a global solution (Benedick 1998). Moreover, public concern
grew in wake o f a November EPA report warning the ozone hole could lead to 40 million cases o f
skin cancer in the United States - 800,000 o f them fatal - over the next

88

years (Mansnerus and

Roberts 1986).
After difficult negotiations, and an eleventh hour attempt by officials in the Reagan
administration to weaken the U.S. negotiation stance, the Montreal Protocol was signed by 24
nations and the Commission o f European Communities (Benedick 1998). The protocol called for
a freeze in CFC production at 1986 levels by 1989, a 20 percent cut in production by 1993 and a
50 percent reduction by 1998. In addition, it called for a freeze on halon production by 1992
(UNEP 1987). The combination of the convention and the protocol has created a politicallyflexible organizational structure that enabled the agreement to evolve with the scientific findings
about the atmosphere. It looks like this: The Conference o f the Parties (COP) o f the Vienna
Convention meets every three years with Ozone Research Managers, a group o f scientific experts
that review the latest available science and monitoring data and produce reports to the COP.
Before 1993, these groups met every two years. The Montreal Protocol established three expert
panels to meet a year before each scientific report is given. These include a Scientific Assessment
Panel, a Technology and Economics Assessment Panel and an Environmental Effects Panel.
Parties to the Montreal Protocol meet once a year at a Meeting o f the Parties (MOP). The
secretarial functions are handled by the Ozone Secretariat based at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi,

16
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Kenya. A Multilateral Fund, created in 1990 to support CFC phaseouts in developing nations, is
based in Montreal (Wettestad 2002).
Proof for the protocol’s structural effectiveness and flexibility can be found in its
evolution (Reisinger 2002; Benedick 1998). Under the continued stewardship o f motivated
political and scientific leaders, the protocol has enabled its members to respond to increasingly
dire scientific findings on the ozone hole with more comprehensive cuts on CFCs, new
restrictions on other chemicals, the inclusion o f targets for developing nations, the establishment
o f the Multilateral Fund, and the steadily growing number o f nations ratifying the protocol and its
amendments. The protocol’s first major adjustment began quickly after its adoption with the 1988
report o f the Ozone Trends Panel which established “beyond a reasonable doubt” the role o f
CFCs and halons in creating the ozone hole and showed that from 1969 to 1986 ozone had
dropped (1.7 to 3 percent) over heavily populated areas in higher northern latitudes (Benedick
1998, 110). The report prompted calls for further cuts, spurred DuPont to speed work on
substitutes and announce a phaseout CFCs (Goeller 1988), and led to a call by the EPA for
“complete global elimination o f both CFCs and halons, plus a freeze in use o f methyl chloroform,
a popular industrial solvent not previously recognized as a major source o f stratospheric
chlorine” (Benedick 1998, 111). The findings created momentum for the 1990 London
amendments, which called for a total ban on CFCs, halons and carbon tetrachloride by 2000 and
methyl chloroform by 2005. It also set up an Interim Multilateral Fund to help developing nations
cope with the regulations (Benedick 2001). Two major revisions followed in Copenhagen in 1992
and in Vienna in 1995, each prompted by research showing worsening conditions in the
stratosphere. The Copenhagen amendments made the Multilateral Fund permanent and moved up
phaseout o f halons to 1994 and CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform to 1996. The
Vienna amendments set delayed reduction schedules for developing nations and introduced a
2010

phaseout for the soil-sterilizing pesticide methyl bromide.

17
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As o f this writing, more than 188 nations have signed the Montreal Protocol. Most
recently, debate among the parties has focused on methyl bromide, with strong resistance from
the U.S. government and agribusiness to the 50 percent phaseout by 2005 prescribed by the
Vienna amendments. In February, 2003, the Bush administration requested exemptions for 54
companies and trade groups to use methyl bromide (Marquis 2003). In Congress, representatives
from California and Southern farm states introduced a bill that would authorize the EPA to grant
methyl bromide exemptions to industry even if the parties to the Montreal treaty rejected them
(Revkin 2003). After an initial rejection by European Union and developing nation negotiators,
the U.S. won exemptions to the 50 percent cut at the 2004 MOP in Prague (Barbassa 2004).

Table 1. Stratospheric Ozone Case Event Timeline

Year

Stratospheric Ozone Event

1974

Two key scientific studies report danger posed to stratospheric ozone by man-made
compounds (Cicerone, Stolarski, and Walters 1974; Molina and Rowland 1974).

1977

Stratospheric ozone amendment to the U.S. Clean Air Act passed in response to public
concern about ozone layer, enabling the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate
substances that could harm the ozone layer. Separately, the United States hosts first
intergovernmental meeting to address global regulation o f CFCs (Benedick 1998).

1978

EPA, under Toxic Substances Control Act, “prohibits use o f aerosol propellants in
nonessential applications” (Benedick 1998, 24).

1982

United Nations Environmental Program organizes scientific and legal experts to prepare
a global framework to protect the ozone layer.

1985

British scientists report discovery o f seasonal “ozone hole” over Antarctica (Farman,
Gardiner, and Shanklin 1985). Also, the Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the
Ozone Layer is adopted by 20 nations and the European Community Commission.
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Year

Stratospheric Ozone Event

Table 1 Cont.

1986

Environmental Protection Agency warns that ozone depletion could lead to 40 million
cases o f skin cancer in U.S. over the next 88 years, 800,000 o f them fatal (Mansnerus
and Roberts 1986). Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy issues a policy statement
supporting international regulation o f CFCs (Benedick 1998).

1987

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is adopted. It calls
for a 50 percent reduction by 1998 in CFC production and freeze on halon production
by 1992.

1988

Ozone Trends Panel report proves CFCs and halons “implicated beyond a reasonable
doubt” in ozone hole and shows depleted ozone (1.7 to 3 percent) over heavily
populated areas higher latitudes (Benedick 1998, 110). The U.S. ratifies the Montreal
Protocol, which enters into force, January 1, 1989.

1990

London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol is negotiated at the second meeting o f the
parties to the Montreal Protocol. It calls for a total ban on CFCs, halons and carbon
tetrachloride by 2000 and methyl chloroform by 2005. It also set up an Interim
Multilateral Fund to help developing nations cope with the regulations (Benedick 2001).

1991

British Stratospheric Ozone Review Group reports mid-latitude stratospheric ozone loss
at 8 percent per decade. NASA says ozone over U.S. has dropped 4 to 5 percent since
1978 (Scientists Say Ozone Layer Significantly Depleted 1991)

1992

Copenhagen Amendment tightens the Montreal Protocol further, moving up phaseout o f
halons to 1994 and CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform to 1996.

1994

Halons phased out by developed countries (Benedick 2001).

1995

The Nobel Prize in chemistry is awarded to Americans Mario Molina and Sherwood
and Dutch citizen Paul Crutzen, for their pioneering research on stratospheric ozone
(Allen, 1995). Separately, the Vienna Amendments set delayed reduction schedules for
developing nations and introduce a 2010 phaseout o f methyl bromide.

1998

London-based environmental group, Environmental Investigation Agency, reports that a
sophisticated, illegal trade in ozone-depleting chemicals is flourishing between
developed and developing nations. Report is released before the 10th Meeting o f the
Parties in Cairo in November 1998 (Bryant 1998).

2004

At Prague conference, a dozen nations, including the U.S, “won continued exemptions
for use of methyl bromide, an ozone-depleting agricultural pesticide that was to have
been phased out this year” (Hanley 2004).
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Stratospheric Ozone Event

Year
2005

Table 1 Cont.

A UNEP report o f the Ozone Research Managers cites studies that show stratospheric
ozone levels improving and models predicting “recovery to 1980 levels” over
Antarctica by about 2065, over the Arctic by about 2040 and in extra-polar latitudes by
2050 (UNEP 2005, 3)

Global Climate Change

Scientific Basis. As complicated as the science behind stratospheric ozone destruction is,
the problem o f global warming, or climate change is arguably even more involved. As with ozone
destruction, there are many feedbacks and interactions, and scientists have struggled to accurately
discern the human fingerprint on climate. Climate change, often called global warming,
commonly refers to the excessive warming o f the planet caused when greenhouse gases released
from fossil fuel burning trap the sun’s heat energy. This process is a form o f solar forcing
considered above and beyond the natural levels of greenhouse warming that have sustained life
on the planet as we know it. Before delving into the evidence for human-caused climate change, it
is useful to review some basics about the planet’s climate system and the methods by which
researchers determine how atmospheric composition and climate have changed over geologic
time scales.
To understand atmospheric phenomena it is best to think o f the Earth as a system
including the atmosphere, the hydrosphere (oceans, rivers and lakes and ice), its biota (life forms),
and the solid Earth (comprising the planet’s core, mantle and crust). Studies o f one or more o f
these elements figure strongly in scientific reports on climate change and, by extension in news
coverage o f those reports and the larger climate policy debate. Thus, it is worth a brief review o f
their respective roles in the climate puzzle.
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The Earth’s atmosphere can be described as “the thin envelope o f gases that surrounds
Earth” (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). Its thickness relative to the planet is often compared to
the skin o f an apple. Without the atmosphere - which is comprised mostly o f nitrogen oxygen,
argon, water vapor and carbon dioxide - life would not exist as it does today. Water and C 0 2 are
greenhouse gases in our atmosphere along with methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, CFCs and many
other gases. These gases absorb outgoing infra-red radiation from the earth and reradiate it back
to the surface, raising the planet’s surface temperature 33°C higher than what it would without an
atmosphere (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999, 46). Life on land and in the oceans relies on the
temperature and the balance o f gases and water in the atmosphere for survival. As discussed
earlier, the atmosphere also includes ozone, which is a pollutant at ground level and an essential
blocker o f harmful ultra-violet radiation in the stratosphere.
Like the atmosphere, the oceans - a critical part o f the hydrosphere - circulate around the
planet, ultimately driven by energy from the sun. Ocean circulation contributes to the distribution
o f energy and nutrients around the world (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999, 5). Ice cover also
helps drive atmospheric and ocean circulation - especially the oceanic thermohaline circulation
(Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999, 250). The hydrosphere supports aquatic life including
microorganisms that affect the global carbon cycle. Lakes, rivers and streams on land provide
water essential for the survival o f many organisms, which in turn affect the water resources.
Humans, for example, are reducing fresh water on land through many activities including
irrigation, deforestation and wetland destruction (Sahagian 2000, 39).
Briefly, biota are plants, animals and microorganisms on land and in the water that
influence nutrient flows through aerobic and anaerobic respiration and photosynthesis. Biota
affect their surroundings both chemically and physically. Some scientists hypothesize that biota
collectively regulate the Earth system for their survival. Humans are altering the global system
through pollution on land, in the oceans and the atmosphere. Rivers like the Indus have been
overused and no longer reach the ocean (Turekian, 179). Finally, many Earth system studies
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concern themselves with the planet’s rocky 70-kilometer thick crust, which sits above an inner
core, outer core and mantle. Weathering o f rocks affects the chemistry o f the hydrosphere and
atmosphere, ocean vents affect ocean chemistry and temperature and volcanic eruptions impact
atmospheric composition and solar reflectancy (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999).
The Earth’s climate and weather is ultimately driven by solar forcing which varies over
the Earth’s surface on different time scales with the planet’s rotation, eccentricity, tilt and
precession. The sun’s energy is distributed around the globe through a dynamic processes
including the temperature- and density-driven ocean Thermohaline circulation system,
atmospheric winds influenced by the coriolis effect (such as trades and westerlies) and coupled
ocean-atmosphere phenomena (such as the Asian monsoon and the El Nino/La Nina cycle).
Without human intervention, the planet has experienced ice ages brought on by eccentricity
changes on 100,000 year time scales; obliquity changes on 41,000-year time scales; and precesses
with periodocities o f 19,000 and 23,000 years (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). In addition,
researchers have theorized that natural variations in solar intensity have led to temperature
variations on the scale o f a thousand years including hotter weather during the Medieval
Maximum and colder weather during the Little Ice Age (Eddy 1994). In addition, sulfate aerosols
from volcanic emissions can cool the Earth’s surface by reflecting incoming sunlight (Kump,
Kasting, and Crane 1999). Big objects from space, such as the meteorite blamed for killing o ff the
dinosaurs, can also reap havoc with the Earth’s climate. How do scientists know this? An
explanation here o f some o f the research methods is in order.
Climate researchers are able to infer conditions on Earth many years ago with the help of
data from ice cores and lake and ocean sediments that serve as proxy measurements for a variety
o f conditions including temperature, precipitation, windiness, plant growth, glacial extent and the
composition o f atmospheric gas. Among the most important types of data used are isotopes, gases
trapped in ice, deposits o f sea salt and terrestrial dust, and pollen grains. Oxygen isotopes, found
in the shells of tiny marine organisms, are indicators o f ocean temperature and can help reveal
22
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past ice ages. The colder the water is, the more likely oxygen’s heavy isotope lsO is to be
incorporated into the CaC03 in the shells o f these organisms (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999).
In addition, during times o f glaciation, the concentration o f lsO in the ocean increases because
this heavier isotope evaporates less readily. It rains out sooner than lighter 160 on the journey
toward the poles to become part o f the glacial ice sheet. For these two reasons CaC03
precipitated in oceans during glacial times is richer in 180 (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999).
Composition o f gas in air bubbles in ice can give researchers a picture o f the greenhouse
capacity o f the atmosphere at the time the air bubble was trapped. Low CO2 levels in the
atmosphere correlate with the glacial periods (Broecker 1987). Concentrations o f dust in the ice
also betray colder, windier climates. A combination o f low CO2 and high dust levels provide
evidence that the Earth was in a glacial time period. Separately, studies o f pollen found on land
allow researchers, who know the climate suitable for the plants it would produce, to infer weather
conditions at the time o f that pollens production (Broecker 1987). These and other methods open
a window on the past for climatologists. There is often much debate over the interpretation of
these fossil records and frequent calls in the scientific literature for more data.
While there is a well documented history o f natural climate change that would by itself
pose a threat to humanity, scientists worry that human interference with the climate system poses
a more immediate threat that might not otherwise have existed. This concern began with a paper
published in 1957 by Revelle and Seuss that claimed greenhouse gases released from fossil fuel
burning were not being absorbed naturally by the ocean (Vig and Axelrod 1999). Instead, they
warned, “Human beings are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment o f a kind that
could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future” (Revelle and Seuss 1957,
Cited in Molitor 218). Two years earlier, a geochemist at the Scripps Institute o f Oceanography,
Charles Keeling, had constructed an instrument to monitor concentrations o f CO2 in the
atmosphere. Evidence for the buildup o f greenhouse gases foreseen by Revelle and Seuss has
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since unfolded in two classic climate records: the “Keeling curve” record o f direct measurement
o f atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations atop Mauna Loa in Hawaii, and a 240,000-year
record o f carbon dioxide, methane and temperature measurements from the Vostok ice core in
Antarctica. The records reveal that the atmospheric concentration o f carbon dioxide has jumped
nearly 30 percent during the past two centuries, reaching levels not seen in the fossil record for
hundreds o f millennia (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). The ice core records show temperatures
increasing almost in lockstep with carbon dioxide, which raised a disconcerting question about
where global temperatures are heading in response to unprecedented burning o f fossil fuels
The fPCC - the body o f experts formed in 1988 by the United Nations and the World
Meteorological Organization to study the science of climate change - reports most recently that
the atmospheric concentrations o f three important greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane
and nitrous oxide - have risen 31%, 150% and 16% respectively since 1750. Over that time,
carbon dioxide concentrations have risen by 80 parts per million (ppm) from 280 ppm to 360 ppm
(IPCC 2001). According to ice core data, rapid rises in C 0 2 concentrations have occurred
naturally in the past (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999). But the present level has not been
exceeded during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20 million years (EPCC
Group 1 2001 p. 7). Finally, a study o f the observed decrease in atmospheric oxygen reveals that
“the observed increase in C 0 2 is predominantly due to the oxidation o f organic carbon by fossil
fuel combustion and deforestation.” (IPCC Group 12001, 39) The IPCC’s latest scientific
assessment sums up the findings in the following critical statement (EPCC Group 12001):

“There is newer and stronger evidence that most o f the warming observed over the last 50
years is attributable to human activities ... In light o f new evidence and taking into account
the remaining uncertainties, most o f the observed warming has contributed significantly to
observed sea level rise through thermal expansion and widespread loss o f land ice.”
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As with stratospheric ozone research, climate researchers attempt not only to make sense
o f what data tell them about the past and present but also use it to predict the future, often under
different emissions and development scenarios. Computer models called General Circulation
Models (GCMs) are used for this purpose. They include data for upwards o f 50,000 points o f
longitude and latitude and many layers o f the atmosphere on a virtual globe. Write Kump and
colleagues (1999,265), “At each o f these points the model must keep track o f a number of
different variables, including temperature, pressure, humidity and horizontal wind speed. A GCM
also needs to account for the absorption and reflection o f solar radiation by gases and by clouds
and for the transfer o f heat and water vapor between the atmosphere and the surface.”
Importantly, climate models have demonstrated that when natural variation is factored in,
observed temperature changes are consistent with the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases.
Over the 20th century, global temperatures have risen .6 °C + .2 (1.08 °F ± .36) (IPCC Group I
2001 p. 13). Further, the IPCC projects in its 2001 report that by 2100 global mean temperatures
could rise from 1.4°C and 5.8°C (2.52 °F and 10.4 °F) between 1990 to 2100 (IPCC Group 12001,
13). Sea level could rise between .09 and .88 meters (3.5 inches and 2.9 feet) (IPCC Group I
2001, 16). The wide range o f these predictions underscores the uncertainty o f predicting climate
change. Nonetheless, studies have made the following observations, deemed “likely” or “very
likely” to be symptoms o f global warming that will become more pronounced in the future:

1. Higher maximum temps and more hot days over nearly all land areas
2. Higher minimum temperatures, fewer cold days over nearly all land areas
3. Increase o f heat index over land areas
4. More intense precipitation events
5.

Shrinking glaciers

6. Thawing permafrost
25
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7. Later freezing and earlier breakup o f ice on rivers and lakes
8 . Lengthening o f mid and high latitude growing seasons
9.

Poleward and altitudinal shifts o f plant and animal ranges

10. Declines o f some plant and animal populations
11. Earlier flowering of trees
(IPCC Group I 2001 pp. 15, 576; IPCC Group II 2001, 3)

As o f this writing, the debate among scientists and policymakers has moved significantly
from whether humans are causing climate change to how to best humans can change their
behavior to address the problem and how bad the problem is likely to be. A January, 2006,
Washington Post article puts the debate in sharper terms: “Now that most scientists agree that
human activity is causing the earth to warm, the central debate has shifted to whether climate
change is progressing so rapidly that, within decades, humans may be helpless to slow or reverse
the trend” (Eilperin 2006). One o f the more disturbing prospects, which has gained attention in
scientific and political circles, is the potential for a shutdown o f the global ocean circulation
system - the thermohaline conveyor belt - which could lead to an abrupt climate changes on the
order o f decades instead o f millennia. While greatly exaggerated by a Hollywood climate disaster
movie (Revkin 2004), the research into the phenomenon is quite serious. Dr. Wallace Broecker, a
professor o f geochemistry at Columbia University and pioneer in paleoclimatology, has been
warning for more than 15 years about the possibility o f abrupt climate change as a result o f
shutting down thermohaline circulation. Recent studies give reason for concern, finding 1) the
flow of water from the Nordic seas into the North Atlantic has slowed by at least 20 percent over
the past 50 years and 2) the water is also getting warmer and less saline - both consistent with
greenhouse gas warming and a weakened thermohaline circulation (Hansen 2001). Broecker has
pointed to evidence in the geological record:
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“Geologic studies suggest the Earth’s climate system resists change until pushed beyond
some threshold; then it leaps into a new mode o f operation ... The implication o f this finding
for future climates in clear: The effects o f the greenhouse gas buildup may come in sudden
jumps, rather than gradually.” (Broecker 1987 p. 75)

Broecker reports in several papers that thermohaline circulation has shut down and
started back up again many times in the past - without human greenhouse gas forcing - causing
rapid cooling and warming across the globe. Oxygen isotope and pollen records reveal a cooling
period that gripped the Earth 11,000 years ago called the Younger Dryas. Writes Broecker,
“Suddenly in as little as 100 years, Northern Europe and northeastern North America reverted to
glacial conditions ... About 1,000 years later, this cold spell ended abruptly - in as little as 20
years.” (Broecker and Denton 1990 p. 55) Broecker cites as evidence measurements o f cadmium
ion, a surrogate for the temperature revealing measure o f calcium in the calcium carbonate o f
foraminifera. Simultaneously, pollen records show that at the onset o f the Younger Dryas forests
in Scandinavia and on the British Isles were replaced by Arctic grasses and shrubs (Broecker and
Denton 1990) A report by the National Research Council released late 2001 sounded the same
alarm, warning that human alterations o f the climate system might expose the planet to “large,
abrupt and unwelcome” climactic events. Commenting on the report for the Boston Globe, Dr.
Cameron Wake o f the University o f New Hampshire painted a picture o f the kind o f world abrupt
climate change could bring us: “Every day could have been a lot like the top o f Mt. Washington
on the coldest, windiest day o f the year” (Thomson 2001).

Policy Evolution. Many scholars agree that the stratospheric ozone policy regime
provided an example for how to approach the climate change problem (Breitmeier 1997;
Benedick 1998; Molitor 1999; Layzer 2002). It makes sense also that many o f the same
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individuals and organizations - including the WMO and UNEP - helped coordinate global
research programs and shepherd negotiations for both issues. But the United States has played an
inconsistent role in the climate change policy process. As with ozone, the U.S. government
supported much o f the scientific research that established climate change as a serious problem,
prompting calls from many nations for a global solution. But, with a few exceptions, the U.S. has
acted to oppose mandatory global curbs on greenhouse emissions and has shunned the leadership
role it played at the outset o f the ozone policy regime (Sprinz and Weiss 2001; Paarlberg 1999;
Breitmeier 1997; Layzer 2002). Writes Breitmeier, (1997, 102) unlike the ozone case, “the
United States was quite reluctant to agree that climate change should be considered an important
issue on the global environmental agenda. In this case, a coalition o f European countries, the
Alliance o f Small Islands States, and some developing countries politicized the issue despite
strong resistance from the United States.”
The most often cited reasons for U.S. reluctance are domestic concerns about the
economic bottom line and the political consequences o f taxing fuel. Put simply by Sprinz (2001,
78), “... U.S. policy is conditioned by the perception that economic costs are exorbitant” - too
great, that is, to generate and sustain political will in the United States to back mandatory
greenhouse gas cuts in the Kyoto Protocol. Perhaps at no time was it more clear than just months
before the protocol’s adoption in 1997, when the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 on a resolution declaring
that the it would not ratify any treaty that harms U.S. economy or does not entail meaningful
participation by major developing countries (Sprinz 2001; Molitor 1999). This dealt a fatal blow
to efforts by the Clinton administration to commit the United States to cuts. In an analysis o f the
intersection o f U.S. domestic policy and climate change Sprinz (2001, 79) concludes that the
United States has been “undoubtedly a strong dragger” on climate negotiations. In a similar casestudy analysis, Layzer (Layzer 2002, 231) concludes:
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Domestic opposition has hampered efforts to build the support that American leaders need to
pursue climate change policies. Opposing greenhouse gas reductions is a potent coalition o f
fossil fuel and fuel-dependent industries that have both deep pockets and strong, longstanding
ties to elected officials. This coalition has lobbied intensely to ensure that members o f
Congress are aware of their position. They have also undertaken a costly public relations
battle in which they wield a potent threat: economic collapse.

This political context, which this study explores in greater detail ahead, colors U.S. involvement
throughout the history o f the climate change policy regime, starting with Revelle and Seuss’s
1957 conception o f greenhouse gas emissions as “large-scale geophysical experiment” (Revelle
and Seuss 1957, Cited in Molitor 218).
Their work prompted further research, including studies by the National Academy o f
Sciences in the United States and the WMO, which created an Ad-Hoc Panel o f Experts on
Climate Change and in 1979 held the first World Climate Conference in Geneva. That conference
concluded with a cautious statement that it “appears plausible” that carbon dioxide emissions
“could contribute to a gradual warming o f the lower atmosphere” (Layzer 2002, 212). Scientific
and political concern grew in the 1980s. In 1983, two extensive reports on climate change, one
from the EPA entitled “Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?” and another from the National
Academy o f Sciences attracted a surge o f news media attention in the United States. A United
Press International reporter described EPA’s report as “the government's first warning o f dire
consequences from a global temperature rise caused by the burning o f fossil fuels an increase in
carbon dioxide levels” (Sangeorge 1983). The report predicted hotter days by the turn o f the
millennium, rising sea levels that could flood coastal cities, and warned o f “ ‘catastrophic
consequences’ unless the world begins planning for the shifts ‘with a sense o f urgency’ (Leary
1983). The 500-page NSA report warned o f similar problems but struck a less pessimistic tone,
counseling “ ‘caution, not panic’ and extensive studies on how to deal with them” (Leaiy 1983).
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The 1985 Villach conference hosted by the WMO and UNEP that concluded with
recommendations that states begin considering a climate convention (Bodansky 2001). Much
happened in 1988 to bridge the gap between science and policy action in the climate case.
Against a backdrop of public concern about a record North American drought, NASA scientists
James Hansen testified to Congress that the science o f climate change was sufficient to warrant
policy action and noted that the “greenhouse effect” would make such droughts more likely in the
future (Layzer 2002; Searles 1988). Also that summer the Canadian government hosted an
important international conference attended by scientists, politicians and environmentalists who
adopted a startling statement echoing Revelle and Seuss’s words: “Humanity is conducting an
unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequence could be
second only to global nuclear war” (World Meteorological Organization 1988, cited in Molitor
221). The conference called for a global 20% cut in C 0 2 emissions by 2005; UN General
Assembly calls climate change “common concern o f man” (Bodansky 2001, 25). Finally that
year, in a move recognized by scholars as central to spurring policy action, the UNEP and WMO
formed the IPCC: “The creation o f the IPPC, a panel o f climate experts entrusted with the task
o f assessing and summarizing the state o f scientific knowledge on climate change, represented an
attempt to centralize and formalize the interaction between science and politics, and to put
governments in charge” (Raustiala 2001, 112). The IPCC is comprised o f three groups, each
charged with assessing and reporting on a separate dimension o f the climate change issue: Group
I reports on latest science and level o f consensus among researchers; Group II examines the
environmental and socioeconomic impacts o f climate change; and Group III explores strategies to
mitigate and adapt to climate change. Since its inception, the IPCC has released three sets of
assessment reports in service o f the UN-led climate policy regime, the most recent in 2001. A
fourth report is underway.
In 1990, the IPPC’s First Assessment report confirmed that human activity was raising
greenhouse gas concentrations and that global mean surface temperatures had risen by 0.3 to 0.6
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degrees over the past century, both consistent with climate models, but also within the range o f
natural variability. Delegates to the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva were unable to
reach consensus on either the human role in changing climate or targets to cut emissions (Molitor
1999). Nonetheless, the United Nations that year created the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee (INC), charged with managing negotiations for a climate change convention.
Fifteen months o f negotiations led to the creation o f the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), which called for “Stabilization o f greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” (United Nations 1992, Article 2). It was signed by 154
governments, including the United States, at UN Conference on Environment and Development
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
It is worth noting here that both the climate change and stratospheric ozone regimes apply
the precautionary principle (Benedick 1998; Layzer 2002; Reisinger 2002) embodied in Rio
Declaration which reads in part, “Where there are threats o f serious or irreversible damage, lack
o f full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation” (United Nations 1992). While the United States embraced
this philosophy in the ozone regime, the administration o f George H.W. Bush reluctantly signed
onto the UNFCC and “with the understanding that it intended to encourage, but not mandate,
emissions reductions” (Layzer 2002, 218). That was indeed the case. Recognizing that developed
nations were responsible for the vast majority o f greenhouse emissions, the Convention requested
that a list o f 38 industrial countries, including some members o f the former Soviet Bloc, return
their emissions to 1990 levels. But the task, which carried no deadlines was voluntary (Molitor
1999; United Nations 1992). These 38 nations are listed an Annex I o f the Convention and are socalled “Annex I” countries. To add to the confusion, they are listed in “Annex B” o f the Kyoto
Protocol and sometimes go by that name, too. In the years following the convention, the science
and scope o f the climate change problem grew more certain and it became clear that a majority o f
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Annex I nations, including the United States, were not progressing toward their voluntary
emission reduction goals. President Clinton, who had chided Bush in the 1992 presidential
campaign for failing to back tougher greenhouse gas limits sought by the Europeans, announced
his support for the UNFCC reductions but failed himself in 1993 to win support in Congress for
an energy tax - the so-called BTU (British Thermal Unit) tax -intended to help meet its goals.
Instead, the White House presented a Climate Change Action Plan based on voluntary measures
(Molitor 1999; Layzer 2002). In 1995, at the first Conference o f the Parties (COP) o f the UNFCC,
convention parties adopted the Berlin Mandate to negotiate binding emissions reductions. The
following year, the IPCC issued its Second Assessment Report which concluded “the balance o f
evidence suggests a discemable human influence on global climate” (IPCC cited in Raustiala
2001) and at the second COP in Geneva, U.S. negotiators announced their support for binding
emissions (Cushman 1997).
The stage was then set for an enormous and costly fight in the United States between
scientists and environmentalists on the one hand, and industry on the other, over whether and to
what extent the country would commit to an international policy regime to cut greenhouse gases.
Writes Layzer (Layzer 2002), “Both sides launched all-out public relations campaigns,
recognizing that whoever succeeded in defining the problem was likely to dictate the solution.”
Groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resources Defense Council called
for the U.S. to lead the climate change effort and amplified concerns o f prominent American
scientists, including James Hansen and many members o f the National Academy o f Sciences. The
coal, oil and automobile industries fought back through the Global Climate Coalition which
worked steadily before and after Kyoto to influence public opinion against U.S. participation
(Paarlberg 1999; Layzer 2002). As noted earlier, in addition to the mantra that greenhouse gas
cuts would hurt the nation’s economy, the fossil fuel industry argued with the help o f skeptical
scientists that the science was unreliable, and that a treaty that exempted China and India from
cuts would be unfair and harmful to Americans. Moreover, as to cover all bases, a coal industry
32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

group and an economist argued that a wanner planet would be beneficial to humans, especially in
North America (Layzer 2002). The battle was joined in 1998 by the Pew Charitable Trust’s
Center for Global Climate Change - whose mission is to bolster the credibility o f climate change
science - and some large supporters in the business o f energy and using energy, including
American Electrical Power, U.S. Generating Company, Toyota, Boeing and Lockheed Martin
(Layzer 2002).
Declaring before a Special Session o f the United Nations that “the science (of climate
change) is clear and compelling,” President Clinton pledged “to bring to the Kyoto conference a
strong American commitment to realistic and binding limits that will significantly reduce our
emissions o f greenhouse gases” (Molitor 1999, 222). In December in Kyoto, Vice President A1
Gore presided over negotiations that resulted in binding emission cuts for Annex I nations by
2008-2012 and committed the United States to reducing its emissions to 93 percent o f 1990 levels
(United Nations 1997; Molitor 1999). Compared to the 7 percent cut required o f the United States,
Europe committed to 8 percent, Japan to 6 percent and 21 other nations to 5.2 percent. O f the
outcome, Layzer writes it “embodied the United States’ worst case scenario: it went beyond the
original target for U.S. reductions but provided no mechanism for making developing countries
reduce their emissions” (2002, 225).
The Protocol was designed to be flexible. It assigned Annex I nations a target to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions using any combination o f a “basket” o f six gases: carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrogen oxides, perflurocarbons, hydroflurocarbons and sulfurhexafluride. Nations
could mix and match up to five general policy options to meet their target (Molitor 1999; United
Nations 1997):

1. Use policies and regulations to actually lower national emissions.
2.

Enhance carbon sinks such as forests (Article 3).

3.

Trading emissions credits with other eligible nations. (Article 17).
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4.

Earn credits, as an Annex I nation, for lowering emissions with projects in other Annex I
nations. This is known as Joint Implementation (Article 6).

5.

Earn credits for lowering emissions in other developing nations. This is called the Clean
Development Mechanism (Article 12).

The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol the following year, joining 150 other nations.
But well aware the Senate would not support the treaty, Clinton did not submit it for ratification.
At the Fourth Conference o f the Parties in 2000, the United States sought permission to meet its
Kyoto obligations through forest and land management practices instead o f emissions reductions.
Eleven days o f negotiation failed as several European nations, chiefly Germany, rejected the
approach. In 2001, shortly after his election, President George W. Bush reversed a campaign
pledge to regulate carbon emissions from power plants and officially walked away from the
protocol on the familiar grounds that it would harm the U.S. economy (Lindlaw 2001; Associated
Press 2001; Hebert 2001). He declared in a February, 2002 speech:

The approach taken under the Kyoto protocol would have required the United States to make
deep and immediate cuts in our economy to meet an arbitrary target. It would have cost our
economy up to $400 billion and we would have lost 4.9 million jobs. As President o f the
United States, charged with safeguarding the welfare o f the American people and American
workers, I will not commit our nation to an unsound international treaty that will throw
millions of our citizens out o f work.

Two public opinion polls taken in July, 2001 underscored concern in the United States
about climate change. A New York Times/CBS News Poll found more than half of those
surveyed said the nation should abide by the Kyoto Protocol and 72 percent thought that
immediate steps were needed to counter global warming (Layzer 2002) while a Gallup poll found
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that 79 percent o f people surveyed thought energy conservation is extremely important. But the
Gallup poll also pointed up an important contradiction: 70 percent believe increased oil and gas
production equally critical. Observed one energy consultant to a UPI reporter, “What we have
here is a classic collision o f two diametrically opposed agendas” (Martin 2001). As an alternative
to joining the protocol, Bush in 2002 presented his Global Climate Change Initiative, designed to
cut greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over 10 years. Greenhouse gas intensity is the ratio o f
greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. Using tax incentives and voluntary measures, Bush
proposed to lower the nation’s rate o f emissions from an estimated 183 metric tons per million
dollars o f Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002, to 151 metric tons per million dollars o f GDP
in 2012. Critics decried the strategy o f linking greenhouse gas cuts to economic growth as a false
solution.
European leaders chastised Bush for abandoning the Kyoto Protocol but proceeded with
negotiations nonetheless, with the United States largely on the sidelines. At COP 7 in Marrakesh,
parties agreed to specific rules for implementing the treaty, including trading provisions and
enforcement measures for non-compliance, clearing a major hurdle to the treaty’s ratification
(Max 2001). But The U.S. rejection lengthened odds o f the protocol’s success considerably,
given that it required ratification by 55 industrialized nations accounting for at least 55 percent o f
global greenhouse gas emissions in 1990. The U.S. alone accounted for 36 percent o f carbon
emissions (Isachenkov 2004) and major emitters, including Canada, Japan and Russia were still
holding out. That year the IPCC released its Third Assessment Report with a more certain and
dire conclusion: “There is new and stronger evidence that most o f the warming observed over the
last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” (IPCC Group I 2001, 10). Through a series of
concessions and difficult negotiations, Canada and Japan ratified the treaty in 2002, and Russia aided by a “post-Soviet industrial meltdown has left emissions some 30 percent below the (1990)
baseline” ratified it in 2004 (Isachenkov 2004). The protocol entered into force on February 16th,
2005 (United Nations 2006).
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Despite the Bush administration’s abandonment o f the protocol, domestic political
support for mandatory cuts in carbon emissions appears to be growing. N ew England governors
and Eastern Canadian Premiers adopted a Climate Change Action Plan to meet UNFCC goals,
noting that it would require long-term reduction o f 75-85 % below current levels (New England
Governors/ Eastern Canadian Premiers 2001). The following year, New Hampshire passed a law
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions to conform to the plan and, separately, California passed a
law to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars. In 2004,44 senators voted for a bipartisan
global warming bill introduced by John McCain and Joseph Lieberman which would require the
nation to cut carbon dioxide to 2000 levels by 2010 and 1990 levels by 2016 (Associated Press
2003; Whipple 2004). Also that year, a coalition o f eleven northeastern states petitioned a federal
appeals court force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (Gillespie 2003). An excerpt
from a New York Times editorial supporting the McCain/Lieberman bill summed up the shift in
the national political attitude toward climate change since the Senate’s 1997 rejection o f a binding
international treaty and the status p f the climate change issue in the country as o f this writing
(2003):

Though it’s hard to predict how this will play out, there has clearly been a major attitudinal
change, even among Republicans, since 1997, when the Senate approved a resolution
expressing doubts about the direction the Kyoto talks were then taking. Many legislators are
deeply troubled by reports o f shrinking glaciers, dying coral reefs and other ecological
changes linked to warming. And many o f these same lawmakers - not least Robert Byrd o f
West Virginia, a co-sponsor o f the 1997 resolution - have lost patience with Mr. Bush's
let's-wait-for-more-research stance.
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Following the timeline below o f major events in the climate policy regime, this section
concludes with a brief synopsis o f reasons scholars see for the success o f the Montreal Protocol
process and failure o f the Kyoto process in the United States.

Table 2. Climate Change Case Event Timeline

Year

Climate Event

1957

Revelle and Seuss claim greenhouse gases released from fossil fuel burning were not
being absorbed naturally by the ocean and warn, “Human beings are now carrying out a
large-scale geophysical experiment o f a kind that could not have happened in the past
nor be reproduced in the future” (Revelle and Seuss 1957, cited in Molitor 218)

1979

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which created the Ad-Hoc Panel o f
Experts on Climate Change, holds first World Climate Conference in Geneva (Molitor
1999).

1983

The EPA releases a voluminous report entitled “Can We Delay a Greenhouse
Warming,” described by UPI as “the government's first warning o f dire consequences”
from climate change (Sangeorge 1983). A National Academy o f Sciences report
underscores concerns but notes there is time to adapt to the changes (Leary 1983).

1985

Conference, held by WMO and UNEP in Villach, Austria finds climate change highly
probable and recommends states begin considering climate convention (Bodansky
2001).

1988

IPCC is formed by WMO and UNEP as “a panel o f climate experts entrusted with the
task o f assessing and summarizing the state o f scientific knowledge on climate change”
(Raustiala 2001, 112); Toronto Conference, Organized by Canada, calls for global 20%
cut in CO2 emissions by 2005; UN General Assembly calls climate change “common
concern o f man” (Bodansky 2001, 25).

1989

Noordwijk Conference, organized by Netherlands, is “first high-level intergovernmental
meeting focusing specifically on climate change issue.” Conferees conclude that
industrialized nations should stabilize CO2 as quickly as possible. Year 2000 is agreed
on by many (Bodansky 2001, 25).
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Year

Climate Event

Table 2 Cont.

1990

IPCC First Assessment Report WMO and UNEP finds global mean temperatures likely
to increase by about .03 C per decade under business as usual scenario; Second World
Climate Conference in Geneva unable to reach consensus on human role in climate
variability (Molitor 1999); Establishment by the UN General Assembly o f the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Bodansky 2001).

1991

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee holds first o f five negotiating sessions,
following the model set the stratospheric ozone process, to draft the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) (Molitor 1999).

1992

FCCC is adopted at the United Nations and signed by 154 governments at UN
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. It calls for
“Stabilization o f greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations
1992, Article 2)

1994

Framework Convention enters into force. Annual Conferences o f Parties (COP) begin
the following year (Molitor 1999).

1993

President Clinton fails to win support in Congress for an energy tax - the so-called BTU
(British Thermal Unit) tax -intended to help meet its goals. Instead, the White House
presents a Climate Change Action Plan based on voluntary measures (Molitor 1999;
Layzer 2002).

1995

Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) holds first o f eight separate meetings to
negotiate a binding protocol. The final meeting was at the 1997 COP in Kyoto.

1996

IPCC Second Assessment Report concludes “the balance o f evidence suggests a
discemable human influence on global climate.” (IPCC cited in Raustiala 2001); At
COP2 in Geneva, U.S. negotiators announce intention to seek a binding international
agreement on fossil fuel emissions (Cushman 1997).

1997

Kyoto Protocol adopted at COP3 by 150 nations. The protocol specifies binding
reduction o f greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, by
39 industrial nations. U.S. is required to reduce greenhouse emission to 93 percent o f
1990 levels by 2008-2012. Reduction commitments do not include developing nations
(United Nations 1997; Molitor 1999); In Washington, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution passes
by 95-0 vote in US Senate, declaring that the Senate would not ratify any treaty that
harms U.S. economy or does not entail meaningful participation by major developing
countries (Sprinz 2001; Molitor 1999).
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Climate Event

Year

Table 2 Cont.

2001

IPCC Third Assessment Report concludes: “There is new and stronger evidence that
most o f the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.”
(IPCC Group 12001, 10) Reversing campaign pledge, President George W. Bush tells
Congress he will not regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants and walks
away from the Kyoto treaty, (Lindlaw 2001; Associated Press 2001; Hebert 2001);
New England Governors/ Eastern Canadian Premiers adopt their Climate Change
Action Plan to meet UNFCC goals, noting that will require long-term reduction o f 7585 % below current levels (New England Governors/ Eastern Canadian Premiers 2001).

2002

California passes a law to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars. Automakers say
they will sue (Jablon 2002).

2003

Bipartisan global warming bill introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman falls
short o f passage with 44 votes (Whipple 2004); A coalition o f eleven northeastern
states, concerned about the health effects o f air pollution, petition a federal appeals
court force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. The EPA claims it lacks
authority from Congress to regulate greenhouse gases (Gillespie 2003).

2004

Russia's ratifies the Kyoto Protocol ensuring the global climate pact will take effect
(United Press International 2004). The protocol enters into force on February 16th, 2005
(United Nations 2006).

Case Comparisons

The preceding case histories o f U.S. involvement in the international stratospheric ozone
and climate change policy regimes offer a description o f the conditions under which the Montreal
Protocol process emerged successful and the Kyoto Protocol process failed in the United States.
The following is a brief summary o f reasons cited by scholars for these two very two different
outcomes. These observations from the literature can provide a point o f comparison for the
findings of this study about what arguments in American news reports say about the Montreal
success and Kyoto failure. For consistency’s sake, the scholars’ comments are organized into
categories created for the coding system used in this study - each category representing one o f
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five dimensions o f the policymaking process - called policy issue criteria (Howland, Becker, and
Prelli In Press). The authors describe these as criteria o f “effective” policymaking because, they
argue, each must be addressed and adjudicated during public policy formation (Lasswell 1971;
Brewer and deLeon 1983). The criteria include (1) the establishment of an accurate definition o f
the policy problem, (2) the proposition o f a policy solution appropriate to the defined problem,
(3) the acquisition o f necessary support for the policy, (4) the technical feasibility o f the proposed
policy and (5) the establishment of accountability for carrying out the solution.
First is the problem definition criterion. As noted earlier, stratospheric ozone and climate
change are similar in big ways: Both are human-caused global atmospheric environmental
problems with potentially profound consequences for society. But scholars argue that in the
United States the ozone hole was established more quickly and with greater certainty than climate
change as a problem worthy o f corrective action. Paarlberg notes that at the time o f respective
adoptions o f the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, the scientific consensus on climate change was
not yet as good - and not strong enough “relative to the significant economic cost o f taking action
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Paarlberg 1999, 248). As noted earlier, opponents to limits
on greenhouse gas emissions, exploited scientific uncertainty (Paarlberg 1999; Layzer 2002) and
the news media amplified it (Zehr 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). Moreover, the public
perceived the stratospheric ozone problem as a bigger, more immediate threat (Reisinger 2002;
Ungar 2000). The sudden discovery o f a so-called hole in the sky and the sunburn or cancers it
could cause were more easily understood than the long-term potential effects o f planetary
warming and melting icebergs. Writes Breitmeier, (1997, 96)

The greater complexity o f the climate issue made it much more difficult to popularize and
politicize the issue. In contrast, the possible impacts o f spray can emissions on the ozone
layer was easy to understand and could be explained to nearly everybody, although it wasn’t
even clear [before 1982] whether the hypothesis was valid.
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Another strike against climate change, writes Reisinger, is that its effects “may be the
least discernible in the short to medium term” (Reisinger 2002, 5) which works against
generating political will for a solution.
On the second criteria, proposing a policy solution appropriate to the defined problem,
many argue that while there is always room for improvement the Montreal Protocol and its
amendments are doing what they were intended to do - cut off the emissions o f CFCs and begin
healing the ozone layer (UNEP 2000; Benedick 1998; Reisinger 2002). By contrast, as difficult as
it has been to win ratification, the Kyoto Protocol is widely acknowledged as unequal to its task.
Only a year after its adoption in 1997, tPCC Chairman Bert Bolin acknowledged it would be “far
from what is required to reach the goal o f stabilizing the concentration o f CO2 in the atmosphere”
(Layzer 2002, 227).
Much has been written that is relevant to the third criteria, the acquisition o f necessary
support for the policy. The stratospheric ozone regime won the necessary blessings, though not
always wholehearted, o f the administration and Congress to achieve the necessary adoptions and
ratification. The Kyoto pact did not do so in large part because o f a concerted industry campaign
against it appealing for its defeat to the public and politicians on multiple grounds, including the
science that informed it and the economic and societal consequences o f following through on the
treaty. The relative intractability o f fossil fuels to daily life, compared to CFCs, also bears upon
this point. Americans were not greatly inconvenienced by the replacement o f CFCs with
substitutes. Reisinger observes, however, that “the concept o f reducing greenhouse gas emissions
is equated with a loss o f comfort, mobility or productivity,” despite arguments that it doesn’t have
to be so (Reisinger 2002, 4). In its reaction to the Kyoto Protocol process, industiy worked hard
to solidify this impression. The broader campaign to derail U.S. efforts to join the climate change
treaty included systematic efforts to influence public opinion. Among them was a campaign by
the Washington-based Coalition for Vehicle Choice, to persuade 1,300 American small business,
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labor and civic groups that limiting emissions would be “bad for America” (Paarlberg 1999, 246).
In addition to industry, organized labor also opposed the Kyoto treaty (Paarlberg 1999; Bryson
Hodel 1999). While the chemical industry in the United States resisted initial efforts to regulate
CFCs, it relented after helping to establish with government scientists the nature and extent o f the
problem (Benedick 1998).
In the criteria o f the technical feasibility o f a solution, the ozone regime had a significant
advantage. The solution to halting the destruction o f stratospheric ozone rested in producing
substitutes that did not harm the ozone layer. These were available and, as noted earlier, required
only proper market incentives to develop. Writes Reisinger, (Reisinger 2002, 3)

Perhaps most importantly, CFCs were specifically manufactured for a limited and clearly
defined range o f industrial uses, whereas greenhouse gases are ubiquitous byproducts o f
almost every form o f energy production, industrial, agricultural or transport process. It is
therefore not easily possible to invent “substitutes” for greenhouse gases - their generation is
an accident o f civilization, not part o f a specific industrial process.

Finally, on the matter o f accountability, Montreal also had a solid advantage. The
Montreal Protocol negotiations were able to secure the cooperation o f developing nations early on,
ensuring as the treaty process moved forward that growing nations would not take up the bad
habit o f using ozone destroying compounds. For their trouble, the protocol’s wealthier parties
created the Multilateral Fund to assist developing nations with the transition to more benign
chemicals. Five years later in 1995, developing nations signed up for delayed cuts o f their own.
This was possible, writes Paarlberg, “because production o f CFCs was concentrated within a
relatively small number o f wealthy industrial countries ... and because the proposed limits on
CFC production has little projected impact on the welfare o f those countries or on the future
economic growth potential o f the developing countries” (Paarlberg 1999, 248). By contrast, a
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major plank in domestic anti-Kyoto platform has been the reluctance o f developing nations to
take on binding greenhouse reduction commitments. Writes Reisinger, “Experience from the
Montreal Protocol seems to indicate that the early setting o f an entry point and long-term
emissions target for developing nations, even if far into the future, may enhance the willingness
of industrialized countries to implement solutions that go beyond no-regrets actions” (Reisinger
2002, 4).
Equipped now with background and a comparison of both policies, this chapter now
shifts to an examination o f the theoretical frameworks that underlie the dissertation.

Theoretical Frameworks

This section breaks down into three parts. The first, Research Orientation, examines
some o f the theoretical literature used to inform this dissertation’s fundamental approach. The
second section, Economic Paradigms, explores two fundamental and competing economic
philosophies - neoclassical and ecological economics - and their relevance to environmental
problems and problem solving. The third, Environmental Discourses, builds on this by describing
a variety o f competing visions, or discourses, for conceptualizing and addressing environmental
and global commons issues. This section concludes with a brief discussion o f the author’s own
observational standpoint.

Research Orientation

Methodological Context. In research methods vernacular, this dissertation can best be
described a case study comparison that draws on both qualitative and quantitative methods to
answer descriptive and interpretive research questions grounded in theoretical literature in four
general and sometimes overlapping areas o f study: 1) The way groups wield values in a social
c
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and political process to achieve their goals, 2) The myriad societal conceptualizations o f and
approaches to environmental problems and policy making, 3) the news media’s influence on
public opinion and policy making, and 4) the effective analysis o f news media content. Important
concepts from the first two bodies o f literature are introduced in this section. Concepts from the
second two, which are more critical to the news media content analysis, are examined in the
following chapter.
A brief explanation o f the italicized terms above can aid in understanding the research
approach taken for this study and the reasons behind it. First, this study is a case study
comparison because it examines two cases - the evolution o f the ozone hole and climate change
policy regimes - and compares them. Definitions o f the terms “case study” and “cross-case
analysis,” provided by Creswell (1998, 61), capture the intent o f this study’s approach:

... a case study is an exploration o f a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over
time through detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources o f information rich
in context. This bounded system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being studied
- a program, an event, an activity or individuals.

In this study, the case is bounded by topic, place and time: arguments on ozone and
climate change (topic), published in the mainstream American news media (place), between 1980
and 2004 (time). It also involves multiple sources o f information rich in context: the news reports
themselves, interviewees, and scholarly articles. Creswell says multiple case studies typically
include a description o f each case and themes within them, called a “within-case analysis,” and
include a “cross-case analysis,” which compares themes across cases (1998, 63). Themes within
and across the cases in this study are described side by side in each chapter. The research
questions used to capture those themes are both descriptive and interpretive and not theoretical.
The three concepts are described succinctly by Maxell as follows:
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Descriptive questions ask about what actually happened in terms o f observable (or potentially
observable) behavior or events. Interpretative questions, in contrast, ask about the meaning o f
these things for the people involved: their thoughts, feelings and intentions. Theoretical
questions ask about why these things happened, how they can be explained (1996, 59).

Among the research questions enumerated at the end o f the chapter, the set o f questions posed o f
the content analysis (Table 3B) are descriptive. For example “In what proportion are the
arguments international or domestic, and economic, political, social or environmental in nature?”
However, questions posed o f interviewees (Table 3C) cross into interpretive territory. For
example, “What you think are the strengths and weaknesses of each policy effort - climate
change and/or ozone?” and “What would you recommend, if anything, be done to improve
them?” Importantly, these questions are not hypotheses. Maxwell (1996, 53) describes the
difference,

Research questions are not the same as research hypotheses. Research questions state what
you want to learn. Hypotheses, in contrast, are a statement o f your tentative answers to these
questions - what you think is going on. The use o f explicit research hypotheses is often seen
as incompatible with qualitative research.

“Qualitative” is a term Schwandt identifies as a “not-so-descriptive adjective” attached to
a variety o f types o f social inquiry including “ethnography, case study research, naturalistic
inquiry, ethnomethodology, life history methodology, narrative inquiry and the like” (1997, 129).
Research questions, rather than hypotheses, were chosen for this study because they invite a
wealth o f description about the process o f social phenomenon which Maxwell calls “the real
strength o f a qualitative approach” (1996, 59). While hypotheses are sometimes used in
45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

qualitative studies, they are traditionally found in “quantitative” studies, described by Schwandt
as “any design (e.g., experimental, survey) or procedure (e.g., statistical) that relies principally on
the use o f quantitative data” (1997, 129). Hypotheses deal less with questions o f process than o f
variance - which explore whether results were causally related to one or another variable and to
what extent (Maxwell 1996, 59). Maxwell notes that a major drawback o f formulating explicit
hypotheses to understand social process is that they can act as blinders, preventing you from
seeing what’s going on.” In doing so, a researcher might lose sight o f the forest for the trees.
Finally, a major concern with any methodology is its validity. This dissertation subscribe to a
definition o f validity that Schwandt (1997) calls “fallibilistic validity”: “Here validity is
understood as a test o f whether an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it
refers. Yet no claim is made that... a valid account is absolutely certain. Defenders o f this view
hold that one can have good reasons for accepting an account as true or false, yet an account is
always fallible” (Schwandt 1997, 169). The content analysis portion o f this study’s methodology
is statistically tested for reliability, the details o f which are explained in Chapter 2.

Groups. Arguments and Systems. As stated in the title, this dissertation is concerned with
arguments in the news media about the ozone hole and climate change. A good deal has been
written about how and why individuals and groups in society wield arguments and how that
process can be conceptualized. This section explores some o f the theory on this broad topic that
informs the work herein.
One o f the fundamental assumptions o f the primary analytic framework used in this study
- the Policy Sciences Analytic Framework o f Harold Lasswell - is called the maximization
postulate, which says that “living forms are predisposed to complete acts in ways that are
perceived to leave the actor better o ff than if he had completed them differently” (Lasswell 1971,
16; Clark 2002). The basics o f this framework will be discussed shortly and in greater detail in
the Methods chapter. Separately, Clark introduces readers to the concept o f Myth, or shared belief,
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that he describes as “the glue that holds groups and society together” (2002, 21). Myth includes
three fundamental components: doctrine, or the philosophy that “functions to affirm the
perspectives o f the group”; formula, the “prescriptive norms o f conduct that must be followed”;
and miranda, which includes “lore, stories, popular legends, poems, heroes and other symbols”
(2002, 22). Clark notes that myth is an essential concept for researchers in “understanding and
operating effectively in policy processes” because it serves to “provide the background, backdrop,
or frame o f reference, whether explicit or implicit, for our rational, political and moral judgments,
intuitions, or reactions” (2002,22). He cites as examples o f myth in modem society, the myths o f
science, capitalism and environmentalism, which can have their own sub-myths. Myth underlies
arguments made by individuals and groups active in the ozone hole and climate change debates be they scientists, industrialists, environmentalists or members o f the diverse and concerned
public. In his book, The Politics o f Earth, political scientist John Dryzek introduces a framework
for analysis of myths and sub-myths unique to debate about the environment. Dryzek does not use
the term myth but refers instead to discourses which he defines accordingly:

A discourse is a shared way o f apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables
those who subscribe to it to interpret bits o f information and put them together into coherent
stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that
provide the basic terms for analysis, debates agreements and disagreements (Dryzek 1997, 8).

Dryzek defines four major environmental discourse categories - Limits, Problem Solving,
Sustainability and Green Radicalism - and contrasts them with the dominant discourse o f our
time, Industrialism. Within each o f the four environmental discourses are two or more sub
categories, themselves discourses with their own distinct characteristics. Similar to doctrine,
formula and Miranda, Dryzek describes four components o f each discourse (1997, 53): 1) basic
entities recognized or constructed by discourse adherents (e.g., in the industrialist Promethean
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discourse, these are markets, prices, energy, technology and people. Nature is nothing but “brute
matter”), 2) Assumptions about Natural Relationships (e.g. humans are hierarchically over all
else) 3) Agents and their motives (e.g. everyone is motivated by self interest), 4) Key metaphors
and other Rhetorical devises (e.g. machines, trend lines). In the section to follow and in the
Discussion and Conclusions chapter, Dryzek’s discourse approach is discussed in greater detail,
providing a useful frame o f reference for sorting and discussing the many arguments examined in
the ozone and climate cases.
O f course, myths and discourses do not operate in a vacuum. They are created, shaped
and disseminated and reinforced over time by elites, parents, teachers, the mass media,
governments and interest groups of all stripe (Dryzek 1997; Clark 2002). It is no small
undertaking to study the interaction o f groups and their arguments - reflections o f their myth and
discourses - around a complicated policy issue. To do so effectively requires contextuality,
defined here succinctly by Brewer and deLeon as follows: “Contextuality means understanding
the relationship between the parts and the whole o f a problem. It also means having a clear sense
and appreciation o f the past, present and future o f events as they interact and change through
time” (1983, 13). It is fair to say the concept o f contextuality is analogous to that o f the systems
thinking approach, which Senge says “lies in a shift o f mind: seeing interrelationships rather than
linear cause-effect chains, and seeing processes o f change rather than snapshots” (Senge 1990 P.
73). Systems thinking is a practical way o f apprehending the world and its complex systems such as the interactions between the Earth oceans and atmosphere or, again, the process o f trying
to protect them. Kauffman writes that complex systems are often one of more or the following:

Self-stabilizing - like a thermostat
Goal seeking - such as the economy
Program following - such as a cook following a recipe
Self-reprograming - like a football coach taking a new strategy to avoid mistakes
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Anticipating - like a dog salivating in advance o f a meal
Environment Modifying - like a beaver damming a pond
Self replicating - as in biological reproduction or the spread o f a McDonald’s food chain
Self maintaining and repairing - such as a nation changing its government
Self programming - More advanced than self-replicating, this requires inventing new goals
and programs to achieve them (Kauffman, 29-32)

Two specific strategies for exploring complex systems within the systems thinking
discipline are system dynamics and the ecosystem approach (Munn 1993; Systems Dynamics
Society 2002; Senge 1990). Systems dynamics, often referred to by the more generic term
“systems analysis,” is a methodology that focuses on studying and managing feedbacks within
complex systems. It centers on identifying and tracking stocks and flows - o f information,
material, gases, power etc. - within systems to better understand and in some cases predict
behavior o f that system. It has applications in many fields where researchers are interested in
understanding and modeling complexity; among them, the Earth sciences, medicine and public
policy (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999; Meadows 1992; Systems Dynamics Society 2002;
Senge 1990; Kauffman). The ecosystem approach focuses on protecting the integrity o f natural
systems that have distinct ecosystem boundaries, often through a combination o f behavioral
changes and technical solutions (Williams 2002). A good example is the cross-border cooperation
between government and citizens groups to protect the Great Lakes River Basin, which has begun
shifting the mindset about pollution from reaction to prevention (Becker 1996; Francis and Regier
1995; MacKenzie 1993). Both the systems dynamic and ecosystem approaches are useful and
often complimentary.
To sum up, the foregoing literature spells out the importance o f understanding the words
and arguments o f groups in the context o f their myth and discourses, and appreciating their role in
a larger system. Apprehending and mapping this with contextuality, and with relevance to the
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making o f policy, requires a powerful unifying analytic framework. The next section outlines the
framework chosen for the task - the policy sciences analytic framework o f Harold Lasswell.

A Unifying Framework. -The policy sciences analytic framework o f Harold Lasswell, is
described by Clark (2002, 4) as “a set o f integrated concepts or conceptual tools for framing
thought and action and for guiding analysis, interpretation and resolution o f any problem.” The
framework defines many worthwhile targets o f observation and inquiry - many which fall into
two general categories - the social process, which focuses primarily on the interactions and
effects o f people and groups who shape the policy process, and the decision process, which
accounts for the process by and institutions through which policy decisions are made and carried
out (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Lasswell 1971; Clark 2002). These are discussed in greater detail
ahead. It is important to first understand that the framework is grounded in three fundamental
guiding principles - the principle o f contextuality, described above, the principle o f having a
problem orientation, and the use o f multiple methods. Problem orientation refers generally to the
commonsense concept o f taking time to understand a problem, before diving in to solutions.
Clark writes that often, especially in the area o f natural resources, people are too quick to offer
solutions to a conundrum.

Being conventionally “solution minded” rather than effectively “problem-minded” means that
we tend to make assumptions about people’s goals, pay too little attention to what has
happened in the past and what might happen in the future, and focus uncritically on possible
solutions (Clark 2002).

To avoid this pitfall, policy scientists like Clark find it useful to engage in five “Intellectual Tasks
o f Problem Orientation” (2002, 87) to lead them to a better understanding o f what solutions might
work. These include 1) Clarifying Goals (establishing what goals are sought by all involved) 2)
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Describing Trends (talking stock o f the history o f the problem and noting key trends, 3)
Analyzing conditions (examining the underlying conditions that created the trends, 4) Projecting
Developments (Given the present state o f affairs, extrapolate what is likely to happen in the future
and consider several scenarios), 5) Inventing, evaluating and selecting alternatives (these are
evaluated in terms o f the goals defined in the first step).
The third bedrock principle o f the policy sciences framework, using multiple methods,
simply encourages a variety o f research approaches to accomplish these tasks. This avoids the
problem described by Brewer and deLeon (1983, 15):

Any method has blind spots that focus attention on highly selected aspects o f a problem while
blocking it out for others. A policy analyst must understand this and counteract it by viewing
problems with a variety o f different methods or approaches and then working to assemble
their partial insights into something approximating a composite whole.

Lasswell and colleagues believed in using many approaches, including the content analysis o f
media messages (Lasswell 1968). Depending on the nature o f the policy problem studied, and the
goals o f the researcher one might use any combination o f methods and tools, among them, case
studies, prototyping, policy exercises, decision seminars, focus groups, surveys, polls, and the
nominal group process (Clark, Perez-Trejo, and Allen 1995; Barrow 1997).
Another major facet o f the policy sciences analytic framework is the definition o f base
values - described by Clark as the “medium o f exchange in all human interactions ... that is, the
things and events in life that people desire, aim at wish for or demand” (2002, 25). Values can be
sought, possessed and wielded. They are: Power (which refers to participation in decision making,
e.g. voting, or leadership); Enlightenment (the accumulation o f knowledge); Wealth (the control
o f resources); Well-being (Safety, health and comfort); Skill (the exercise o f talents); Affection
(love intimacy and friendship); Respect (recognition, freedom o f choice and equality); and
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Rectitude (the participation in forming and applying norms of responsible conduct) (Brewer and
deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Lasswell 1971). Clark argues that to be effective, policy consultants
need to be aware o f their own observational standpoint, which includes an accounting o f their
base values, biases, critical thinking skills and position relative to their task. To that end, the
author, a former news reporter and editor, will briefly discuss his own observational standpoint at
the end o f the following section on environmental discourses.
Equipped with an understanding o f contextuality, problem orientation, multiple methods
base values and observational standpoint, the policy analyst turns to the categories o f observation
and inquiry outlined in the framework’s social and decision processes. Mapping these processes
- defined below from the works o f Lasswell, Clark and Brewer and deLeon - empowers the
execution o f the five tasks o f intellectual problem solving.
Clark (2002) broadly defines social process as the interaction o f individual and organized
interests in society that form the context within which all policy problems exist. It includes an
accounting o f participants (the stakeholders in the policy problem), their perspectives (what they
think about it), situations (in what situations they interact), base values (those sought or used to
pursue their goals), strategies (used to achieve their goals), outcomes (the short-term changes in
distribution o f values) and effects (long-term institutional or value changes) (Brewer and deLeon
1983; Lasswell 1971). The decision process comprises seven activities o f decision making,
including intelligence gathering (essentially planning, the collection and processing o f
information for policymaking), promotion (the promoting of, lobbying for policies), prescription
(the establishment o f the rules), invocation (the enforcement o f the rules), application (the process
o f shaping and keeping the prescription and invocation in check, e.g. through appeals or lawsuits),
appraisal (“the assessment o f a decision process as a whole and o f the success o f particular
prescriptions in achieving their goals” (Clark 2002, 68)), and termination (“the repeal or largescale adjustment o f a prescription” (Clark 2002, 69)).
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One o f the policy sciences framework’s greatest attributes is its comprehensiveness. But
researchers are by no means required to equally emphasize or complete all five problem
orientation tasks or investigate all elements o f the social in decision process. This study, for
example, used the analytic framework primarily to map trends and conditions in social and
decision process - and the base values of participants - as they appear in news reports. It does,
however, keep in mind the larger principles o f contextuality, multiple methods, which demand
and empower a big-picture view appropriate to the subject.

Economic Paradigms

As demonstrated in the brief histories o f the ozone and climate change regime, economics
plays a central role in the course o f environmental policy. As important as it is to understand the
basic environmental science that propelled these issues onto the global policy agenda, is it is
equally important to understanding the economic principles at work - and often at conflict - in
the efforts to address the problem. To that end, this section examines two broad and competing
schools o f economic thought - the neoclassical and ecological economic paradigms - and how
they relate to environmental problems. This includes a description o f ethical criteria and many
theoretical concepts embodied in the paradigms’ analyses o f natural resource problems including the topics o f sustainability, cost-benefit analysis, substitutability, present value
calculation, dynamic efficiency, the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity and
innovation. It also discusses some approaches by different economists to address the problem o f
climate change. It is useful background for the section to follow on environmental discourses and
for placing many economic arguments in news articles in context.
In the policy arena, the question o f how to go about achieving the goals o f the Kyoto
Protocol, or even whether they are worthwhile pursuing falls under the purview o f economists
who struggle to weigh the costs and benefits o f action and inaction. Recall that the uneven
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circulation o f heat energy across the Earth’s surface - an artifact o f geography, weather patterns
and the changing tilt and orbit o f our planet - ensures that climate changes are far from uniform
let alone predictable (Kump, Kasting, and Crane 1999; IPCC Group 12001). Research shows that
different changes in climate in different regions can create “winners” and “losers.” For example
warmer weather might bring flooding to one region while it could enable the growing o f new and
more lucrative crops in another (O’Brien and Leichenko 2000). In addition, given the centuries’
long residency o f carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the symptoms of
climate change will be slow to heal. Together this uncertainty and delay constitute a nagging
problem for economists tying to find ways to assess and ameliorate the problem with their
pocketbooks. Weyant sums up some o f the challenges facing economists:

Projecting the costs o f reducing carbon emissions is difficult because many assumptions must
be made about how the world will evolve over a very long period o f time with and without a
control program. Typically, some o f these assumptions, like population growth, are taken
lfom outside sources. Other factors, like the response o f energy demand to changes in
economic output or energy prices, are the result o f modeling the behavior o f economic actors
in response to exogenous stimuli. Considerable uncertainty exists about both the exogenous
factors and the best way to model the behavioral responses. (1993 p. 27)

Two economic camps. When it comes to sorting out issues concerning the environment
and natural resources, economists are often divided between two camps - the neoclassical and
ecological camps (Goodstein 1999). Goodstein provides one of the most accessible explanations
o f their differences:

Neoclassical economists view natural and created capital as substitutes in production. They
are technological optimists, believing that as resources become scarce, prices will rise, and
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human innovation will yield high-quality substitutes, lowering prices once again. More
fundamentally, neoclassicals tend to view nature as highly resilient; pressure on ecosystems
will lead to steady, predictable degradation, but no surprises ... By contrast, ecological
economists argue that natural and created capital are fundamental complements - that is, they
are used together in production and have low substitutability. Technological pessimists,
ecologicals believe that as the sinks and sources that make up our stock o f natural capital are
exhausted, human welfare will decline. Fundamentally, ecologicals view natural systems as
rather fragile. (1999 p. 81)

A central theme o f concern for economists o f all stripes is sustainability - how to keep
the economic world turning - and it offers a point o f departure for comparing the two camps. One
definition o f sustainability widely quoted in science and policy circles appears in the landmark
1987 report o f the Brundtland Commission, which declares: “Sustainable development is
development that meets the needs o f the present without compromising the ability o f future
generations to meet their own needs” (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 7; Nordhaus). Neoclassical
economists argue sustainability can be measured by comparing the material benefits o f growth
against the environmental costs in dollar terms. They argue further that the growing market
economy has seen a steady rise in benefits over costs along with a rise in welfare for the median
individual. They conclude then that society is “thus, by definition, living in a sustainable
economy” (Goodstein 1999, 84). By contrast, Herman Daly, considered a father o f modem
ecological economics, rejects the notion that growth-driven economy is sustainable, and calls for
the world to move toward a “steady state economy” in which material growth (the steady increase
o f energy/matter moving through an economic system) is replaced by development (the
qualitative improvement o f that matter) (Daly 1996). He says that fundamental to this task is the
recognition that human and manmade capital are not substitutes but complements.
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“The complimentarity o f man-made and natural capital is made obvious at a concrete and
commonsense level by asking. What good is a saw-mill without a forest, a fishing boat
without fish, a refinery without petroleum deposits an irrigated farm without an aquifer or
river?” (Daly 1996 p. 77)

Roy Darwin and colleagues echo this viewpoint with their characterization o f ecological
economics:

A basic premise o f ecological economics is that the world economy is embedded in and
dependent upon Earth’s ecosystem. Because land is a basic source o f mass and energy
throughput in all terrestrial ecosystems, land use and cover represents an integrating element
in ecological economics. (Darwin et al. 1996 p. 157)

Cost Benefit Analysis. A substantial area o f disagreement between neoclassical and
ecological economists centers on cost-benefit calculations. Recalling the maximization postulate,
everyone does cost-benefit calculations in their head when they make a decision. In economics,
the involves choosing what should belong in the cost and benefits columns, placing dollar values
on them and reaching a conclusion about what it means for the economy. A classic example o f
this is national Gross Domestic Product, a widely used measure o f costs and benefits in the
market economy that has been used historically as a proxy for societal welfare. Ecological
economists argue that for this purpose the measure leaves out a lot o f important things from both
columns. For example, in the benefits column, non-market production (e.g. parenting and
household labor) is ignored. The cost column is missing the depreciation o f man-made and
natural capital used in production (e.g., forests, fossil fuel reserves, minerals) and the damage
done to the environment and human health (e.g. air and water pollution) in the process (Goodstein
1999; Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe 1995). These missing items, which are external to most measure
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o f economic growth, are often referred to as “externalities.” Realizing these shortcomings, some
ecologically-minded economists have looked for more inclusive measures o f well-being including the Genuine Progress Indicator and the Index o f Sustainable Economic Welfare. While
s

imperfect, these measures are intended to draw broader attention to societal and environmental
effects o f the market system (Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe 1995; England 1998). Neoclassical
economists argue that mainstream economic indicators demonstrate that society is living
sustainably. But ecological economists argue that this is made possible with the help o f three
fundamental and controversial assumptions:

1. Natural and created capital are substitutable (meaning that society will never run out o f
resources to keep the economy going).
2.

Natural capital, particularly non-renewables such as minerals and oil deposits, are worth
more in the present than in the future (meaning it makes more sense to use resources now
than save them for future generations).

3.

Using discount rates can be used to achieve efficient distribution o f resources between
the present and future. (Harris 2002; Goodstein 1999; Daly 1996)
*
Substitutability. Ecological economists worry that by following the neoclassical model,

society is whittling down its natural resources - nonrenewable sources and pollution sinks - to its
peril (Harris 2002; Daly 1996; Goodstein 1999). But convinced o f the principle o f substitutability,
neoclassical economists disagree. Goeller and Weinberg, declare this in an article entitled “We
are Comucopian.” The authors took an inventory o f essential minerals and metals and conclude
that with recycling and substitution, humankind will basically never run out o f resources (Goeller
and Weinberg 1978). Sagoff (1997 quoted in Ehrlich, 1999) concurs:
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It is simply wrong to believe that nature sets physical limits to economic growth - that is to
prosperity and the production and consumption o f goods and services on which it is based ...
Although raw materials will always be necessary, knowledge has become the essential factor
in the production o f goods and services.

Goodstein notes that ecological skeptics o f this view, including Malthus, have been
accused o f crying w olf after predictions o f rising mineral prices and declines o f natural resources
that failed to materialize. Angus Maddison, a Comucopian, says capitalist economies owe their
success to innovators, who infuse new energy into the markets with new products. Writes
Maddison, “the entrepreneur is thus the hero o f economic development, and his heroism is all the
more legitimate because in each wave new men emerge as the function o f the entrepreneur itself
cannot be inherited.” (Maddison 1991 p.21) Speaking for those worried about natural limits
squelching this cycle, Goodstein writes: “While ecologicals stretching back to Malthus have
indeed done their share of crying wolf,” write Goodstein, “this does not, o f course, mean that the
w olf won’t yet come.” (Goodstein 1999 p. 122)

Present value calculation. Cost-benefit analysis sometimes begs the question o f how
much to value the future. Mainstream economic practice places more value on a bird in hand
today than a bird in hand in the future. This is put into practice using present value calculations,
which are basically the mirror image o f a compound interest calculation (Harris 2002; Goodstein
1999). For example, a present value calculation might answer the question: “How much would a
million dollars given to me 10 years from now be worth in today’s dollars?” To answer this you
need a “discount rate.” At an annual discount rate o f 7 percent, that million would be cut in about
half - to $508,349 - over 10 years. The formula for calculating the discount rate is N,+ N0 (1 +r)'
where r is the discount rate, t is time in years; No is the million; and N, is the discounted amount
(Goodstein 1999,92). When it comes to basic market transactions such as a mortgage to buy a
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home, discounting makes sense because living in that home now is worth the expense o f paying
more later. But economists stretch this logic over much larger spatial and temporal scales to the
point o f placing a value on future generations. A zero discount rate values the present and future
equally. Any discount rate higher than zero values the future less. The standard economic practice
o f discounting is crucially relevant to national investment in mitigation or adaptation programs to
address climate change, which involves policy decisions on scales of hundreds o f years. In an
essay on the topic, economist William Nordhaus provided a sharp hypothetical example to
highlight the danger o f using economic discounting alone to guide policy. He noted that a strict
interpretation of the discounting rule would lead policymakers to write off spending money today
to prevent an asteroid from hitting Florida in 200 years. The logic is as follows: If Florida is
worth $2 trillion today, the mandated 7 percent discount rate on goods would put the state’s worth
at about $3 million in 200 years. If a space mission to deflect or blow up the asteroid costs more
than $3 million today, it would not make economic sense to try to save the state. Thus, even an
ardent mainstream neoclassical economist, which Nordhaus is, can agree that discounting has its
limits (Nordhaus 1999).

Dynamic Efficiency. An extension o f the present day value mindset leads to the concept
o f dynamic efficiency. Mainstream economists are focused on achieving the most efficient use o f
resources and have devised a way to divide the pie o f a finite non-renewable resource between
present and future generations using discount rates. An example o f this is illustrated below in a
graph modified from Harris that shows the efficient amount o f a resource (e.g. copper) to use
today is determined by crossing the demand curves o f the present and the future time periods
(projected as mirror images) of over an X axis representing the total quantity o f the resource.
(Harris 2002).
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Figure 4. Dynamic Efficiency

Note that without regard to the future, mining companies today could efficiently take a quantity
o f copper up to 200. Using a discount rate, they arrive at the curve PV[MNB2], which is half that
o f the present day demand curve MNB]. By factoring in the needs o f the future, reduced by a
discount rate, economists decide that it’s most efficient to hold off mining those extra 50 units o f
copper today and saving it for the future. Writes Harris:

We can justify using up copper today so long as the benefits from doing so outweigh user
costs imposed on future citizens. But once the user costs become higher than the benefits
from consumption today - in our example, at any level o f present consumption above 150
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units - we reduce total economic welfare by our excessive present consumption. (Harris 2002
p. 68)

In practice, shifting the quantity from 200 to 150 creates a new supply curve, and in Harris’
example the distance between the old and new supply curve is $25. We have effectively shifted
the market equilibrium by internalizing the cost o f taking copper from future generations. This
new equilibrium is called dynamic equilibrium (Harris 2002). The process described here is what
Goodstein refers to when he says neoclassical economists try to achieve the maximum net
national welfare over time, a goal known as dynamic efficiency.

Ecological Sustainability. The concepts above aid in a closer look at the economic
sustainability debate - the starting point for exploring disagreement between the neoclassical and
ecological camps. In his book Beyond Growth, Herman Daly calls for a shift from the
neoclassical economic norm o f quantitative expansion, or growth to a concept o f qualitative
expansion. He says society should strive for a state o f strong sustainability —where man-made
and natural capital are treated as complements and kept in fixed proportion. Daly says the
neoclassical model essentially ignores the value o f natural capital:

In the standard economic textbook view, we consume only that value which we have added to
natural resource flows. And then we add it again to the same indestructible building blocks,
and consume it again, add it again, etc. in the celebrated circular flow (1996, 63).

On the climate change question, Daly countered economists who argue that climate
change would have little effect on the U.S. economy because only agriculture - which represents
about 3 percent o f GDP - is sensitive to climate. “Evidently,” wrote Daly, “it is the value added
to seeds, soil, sunlight and rainfall added by labor and capital that keeps us alive, not the seeds,
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soil and sunlight themselves” (1996, 63). The critique o f Daly and others who warn o f wasting
finite resources is grounded in the laws o f thermodynamics, which bares a short explanation. The
first law, the law o f mass/energy conservation, states that all matter/energy is conserved in an
isolated system. The universe is considered an isolated system. Energy and matter change form
and they may dissipate, but they never disappear (England 1994; Natural Step 2002; Silberberg
2000). The second law describes entropy: a measure o f the disorder or randomness, which in an
isolated system always increases. Another way o f thinking about entropy, formulated by
economist Georgescu-Roegen, is to understand that “[I]n an isolated system, ... the available
energy continuously and irrevocably degrades into unavailable states.” The laws of
thermodynamics demonstrate that many o f the minerals used and fuels burned are finite stocks
because their waste products and dissipated heat cannot be put to identical use again. Waste can
pollute the land and poison the water and air.
Acknowledging the importance o f natural capital to ecological economists, Nordhaus
responds that ecological economists lack an approach to sustainability when it comes to truly
strapped resources.

Ironically, the sustainability paradigm has particular difficulty dealing with situations where a
society has a finite stock o f an essential resource and must allocate it over time. In such a
situation, the criterion o f maintaining capital intact is unattractive because the only
sustainable (capital-intact) path is immediate and permanent starvation. A more attractive
path would be one in which the resource is gradually reduced as the stocks run down while
society hunkers down to await a rescue from a technological breakthrough. (Nordhaus, 320)

In addition to criticizing the unsustainability o f the growth paradigm, ecological economists
accuse neoclassical colleagues o f oversimplifying the world by assuming perfect information in
their models. They argue that rather than a machine that can be reduced to its parts and
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understood like a clock, the world is a complex and dynamic system and that underestimating this
can lead to dangerous environmental problems (Norgaard 1984). Consider the non-linear nature
o f the earth’s climate system and potential for abrupt changes discussed earlier.

Intereenerational Equity. Borrowing a page from the discipline o f systems thinking,
Norgaard introduces the concept o f co-evolution, where natural and manmade systems evolve in
unforeseeable ways. He says humans live in a world o f both positive (self-amplifying) and
negative feedbacks and writes: “Negative feedback mechanical systems facilitate prediction and
prescription, thereby empowering their users, like neoclassical economists, with special
authority.” He says we need to “correct the environmental catastrophe this view creates.”
(Norgaard 1984, 82) He cites two examples: the rapid development o f resistance by insects to
pesticides that resulted in more environmental harm than the insect populations they were
intended to eradicate; and the extinction o f species and habitat and social systems with the
introduction o f industrial agricultural in the Amazon (Norgaard 1984). Recall that the
precautionary principle is geared to avoid such problems (Harris 2002). This is a akin to the
safety standard, which emphasizes human safety over efficiency as determined by cost-benefit
analysis (the efficiency standard) (Goodstein 1999). As it relates to climate change, Lave and
Dowlatabadi say the precautionary principle “states that humans should act to minimize the
chance that Earth will be spoiled for future generations” (Lave and Dowlatabadi 1993 p. 1968).
With this they have identified another key concept in the toolbox o f ecological economists intergenerational equity. Recalling the discussion on discounting, many environmentalists and
some ecological economists find it unethical to place a lower value on future than present
generations. Dartmouth economist Richard Howarth rejects the practice o f equating the discount
rate with the return to private capital because, he argues “greenhouse gas emissions abatement
constitutes a type o f insurance mechanism that reduces the risk that future generations will bear
the impacts of catastrophic climate change.” (Howarth 2001 p. 22)
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Economic approaches to climate change. Economists propose many solutions to the
problem. One o f the offerings from the neoclassical camp comes from Nordhaus who has
constructed a computer model intended to show the effects o f certain climate change strategies on
the nation’s economy (Nordhaus 1999). The Dynamic Integrated model o f Climate and the
Economy (DICE) is structured on some familiar neoclassical assumptions among them: potential
emissions are dependent upon current GDP and current state o f technology, an opportunity cost
today because o f the diversion o f scare resources from commodity production, and a 3 percent
annual discount rate (England 2001). Nordhaus uses his DICE model to compare the price tags
and global temperature change that could result from four approaches climate change over the
next 500 years: 1) lowering the overall discount, 2) lowering only selected discount rates, 3)
targeting spending directly to stabilizing the Earth’s temperature and 4) seeking to stabilize a socalled intermediate variable such as greenhouse gas concentrations or emissions (Nordhaus 1999).
He compares the results o f these approaches with a baseline economically “optimal” approach in
which the marginal costs and benefits o f emissions are balanced. The optimal approach - which
Nordhaus says allows temperatures to rise to unacceptably high levels —calls for expenditures o f
“$10 billion annually in the near term followed by $50 billion after a couple centuries” (1999).
He concludes after running his model that the greatest progress against climate change with the
lowest cost to the economy can be achieved by setting out to lower the Earth’s temperature. The
worst results came from an overall reduction in the discount rate. Nordhaus calls the results
“sobering,” because they demonstrate there is no easy way to use discount rates to efficiently
meet long-term objectives. He concedes that climate change has thrown a wrench into the
machine o f cost-benefit analysis using present value calculations. He concludes (1999):

When economic analyses cannot appropriately capture all the costs and benefits, the
temptation is to turn to turn to simple solutions such as differential discount rates or
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intermediate objectives. Just as trade sanctions are unlikely to be a powerful weapon for
human rights, so are these makeshift proxies unlikely to be efficient ways o f meeting long
term objectives. We are better served by looking at the ultimate objective - in this case,
global climate change - and setting our policies with this objective in mind.

In a response from Nordhaus’s own camp, Hasselmann said that the difficulty o f
calculating costs and benefits associated with climate change should not be a reason to abandon
the approach but a challenge to incorporate uncertainty into future cost-benefit analyses
(Hasselmann 1999). Others, like Pielke, Klein and Sarewitz say that given what they perceive as
great uncertainties about the causes and effects o f climate change, the most efficient approach is
to invest in adaptation, not mitigation (Pielke, Klein, and Sarewitz 2000; Pielke 1998; Sarewitz
and Pielke 2000).
Other economists, like economist Robert Ayres, say much stronger measures are needed.
In the September/October 2001 issue o f Word Watch, Ayres made a case for government
restrictions on access to cheap, oil, coal and natural gas to spur the development o f cleaner
technologies. He faults the Bush administration for adhering to the principles o f “conservative
economic ideology” embodied in the work o f Nordhaus, and writes that Bush’s new energy
policy was built on the virtually unquestioned assumption “that the only way to keep the U.S.
economy healthy is to greatly increase supply - and consumption - o f coal, oil, and natural gas.”
Noting that Bush had backed out o f the Kyoto process, Ayres argues that the administration has
ignored the logic o f the IPCC’s findings on climate change, and replaced it with neoclassical
economic thinking, which argues that “the costs o f any government inspired actions aimed at
reducing greenhouse emissions will greatly exceed the discounted present value o f the future
benefits.” (Ayres 2001, 14)
Ayres says that to help save the world from climate change, the nation must develop the
next generation of energy technologies that rely on renewable sources - such as solar, wind and
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hydropower - delivered by non-polluting fuel cells or similar methods. Reminding readers that
necessity was the mother o f inventions such as fossil fuel use and its related technologies, Ayers
says it should be so with a new generation o f cleaner energy products. But - and this is where he
splits with neoclassical thinkers - given the slow and hidden nature o f climate change, he argues
that government should create the necessity by cutting back access to cheap coal, oil and gas
(Ayres 2001). Bryner notes that the concept o f forcing the development o f new technologies has
been partially tested by the Clean Air Act, which by imposing new tailpipe emission standards,
resulted in the development o f air pollution control technologies such as the catalytic converter.
But Congress has seldom pushed industry to innovate beyond what company experts say is
technically feasible and thus “technology forcing has often meant forcing the more widespread
use of already existing technologies required to meet stringent standards.” (Btyner 1995)
Beyond setting total emission targets, the Kyoto Protocol has no mechanism for forcing
new technologies, only incentives for sharing technology. Economists Warwick McCabe and
Peter Wilcoxen say the protocol’s emissions permit trading system is highly inefficient and could
harm the world economy by altering the balance o f trade. They propose an alternative system that
combines attributes of permit trading and taxation to allow for significant greenhouse gas cuts
while protecting nations from large shocks to their economy. The method relies on the
assumption that when it comes to abating climate change, the marginal cost curve o f abatement is
steep while the marginal benefits are relatively flat. That is because it costs a lot in the short term
to cut back on emissions and few benefits are realized until much later. Given this, the authors
argue for a system o f fixed emissions permits - their number geared toward specific emission
reductions - that could be traded internationally. In the event the market prices climbed to an
agreed-upon ceiling deemed economically dangerous, national governments could introduce
temporary permits - say, good for only one year - at the high ceiling price. These annual permits
could reduce the shock to economies as they work their way painfully (but not fatally) toward
meeting set goals (McKibben and Wilcoxen 2002). They argue that beyond standardizing permit
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prices and ceilings, national participation should be voluntary. They also do not specify reduction
targets. They say it would end the debates about political sovereignty and high costs o f abatement
and also provide a more flexible tool for nations to address the uncertainty o f climate change
(McKibben and Wilcoxen 2002).

Environmental Discourses

As is clear from the comparison o f neoclassical and ecological economics traditions,
debate about the environment is often wrapped up in competing opinions about humanity’s place
in the world and competing notions o f progress, ethical behavior and the needs o f society. The
divisions described in the previous section are only the tip o f the iceberg, as environmentalism
comes in many forms. This section explores a variety o f environmental discourses as identified in
Dryzek’s elegant typology in his book The Politics o f the Earth, mentioned earlier in the chapter.
Understanding the scope and origins o f environmental viewpoints can be useful. Beyond an
intellectually satisfying exercise, it can enable people to bridge disagreements and find common
ground to address social and ecological problems. In this study it serves to provide a broader
social and historical context for arguments that appear in the news media about the ozone hole
and climate change. It enables, if only informally, the gauging o f the wider relative prevalence o f
discourses in the news media’s coverage - in other words, a look at which school o f thought is
getting its message across louder in the press. This section briefly summarizes four major
categories o f discourses defined by Dryzek - Limits, Problem Solving, Sustainability and Green
Radicalism - and the nine discourses within them. To the best o f the dissertation author’s ability,
they are summarized along the lines o f their doctrine (underlying philosophy), formula (norms o f
conduct) and Miranda (symbols). The nine discourses are not mutually exclusive, that is, a
person’s environmental views likely comprise two or more o f the nine philosophies presented
here. Not included in that number, though represented in different ways by several o f the nine
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discourses, is the dominant discourse o f modem society: industrialism. Dryzek writes that
industrialism “may be characterized in terms o f its overarching commitment to growth in the
quantity o f goods and services produced and to the material well-being which that growth brings”
(1997). He writes also that host o f “isms’ - liberalism, conservatism, socialism, Marxism and
fascism - all subscribe to industrialism. In the United States it is safe to say that it is the status
quo. The table below outlines the structure of Dryzek’s category system and includes his chapter
titles, which correspond to the gist o f each discourse.

Table 3. Dryzek Environmental Discourses

(Table assembled from Dryzek 1997)
Category
Limits

Problem Solving

Discourse

Catchphrase

Survivalism

“Looming Tragedy” (1997, 21)

Promethean

“Growth Forever” (1997, 45)

Administrative Rationalism

“Leave it to the Experts” (1997, 63)

Democratic Pragmatism

“Leave it to the People” (1997, 84)

Economic Rationalism

“Leave it to the Market” (1997, 102)

Sustainable Development

“Environmentally Benign Growth”
(1997, 123)

Ecological Modernization

“Industrial Society and Beyond” (1997,
136)

Green Romanticism

“Save the World through new
Consciousness” (1997, 155)

Green Rationalism

“Save the World through New Politics”
(1997, 172)

Sustainability

Green Radicalism

Limits. The limits discourse embodies the two sides of the debate about the limits o f
natural resources, including sources o f raw materials and sinks for pollutants, discussed in the
preceding section on economics. The discourse o f Survivalism holds that people are using up the
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world’s limited resources at a rate that will bring disaster upon humanity. It is summed up
beautifully in the words o f Karl-Henrik Robert, a Swedish cancer researcher, who founded The
Natural Step, a non-profit consulting company that promotes sustainable practices: “As we busy
ourselves with tearing down more than we rebuild, we are racing toward world-wide poverty in a
monstrous poisonous garbage dump” (Robert, 11). Dryzek notes that the survivalism discourse
has its roots in the work o f systems thinking computer modelers who sounded the alarm about the
growth in resource use in the early 1970s in a popular book called Limits to Growth. The 1992
sequel to the work, Beyond the Limits, concludes:

“Human use o f many essential resources and generation o f many kinds o f pollutants have
already surpassed rates that are physically sustainable. Without significant reductions in
material and energy flows, there will be in the coming decades an uncontrolled decline in percapita food output, energy use, and industrial production (Meadows 1992, xvi)

The doctrine o f the survivalist discourse is limits. Its warnings are echoed in the words o f many
ecological economists, such as Herman Daly, who are concerned with the welfare o f future
generations. Its miranda includes the exponential curve o f growth and the warning o f Garrett
Hardin’s “Tragedy o f the Commons” - an archetype in which common resources (such as fish in
the sea) are exhausted by takers motivated by their individual wants and oblivious to the need for
a communal solution to manage scarce or renewable resources (Senge 1990; Dryzek 1997).
Dryzek sums up the formula o f survivalism as “think globally, act globally” (1997, 41)and
argues that beyond raising awareness - itself a critical function - discourse lacks a clear plan o f
action.
The antithesis o f survivalism, the Promethean discourse, is also about limits - it sees
none. This discourse, which Dryzek says views natural resources as inexhaustible brute matter,
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reflects the technological optimism o f the neoclassical economists quoted in the previous section.
Dryzek sums up Promethean doctrine as follows:

In Greek mythology, Prometheus stole fire from Zeus, and so vastly increased the human
capacity to manipulate the world for human ends. Prometheans have unlimited confidence in
the ability o f humans and their technologies to overcome any problems presented to them,
including what can now be styled environmental problems.

Promethean miranda includes markets, technology and competitive entrepreneurs. Dryzek cites
the “anti-government market-oriented” stance o f the Reagan administration as an embodiment of
Promethean ideals. Reagan appointees James Watt and Anne Gorsuch Buford, Interior Secretary
and EPA Administrator, respectively, carried out the formula: “Watt favored rapid development
and disposal of public lands and justified his approach to Congress by saying that he saw no point
in preserving lands because he ‘did not know how many future generations we can count on
before the Lord returns’” (Layzer 2002, 240). O f Buford, Dryzek charges she “turned
policymaking over to the polluters the EPA was supposed to regulate” (1997, 55).

Problem Solving. The problem solving category and its three environmental discourses
encompass mainstream approaches to problem solving within the status quo o f industrialism and
liberal capitalism, which serve as their doctrine. Briefly, the Administrative Rationalism discourse
is partial to the strategy of leaving environmental problem solving to elites and agency
bureaucrats. Its formula is bureaucracy and miranda the concerned but reassuring expert. The
discourse o f Democratic Pragmatism leans in the opposite direction, encouraging public and
community participation in environmental matters. The concept o f citizen participation is central
to doctrine, formula and miranda o f this discourse. The Economic Rationalism discourse is a
distillate o f the Promethean discourse that advocates wide scale privatization o f natural resources
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- including land, air, water and even wildlife - and is characterized by “unremitting hostility to
environmental management on the part o f government administrators” (Dryzek 1997, 102). The
discourse holds that privatization can help solve environmental problems. Tradable pollution
permits, such as those used in the U.S. today for sulfur dioxide and proposed in the Kyoto
agreements, make sense to economic rationalists provided the market is left to determine the price
o f clean air or clean water. Its formula is the market and its miranda evokes freedom from
onerous government regulation.

Sustainability. Recall from the previous section that the Brundtland Commission defines
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs o f the present without
compromising the ability o f future generations to meet their own needs” (Vig and Axelrod 1999,
7; Nordhaus). Many o f the concepts o f this discourse were addressed in the previous section on
economics. Its doctrine shares many o f the same fears as the survivalism discourse and derives
from the systems-thinking, systems-dynamic perspectives. But instead o f calling for drastic cuts
in global resource use, sustainability proposes a more appealing middle path. Its appeal is
reflected in the political success o f the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development at which world leaders representing 98 percent o f the world’s population in 1992
signed on to Agenda 21. The non binding agreement has been described as “the principal global
plan to confront and overcome the economic and ecological problems o f the late 20th century”
that provides a “comprehensive blueprint for humanity to use to forge its way into the next
century by proceeding more gently upon the Earth.” (Sitars 1993 p. 1) Agenda 21 includes
general strategies to encourage efficient use o f natural resources and protection o f global
commons such as the oceans and atmosphere.
Dryzek divides sustainability into two discourses - Sustainable Development and
Ecological Modernization. He labels the concept o f Sustainable Development “Environmentally
Benign Growth” (1997, 123). As with survivalism, its doctrine is grounded in global limits and its
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miranda the healing o f interdependent ecosystems. But Dryzek criticizes the discourse for
offering an appealing goal with little or no concrete formula and summarizes sustainable
development’s promise as a promise that cannot be kept: “We can have it all, economic growth,
environmental conservation, social justice and not just for the moment but in perpetuity. No
painful changes are necessary” (1997, 132). Others who subscribe to the sustainability moniker
might find this characterization overly general and unfair. Robert, a leader in the global
sustainable development movement, has articulated a four-step formula that is comprehensive and
certainly not without pain. It includes conserving mineral resources and cutting back on fossil
fuels, substituting unnatural compounds with others that break down more easily, using land more
efficiently with fewer impacts, continuing to meet basic human needs while “using resources
efficiently, fairly and responsibly” (Natural Step 2002). One concrete manifestation o f the
sustainability discourse is the ecosystem approach, through which policy professionals and
resource managers work with myriad stakeholders, including everyday citizens, to protect the
integrity o f natural systems with distinct ecosystem boundaries - often through a combination o f
behavioral changes and technical solutions (Williams 2002). A good illustration o f this can be
found in the ecosystem management approach used in the Great Lakes Basin, which encouraged
local citizen participation in the messy international and regional problem o f polluted lakes, rivers
and streams (Becker 1996).
If the Sustainable Development is generalist, the discourse o f ecological modernization is
more specific and centered around economics. Writes Dryzek, “The storyline o f ecological
modernization is that the capitalist political economy needs conscious reconfiguring and far
sighted action so that economic development and environmental protection can proceed hand-inhand and reinforce one another” (Dryzek 1997, 143). The concept o f pollution is equated with
wasting money, and so ecological modernization stresses the logic o f avoiding pollution problems
today to save money in the future. Citing the work o f Peter Christoff, Dryzek notes that the
discourse can be divided into two categories: a “weak” or “techno-corporatist” version which
72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

emphasizes technological solutions to environmental problems in developed nations dominated
by economic, scientific and political elites; versus a “strong” version that seeks broad structural
changes to economic and social institutions worldwide while emphasizes democratic citizen
participation in the process (Dryzek 1997, 147).

Green Radicalism. The discourse category o f Green Radicalism includes the discourses
o f Green Romanticism and Green Rationalism. Unlike the previous discourses Dryzek notes that
these reject, to a varying degree, principles o f the Enlightenment - “the Eighteenth-century
movement which renounced, religion, myth and traditional social order in the name o f reason”
(1997, 153) - largely taken for granted by the other foregoing discourses. Both “agree that
technology wielded in human arrogance have meant massive environmental destruction, along
with profound human costs” (1997, 153). Dryzek writes that Green Romanticism rejects
anthropocentrism and Enlightenment values and generally has no use for government institutions.
It encompasses a wide array o f environmental philosophies that include deep ecology, cultural
eco-feminism, eco-theology and eco-communalism. Among its most well known subscribers are
members o f Earth First!, known for raucous direct action including demonstrations, camping in
trees, and sabotage o f equipment used in projects deemed damaging to the environment.
By contrast, Green Rationalism is a more politically and institutionally engaged discourse
that includes members o f the European Green party, environmental justice movement and
advocates o f animal rights (Dryzek 1997). The doctrine o f both recognizes global limits and the
interconnectedness o f ecosystems, but the rationalist formula includes working to change the
system from within. Both find ways to draw attention to environmental matters and green
messages are found in news coverage o f the ozone hole and climate change. Finally, the miranda
o f greens is varied. Many romantics embrace a view o f the earth as a living, self regulating
system - as captured in the Gian hypothesis. In The Monkevwrench Gang, author Edward
Abbey’s character, Hayduke, litters the roadside with empty beer cans, capturing the attitude of
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some romantics that once developed, land is no longer worth keeping clean. Dr Seuss, takes a
more rationalist approach in his classic environmental tale, The Lorax. Mourning a life spent in
an industrial wasteland created by his greed, the Once-ler offers a warning to a young boy who
hears his story: “UNLESS someone like you cares a whole awful lot, nothing is going to get
better, it’s not” (Dr. Seuss 1971).

Author’s Observational Standpoint. Recall that Clark emphasized the importance to
policy practitioners - and in this case, researchers - o f being aware o f their observational
standpoint. An author’s experiences and opinions inevitably color their work to a degree. In the
interest o f transparency, I will briefly shift to the first person to note two o f the more important
aspects o f my observational standpoint - proverbial grains o f salt with which readers can take this
study’s findings. First, as a former full-time news reporter and editor for more than ten years three with The Associated Press in Boston - 1 am approaching this study as an insider. This has
its pros and cons. On one hand, having reported complicated environmental stories on a daily
deadline for many years and moved copy on international wires, I know first-hand the skills and
pressures involved in producing my primary data source. Some o f my own articles were
automatically culled in the sampling o f the original 21,000 stories on climate change. On the
other hand, I cannot be accused o f being an objective evaluator o f journalistic standards. But my
work on this study - including a review o f literature on the press and policy - has sensitized me
to some o f the practices and institutional biases o f the profession. These include striving to
balance controversial stories with “the other side” - no matter how off-base the other side may be
- and giving heavy preference to “expert” over lay opinions. Both o f these practices have come in
for criticism from scholars studying the media’s coverage o f climate change. The second
important aspect o f my observational standpoint comes from the study o f earth system science,
which has made me a firm believer that the ozone hole and climate change are enormously
serious environmental problems. I believe that that climate change requires a global political
74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

solution that includes immediate and extensive cuts in the use o f fossil fuel in developed and
developing nations and a serious commitment to renewable energy. It should be done at a pace
that can ensure that basic human needs, human rights and human dignity are preserved.

Research Products and Questions

In the pages ahead, this study examines a quarter century o f news reports by three o f the
nation’s biggest news outlets - The AP, United Press International and The New York Times - to
see how the debate evolved in the press in both cases. The study takes notes on who said what,
when, where and why to understand to what extent and where support or opposition to either
policy exists in news content. In the process, the study seeks to describe and map the evolution o f
arguments relevant to the policy making process made by common participants in both debates scientists, politicians, industry officials and environmentalists, among others. Further, the study
keeps tabs on environmental discourses that underlie and sometimes drive those arguments.
Apart from the foregoing case synopses, specific products o f this research effort include:

1. Rhetorical landscape maps created using an original content analysis categorical system
designed to systematically and transparently examine a data set o f more than 1,000 news
articles. The content analysis system and its place in the literature are described in detail
in Chapter 2 (Methods) and its results are found in Chapter 3 (Coding Results).
2.

A summary o f structured interviews with seven participants in the policy process
(including the environmental news reporters, a member o f the US Congress and worldrenown leaders in the scientific, industry and environmental communities) to help place
the results in context. This comprises Chapter 4 (Interviews).

3.

A synthesis o f the study’s coding, interview and discourse analysis results with literature
on the U.S. role in the ozone and climate policies collectively geared to describing
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conditions and trends that likely affected the current outcomes o f U.S. position on both
treaties and may affect it in years to come. This and the following two items are found
Chapter 5 (Discussion and Conclusions).
4.

A critique o f the news media’s reporting on the issues including recommendations for
reporters and readers o f this critical message source - including the study’s seven
participant groups.

5.

A brief evaluation o f the larger study - how it evolved, what it has helped accomplish,
what its limitations are, and how it might be used in the future.

The table below, divided into four sections, provides a complete list o f the research questions. It
is intended to serve as a useful reference and a reminder o f the progression o f the overall study.
The next chapter details the methods for answering these questions and includes a description o f
the original content analysis categorical system developed to examine thq news articles.

Table 4. Research Questions

A. Overall Guiding Questions

(Chapters III, IV & V)

1.

How have the sources, structure and content o f arguments carried by mainstream
American print media about the ozone hole and climate change evolved from 1980 to
2004?

2.

What do the trends in social and decision process emerging from this analysis reveal
about the relative success o f the Montreal Protocol in the United States versus the
failure o f the Kyoto Protocol?
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B. Coding Questions - from analysis o f 1,076 news articles

(Chapter III)

1. Are the arguments supportive or opposed to the goals and/or principles o f the policy?
2.

In what proportion are the arguments international or domestic, and economic, political,
social or environmental in nature?

3.

What stakeholder groups are main sources/ subjects o f the arguments?

4.

What are the arguments’ relevance to one or more o f five policy issue criteria?

5.

What are the trends over time in the above categories?

C. Interview Questions - posed to stakeholders

(Chapter IV)

1.

What is your experience with climate change and/or ozone issues?

2.

What role do you think your group has played and will play in the future with regard to
US involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?

3.

What role do you think the news media has played and will play in the future with regard
to US involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes? [Everyone gets this
question but news reporters who’ve already answered it]

4.

What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of each policy effort - climate
change and/or ozone. What would you recommend, if anything, be done to improve
them?

5.

Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a few ways, if any, you
think it has affected and/or will affect US involvement in either policy effort.

6. What do you think the future holds for each policy?
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D. Policy Sciences Analytic Framework Synthesis

(Chapter V)

1. What conditions and trends, both overall and within each cases’ main
participant/stakeholder groups, have led to the current outcomes? What direction are
these trends pointing in the future?
2.

What discourses are most prominent within and among the participant/stakeholder groups
and in the news media coverage as a whole and how might that relate to outcomes?

3.

What lessons do these findings hold for news reporters and editors and consumers of
news?

4.

What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses o f this dissertation’s methodology? How
might it be improved and used in the future?

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II

METHODS

Introduction

This chapter breaks down the methodology used to answer the research questions
summarized at the end o f the background chapter. The methodological centerpiece o f this
dissertation is its original categorical content analysis coding system, designed to systematically
find and describe arguments in news reportage and characterize their relevance to the policy
making process. As noted earlier, the data from this exercise - both qualitative and quantitative can be used to help describe social and decision process surrounding a policy problem using the
policy sciences analytic framework. The first section o f this chapter, under the heading Basic
Methodology, is devoted to describing in detail the coding system and how it can inform a policy
sciences investigation. The text under this heading is a copy, with some minor formatting and
organizational edits, o f an article in press at Policy Sciences by the author and his advisers,
professors Mimi L. Becker and Lawrence J. Prelli, entitled “Merging content analysis and the
policy sciences: A system to discern policy-specific trends from news media reports.” The article
places this dissertation’s analysis system in context with the literature on content analysis, the
policy sciences approach, and content analysis methodology specific to studies o f ozone and
climate change news coverage.
The second section o f this chapter describes some methodological adjustments and
updates needed to move from the smaller pilot study described in the Policy Sciences article - an
examination of 90 news stories about the stratospheric ozone problem written between 1980-1987
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- to this dissertation’s much larger case study comparison o f 25 years o f ozone and climate
change coverage ending in 2004. This includes a description of a sampling strategy used to pare
down a sample o f more than 21,000 news articles on the climate issue, and some additional tools
for note-taking while coding. Also described is a separate research protocol for the larger study:
structured interviews with experts on the ozone and climate change problems and the news
media’s coverage o f them. Finally, the general approach used to integrate the data from the news
content analysis, the interviews and relevant published literature is discussed.

Basic Methodology

As noted above, the text under this heading is in press at the journal Policy Sciences. It is
copyrighted by Springer, and until publication can be cited as follows:

Howland, Dave, Mimi L. Becker, and Larry Prelli. In Press. Merging content analysis and the
policy sciences: A system to discern policy-specific trends from news media reports. Policy
Sciences.

Abstract

In this article we set out to bridge a surprising methodological gap between two timehonored research traditions - news media content analysis and the policy sciences analytic
framework. Lasswell, a recognized pioneer of both the method and the framework, discussed the
mutual benefits o f each decades ago. But few researchers, if any, have formally linked the two.
To that end, in this article we 1) make the case for using news media content analysis to inform
research studies using the policy sciences analytic framework; 2) introduce an original content
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analysis categorical system for that purpose; 3) demonstrate that system with a study o f 90
national news articles about the stratospheric ozone hole; and 4) compare our system to others
used to examine news content. We report that our system, used by human coders, is well geared
to describing and mapping trends in the social process surrounding the development o f the
Montreal Protocol ozone treaty during the intelligence gathering and promotion phases
encompassed by our data sample. We argue that other content analysis systems fall short - in
structure and purpose - o f meeting the promise ours holds to the policy scientist.

Overview

Harold Lasswell, whose varied contributions to the social sciences spanned many
disciplines, is well known for his pioneering work on communication theory and quantitative
content analysis methodology (Danielson and Lasorsa 1997; Lasswell 1972, 1968; Neuendorf
2002). Lasswell (1971) is also recognized for establishing the policy sciences analytic framework,
described by Clark (2002, 4) as “a set o f integrated concepts or conceptual tools for framing
thought and action and for guiding analysis, interpretation and resolution o f any problem.”
Despite Lasswell’s renown for his work in both the communications and policy sciences fields,
studies explicitly merging content analysis with the policy sciences framework - apart from
Lasswell’s own writings - are hard to find. This methodological gap is surprising, given the
utility o f content analysis for policy research and the power of Lasswell’s policy sciences analytic
framework, which welcomes the use o f multiple methods.
The purpose o f this article is to introduce an original content analysis categorical system
designed to bridge that gap on at least one front, drawing upon one o f Lasswell’s favorite data
sources - the national news media (Danielson and Lasorsa 1997). Geared to writing an immediate
first draft o f history, news accounts are rich in description about the present and they both reflect
and influence public opinion and policy formation (Bengston, Fan, and Celarier 1999; Huebner,
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Fan, and Finnegan 1997; Jamieson and Campbell 1988; Lang and Lang 1983; Nelkin 1995;
Neuendorf 2002; Trumbo 1995; Wanta, Golan, and Cheolhan 2004). Our content analysis system
- which produces maps of what we call the rhetorical landscape o f policy formation - is designed
to aid the policy scientist in the description o f trends in social and decision processes surrounding
a policy. Specifically, it enables human coders to do the following: identify arguments in news
articles bearing upon a specific policy problem and solutions to solve it; assess the direction o f
the arguments relative to a specific set o f policy goals and principles; categorize the content o f the
arguments; note the stakeholders linked to the argument; and sort the arguments for relevance to
one or more o f five dimensions o f the policymaking process [noted in the previous chapter] that
we call policy issue criteria. We could find no content analysis methodology with similar
structure or purpose and none that unified the above elements o f coding for direction, substance,
stakeholders and relevance to dimensions o f the policy process.
Within the policy sciences analytic framework, recall that Clark (2002) defines social
process as the interaction o f individual and organized interests in society that form the context
within which all policy problems exist. It includes an accounting o f participants, their
perspectives, situations, base values, strategies, outcomes and effects. The decision process
comprises seven activities o f decision making, including the gathering and processing o f
information (Lasswell’s intelligence gathering function) and the promotion o f policies (the
promotion function). To illustrate and test our method, we conducted a content analysis o f 90
news articles about the stratospheric ozone hole written by the New York Times, The Associated
Press and United Press International. We sought out and coded arguments relative to the goals
and principles o f the treaty forged to address the problem - the Montreal Protocol. We chose to
examine the rhetorical landscape during the policy’s intelligence gathering and promotion phases
and thus selected articles written between 1980 and 1987 - the year the protocol was adopted.
Our content analysis was driven by four basic research questions enabled by our coding
categories:
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1. Are the arguments supportive or opposed to the goals and/or principles of the policy?
2. In what proportion are the arguments international or domestic, and economic, political,
social or environmental in nature?
3. What stakeholder groups are the main sources/ subjects o f the arguments?
4. What are arguments’ relevance to one or more o f five policy issue criteria?

The answers to these questions provide a map that enables valuable understanding o f the
rhetorical structure and tenor o f news reporting relative to the protocol. By analyzing
combinations of these variables and their evolution over time, we can relate mapped trends to
social and decision processes surrounding the development of the protocol. As we shall show,
maps o f the rhetorical landscape can inform policy related decisions and processes. Table 3
provides an overview of our approach that can serve as a useful reference throughout the article.

Table 5. Overview of model

1. Collect relevant news articles
News accounts about a policy problem are collected using online databases. Studies show
news media reports both reflect and influence public opinion and policy making.

2. Code news articles
Through our categorical content system we:
• Identify specific arguments relevant to a policy problem and solutions to solve it
• Code those arguments for direction relative to goals and/or principles o f a specific policy
• Describe the substance o f those arguments
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Table 5 Cont.
• Identify stakeholders linked to those arguments
• Match arguments to one or more o f five dimensions o f the policy process

3. Use coding results to inform elements o f policy sciences analytic model
Analyzing empirical coding data and content o f coded arguments enables description of:
• Social Process - (particularly) participants, perspectives, situations, base values and
strategies
• Decision process - (particularly) intelligence gathering and promotion
• Trends - in each o f the our content analysis categories and above policy sciences
elements

We argue that our categorical system stands out in the content analysis literature as uniquely
suited for our task o f analyzing and describing policy-relevant news media accounts. We begin by
showing the need for a categorical system that can help integrate content analysis methodology
and the policy sciences. Second, we articulate that categorical system. Next, we report the results
o f our sample study using that system to address the four research questions outlined above. We
then discuss the advantages and limitations o f our proposed system for informing policy analysis
using the policy sciences analytic framework.

Content analysis and the policy sciences

In an examination o f the evolution of Lasswell’s writings on content analysis, Danielson and
Lasorsa (1997, 104) note that Lasswell and colleagues believed humans lived in a “symbolic
environment,” an “environment o f words and images ... o f meanings that surround us from our
earliest moments o f existence.” Lasswell clearly thought content analysis was a useful method
for mapping that symbolic environment as it was manifested in particular cases. For example, his
1927 dissertation applied content analysis to World War I recruitment posters and pamphlets that
84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were dropped from airplanes and balloons. During World War II, he worked to describe and
predict Nazi communication activity using content analysis o f German newspapers, among other
methods, to provide an important window on enemy morale (Neuendorf 2002). As Naisbitt
(1982,3) reported:

The strain on Germany’s people, industry, and economy began to show up in its newspapers
... Over time, it was possible to piece together what was going on in Germany and to figure
out whether conditions were improving or deteriorating by carefully tracking local stories
about factory openings, closings, and production targets, about train arrivals, departures, and
delays and so on.

After the War, Lasswell developed methods including a precursor to computer-assisted
coding while heading a program at the Hoover Institute and Library on War at Stanford
University, Revolution and the Development o f International Relations. He and his colleagues
painstakingly transferred codes onto punch cards to run through a counter/sorter machine, all the
while working to establish scientific standards for assessing applications o f content analytic
methodology. According to Danielson and Lasorsa (1997, 104):

The methods they used to study the flow o f symbols are not unlike those many researchers
use today: They sampled text over time. They established the reliability and validity o f their
coding techniques. They counted the occurrence o f key symbols in political documents and in
the press. They counted what they called themes (i.e. symbolic condensations o f textual units).
They applied statistical techniques to describe their findings.
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Based on this work, Lasswell is seen as a pioneer who developed “methods of pilot testing, coder
training and reliability assessment that served as early models o f current sound practice”
(Neuendorf 2002, 36).
Lasswell also was interested in using the tools o f content analysis to understand and solve
policy problems. In at least two papers, Lasswell (1968; 1972) discussed how content analysis
could augment studies o f the policy process using his policy sciences analytic framework. This
framework emphasizes problem-oriented inquiry centered around five intellectual tasks:
clarifying goals, describing trends, analyzing conditions, projecting developments and inventing,
evaluating and selecting alternatives (see also Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Lasswell
1971). Conducting this sort o f inquiry requires an understanding o f both the social and decision
processes at work. Lasswell’s social process model requires an inventory o f the participants, or
stakeholders, in the policy process; their perspectives, situations, base values and strategies; and
the outcomes and effects o f their actions. His decision process model focuses on institutional
context: how information is gathered and ideas promoted, what solutions are prescribed, how they
are enforced, how resulting disputes are resolved and how the entire process is evaluated and
ultimately terminated (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Lasswell 1971). Clark (2002, 9),
an expert user o f the policy sciences framework as applied to natural resources and environmental
policy problems, underscored the importance o f Lasswell’s policy sciences analytic framework:
“Just as we need maps to locate ourselves spatially in an ecosystem and to carry out management
activities, we need realistic maps of the policy process in which we participate.”
Lasswell (1968) thought those maps could be generated by sampling the flow of
communication throughout society to disclose policy-significant trends. He proposed dividing the
types o f communication examined into eight base values categories within his social process
model: “Power (e.g. Government, law and politics); Enlightenment (Language, science and
communication); Wealth (Agriculture, industry and finance); Well-being (Safety, health and
comfort); Skill (Education, arts, vocations); Affection (Family, fraternities); Respect (Classes,
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castes); and Rectitude (Religion, ethics)” (Lasswell 1968, 60). Lasswell (1968, 62) also presented
as a “model o f communication” the seven category social process model of the policy sciences
analytic framework discussed above —participants, perspectives, situations, base values,
strategies and outcomes (Clark 2002). Lasswell (1968, 62) related these categories to content
analysis, observing that the seven elements together posed the question: “who, with what
intentions, in what situations, with what assets, using what strategies, reaches what audiences,
with what result?” This focus on communication as a process is one o f Lasswell’s most enduring
contributions to the communication field, as well as a powerful methodological emphasis for
policy analysts.
Four years later, Lasswell (1972, 307) challenged communication researchers to take a
more active role in society as “a third, disinterested voice to supply a competing appraisal of the
images spread by self-serving sources.” He urged them to “report on the adequacy o f flows of
information that enter into policymaking, as well as on the functioning o f the policy process at all
stages” (1972, 301). He also demonstrated how each o f the decision process functions are open to
study and assessment using standards attached to each by the policy sciences framework. For
example, researchers could appraise the intelligence gathering function for its “dependability,
comprehensiveness, selectivity, creativity and openness” (Lasswell 1972, 308). He offered this
approach as a way for communication researchers to “take some o f our destiny in hand” and
chided them with this closing remark: “I therefore pose the question: Do you think that you will
get on with it?” (Lasswell 1972, 310).

Structure and uses o f content analysis. To provide context for the methodology described
in this paper, we now take a broader look at the use o f content analysis today and the many forms
it takes. Communications researchers, social scientists, psychologists, and commercial analysts
study a wide array o f messages - ranging from news accounts (e.g. Bengston, Fan, and Celarier
1999; Jordan and Page 1992; Zehr 2000) to academic and popular journals (e.g. Henslin and
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Roesti 1976; Malone and Orthner 1988) and transcripts o f hearings and interviews (e.g. Taber
1992; Korsmo 1990) to movies (e.g. Stem 2005), advertising billboards (e.g. Mastro and Atkin
2002) and Web sites (e.g. Musso, Weare, and Hale 2000). In addition, the studies explore a
variety o f dimensions o f communication ranging from the structure o f the message alone to
characteristics o f its source and the impact o f the message on its receivers.
Today, many studies, whether funded by government agencies or by the private sector,
examine message content to inform policy making and governance. In the 1970s, the U.S.
Bureau o f Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Department o f Health, Education and Welfare
funded separate content analysis studies in Michigan as part of efforts to gauge the effects of
alcohol advertising and children’s television programs respectively (Neuendorf 2002). Taber
(1992), a political scientist, conducted a content analysis o f Congressional Record documents to
build a model to anticipate decisions o f policymakers to specific events, including an invasion of
South Korea by North Korea. Huebner and colleagues (1997) conducted a study o f news articles
written over a year’s time to gauge the impact o f media coverage on public opinion surrounding
President Clinton’s universal health insurance proposal. In a study supported by the U.S.
Department o f Agriculture’s Forest Service, Bengston et al. (1999) analyzed online news articles
about U.S. national forests to measure changes in public opinion about the recreational,
commodity, ecological and aesthetic values o f forests. Musso and colleagues (Musso, Weare, and
Hale 2000) analyzed 270 municipal Web sites in California against a theoretical framework for
management and government designed to evaluate the performance o f local governments. These
are but a few examples o f how the method o f content analysis can be used for policy-relevant
research. Lasswell understood the potential o f content analysis to better understand the policy
process, specifically, using his policy sciences analytic framework.
Neuendorf (2002) offers a useful integrative model o f content analysis that enables us to
classify content analysis studies according to whether they focus on one or more o f the following
qualities: the source o f the message; the message and channel it follows; and the receiver o f the
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message. One limitation of content analysis is that it can only “describe message characteristics
or identify relationships among message characteristics . . . ” (Neuendorf 2002, 53). Content
analysis cannot substitute for other methods, such as polls, surveys, and interviews used to
understand communication. But in combination with one or more o f these other methods, content
analysis methodology can help researchers study relationships between messages, senders, and
receivers. Neuendorf (2002, 66) cites the work o f Gottschalk et al. as an example o f studying
message senders. Gottschalk and Fronczek analyzed the content o f subjects’ reports o f dreams
and then combined this data with physiological measures o f the subjects taken at three different
levels o f consciousness to reach conclusions about their “cerebral representations o f hopefulness
and hopelessness” (Gottschalk, Fronczek, and Buchsbaum 1993, 14).
In the field o f mass communications, agenda setting research often combines news media
content analysis (the message) with survey data to draw conclusions about the effects o f news
coverage on public opinion (the receiver) (e.g. Wanta, Golan, and Cheolhan 2004). An ambitious
study by Trumbo (1995) outlines a method to map synergistic effects between the media, public
opinion, and policymaking —wherein each plays a role as source and receiver. Simpler, but no
less informative, are some studies that examine message content alone without linking data to
source or receiver. Dixon and Linz (2002) do this in an analysis o f news coverage o f pretrial
publicity o f criminal defendants in Los Angeles that focused on the relationship between reported
race o f the defendants and the amount o f prejudicial information - as defined by the American
Bar Association - contained in newscasts. They found that blacks and Latinos were twice as
likely to be associated with prejudicial statements.

News articles as data. O f all the sources o f messages available for analysis, Lasswell and
his colleagues working at the Hoover Institute put a premium on newspaper reports, which they
found “accessible and rich in the vocabulary o f political ideology current among the elite at any
given time” (Lasswell, Lemer, and Pool 1952, 17). Studies show that the news media reflect and
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also influence both public opinion and policy making. Bengston, Fan and Celarier (1999, 187)
report: “Analysis of the content o f news media has repeatedly been shown to produce results that
are remarkably similar to attitude surveys and opinion polls.” Conversely, research on agenda
setting theory shows that mass media “not only highlight important issues to consider but also
provide interpretive frameworks that influence individuals to think about issues in certain ways
but not others” (Huebner, Fan, and Finnegan 1997,254). Further, Jordan and Page (1992, 227)
report that analyses “have indicated that U.S. foreign policy corresponds with what a majority o f
Americans favor, and that “changes in collective public opinion are followed by congruent
changes in policy about two thirds o f the time.” Such findings are summed up well by Nelkin
(1995, 72), who writes: “It is the media that creates the reality and sets the public agenda, directly
influencing policy decisions.”
International news media, according to Schrondt (2001), resemble “professional
intelligence services in both function and structure.” Schrondt concurs with Whaley (Whaley,
1973 cited in Schrondt 2001) who wrote o f news services: “They ferret out, collect, collate,
evaluate, analyze, summarize and report vast quantities o f information, and they do so with an
organization comprising correspondents in the field with their local networks and stringers.”
Given the comprehensive nature o f news accounts, a sizable sample o f articles can yield much
information about a policy issue. We turn now to our method, illustrating it at all stages with our
study o f news coverage about the stratospheric ozone problem.

A new category system for mapping the rhetorical landscape

Finding articles to code. The news media was and continues to be integral to the Montreal
Protocol policy process. Wrote Benedick (1998, 28), a principal architect and chief U.S.
negotiator o f the protocol:
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The U.S. media played an important role in keeping the issue before the American public
through press and television coverage o f the scientific theories and warnings over use o f
CFCs. After the diplomatic negotiations began in 1986, media attention intensified; the ozone
threat was featured in such widely circulated magazines as Time and Sports Illustrated.

We selected articles from three news sources for our study: The AP, UPI, and The New
York Times. The AP and UPI are international news wire services and the N ew York Times is a
daily newspaper distributed internationally in print and worldwide on the Internet. We chose
these organizations because o f their ability to reach millions o f readers in the United States and
around the world; the accessibility o f their articles via archives on the Internet; and their
consistent and relatively high ethical standards (The Associated Press 2003; United Press
International 2002; The New York Times 2003).
We accessed news articles from the Lexis-Nexis database, requesting stories from The
AP, UPI, and New York Times written between 1980 and 1987 - the eight years leading up to the
enactment o f the Montreal Protocol - that contained in their body the terms “stratospheric ozone”
or “ozone hole” or “Montreal Protocol.” To avoid duplicates o f the same wire service articles, we
selected only AM (morning) and BC (both news cycle) stories. BC stories are essentially identical
stories that run in both the morning and evening news cycles. This process yielded 90 articles for
us to code, with the bulk o f stories written in 1986 and 1987.
Unlike the Bengston and Huebner methods, which rely on computer programs to identify
and code phrases, our method used the judgment o f human coders. Scholars on argumentation
and persuasion (Bitzer 1959; Woodward and Denton 2000) have long contended that important
elements o f arguments are often implied rather than explicit in statements made within a text. We
believe human coders are more alert to those implied elements as they read arguments in their
context. Thus, whatever our method lacks in relative speed o f analysis and quantity o f articles
analyzed, it makes up in quality of analysis. In some cases, text is best analyzed by humans
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because, as Stone put it, “somewhere embedded in the analysis is a very human judgment” (Stone
1997, 47).
Our coding scheme can be accomplished on pencil and paper but we use a qualitative
analysis program (Atlas.ti 2003) that allows us to load our articles in text format onto a computer
screen, electronically highlight passages, and assign our codes to them. We can easily search and
sort our results using an electronic search function. Separately, we record the presence or absence
o f codes using ones and zeros in a computer spreadsheet program which enables us to make
graphic charts o f our findings.
Researchers code the articles by following four steps: (1) identify statements to be coded;
(2) assign each statement one or more o f 16 codes to establish the direction and substance o f the
argument relative to the proposed policy (these codes can only count once per article); (3) assign
each statement one or more o f five policy issue criteria codes; (4) note the source/subject o f each
statement and assign it a corresponding code (i.e. a statement by a scientists would be coded
“scientist”).

Identifying arguments in articles. Researchers seek out statements in news articles that
bear upon (1) the destruction o f stratospheric ozone by manmade chemicals called
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and/or (2) proposals to solve the problem o f stratospheric ozone
depletion. Statements qualify for coding if they comprise both a claim and data. These elements
o f argument, drawn from Toulmin’s theory o f argument (Toulmin 1958; Toulmin, Rieke, and
Janik 1979), constitute the “main proof line” (Brockriede and Ehninger 1960), which Hauser
(1986, 178) succinctly explains as follows: “Data answers the question, ‘What have you got to go
on?’ ... Claim is the inference drawn as a conclusion from the data. It is where we are going with
the argument.” Consider the elements o f two example arguments, which we will refer to as we
describe our coding steps. Note first that both arguments are relevant to either our policy problem
or the proposed solution.
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Claim: “Dr. Joseph M. Steed, a DuPont scientist, said, "discussion o f the possible effect on
ozone from chlorofluorocarbons alone is unrealistic and does not reflect real world
conditions.’” Data: “He said new computer calculations made at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory suggest there will be no change in the ozone layer over the next century
when the combined effect of several chemicals are considered” (Connell 1982).

In this case, the underlined claim is supported by “new computer calculations.” Those
calculations are what Steed, in the words o f Hauser, has “to go on.”

Claim: “Ms. Ehrsam said McDonald's products would continue to be sold in foam packages,
but they will be manufactured with hydrocarbon-based blowing agents. Data: “She said
these agents are considered environmentally safe by federal authorities. ‘We don't anticipate
any added costs to our customers, she said in a telephone interview’” (Goeller 1987).

Here the claim that McDonald’s will continue using foam packages is supported by two forms o f
data: the contention that the new foam packages are environmentally safe and that using them
will likely not cost more. Often claims and data are lumped closely together, but sometimes they
are in separate parts o f the story. Transition words like “because,” “thus,” and “therefore” are
good indicators o f data and claims but they are not always present, as with the first example
above. Sometimes several claims made in one article rely on the same statement or statements o f
data. Here again we see the necessity o f human evaluation to detect connections between claims
and data.

Coding the Direction and Substance o f Arguments. Before we can code an argument
about stratospheric ozone depletion for its relevance to the Montreal Protocol, we must more
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narrowly define what we mean by the Montreal Protocol. This is necessary to ensure focus and
consistency. Thus, for coding purposes, we define the Montreal Protocol by its most basic goals
and principles, which we distilled from the original 1987 document. The goals are to freeze CFC
emissions in 1989 at 1986 levels; reduce emissions by 20 percent in 1993; and by another 30
percent by 1998. The principles comprise the 244-word preamble to the original protocol (UNEP
1987 reprinted in Benedick, 353).
Having identified an argument, coders then proceed to code it for both rhetorical
substance and direction relative to the goals and principles of the Montreal Protocol. Direction
refers to whether the argument is opposed or in support o f the protocol. For example, an article
might contain several arguments against cutting back the production o f chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) to halt the worldwide destruction of stratospheric ozone. If the proposed policy being
studied is the Montreal Protocol, which calls for just that, then these statements would be coded
as arguments “Against” the proposed policy that are international or transboundary. Substance
refers to two sets o f criteria: First, whether the argument is economic, political, social, or
environmental (we use the more inclusive but slightly less intuitive term “natural”); and second,
whether it is international or domestic in scope. For example, if opposition to the protocol is
based on, say, the exorbitant cost to transnational corporations, the substance o f the argument
would be coded “Economic,” rather than “Social” or “Political.” It would also be coded
“Transboundary,” rather than “Local.” An argument that is determined to be “For” the Montreal
Protocol and is “Social” and “Transboundary” gets the code “FST.”
In all, this approach yields 16 potential code combinations for direction and substance.
Eight are “For”: FEL, FET, FPL, FPT, FSL, FST, FNL, FNT. And eight are “Against”: AEL,
AET, APL, APT, ASL, AST, ANL, ANT. We provide some examples below. Let’s code our first
sample argument from the DuPont scientist. Because the Montreal Protocol aims to correct the
problem o f stratospheric ozone depletion by eliminating CFCs, we can conclude by reviewing our
criteria and the goals and principles o f the protocol that this statement is “Against” the protocol.
94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The data are grounded in scientific research on the environment and so we code the argument
“Natural.” Finally, the argument is concerned with a transboundary phenomenon - the destruction
o f ozone - and so we code it “Transboundary.” The result is the three-letter code: ANT.
Now to the second argument, which qualifies for more than one code. McDonald’s has
announced that it is giving up on packaging containing CFCs and switching to products that do
no not harm the ozone layer. This is clearly in line with the goals and principles of the Montreal
Protocol and so we code it “For.” The data, again, are concerned with environmental quality and
so we code it “Natural.” However, a case could be made that this argument is also “Economic”
because the data indicates that environmentally safe substitutes are commercially available. Is it
Transboundary or Local? On this, the two codes split. Environmentally, it’s a transboundary issue,
because CFCs know no borders. Economically, it’s a local issue, because elsewhere in the article
the McDonald’s spokesperson said the packaging changes would take place first only in the
United States. So we code this argument both FNT and FEL.

Coding Arguments for Relevance to Policy Issue Criteria. In the next step, the coders
determine which o f five criteria o f effective policy making are put at issue by the arguments.
These criteria include (1) the establishment o f an accurate definition o f the problem, (2) the
proposition o f a policy solution appropriate to the defined problem, (3) the acquisition o f
necessary support for the policy, (4) the technical feasibility o f the proposed policy and (5) the
establishment o f accountability for carrying out the solution. It is possible for an argument to be
relevant to just one or several o f these categories at once. We call these criteria o f “effective”
policymaking because we believe each must be addressed and adjudicated during public policy
formation (Lasswell 1971; Brewer and deLeon 1983). For example, news articles might contain
statements contesting the theory that CFCs destroy ozbne. This relates to the issue o f whether the
policy is based on an appropriate definition o f the problem. Another statement might refer to the
logistical difficulties o f pulling off such a ban, which would clearly relate to the issue o f
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feasibility. In sum, these five criteria enable us to envision the overall range o f possible issues a
proposed policy faces and get a sense o f that policy’s potential to resolve these issues.
Our sample DuPont argument is primarily relevant to the first o f the five criteria: Does the
argument relate to whether the policy problem is defined appropriately? Our McDonald’s
argument was coded twice. The first code, FNT, is relevant to several o f the criteria: the
definition o f the problem, support for the policy, and the feasibility o f the policy. The second
code, FEL, is relevant to support for the policy and the policy’s feasibility.

Identifying Stakeholder Groups. The final step in the coding process records the
stakeholders (i.e. scientists, environmentalists, the public, and industry officials) that are
explicitly linked to coded arguments. By explicitly linked we mean that the stakeholder is either
the clearly identified source o f an argument or a clear topic o f the argument. For example, an
argument by an environmentalist deriding industry’s position on CFCs would be coded both
“environmentalist” and “industry.” Codes to identify stakeholder groups should be created only
after completing the task o f coding all arguments in the sample for direction, substance, and
policy issue criteria. After examining the claims in this study, we created seven categories for
stakeholders that appeared most often in the arguments: “scientists,” “U.S. government,”
“industry,” “environmentalists,” “United Nations” and “Europe.” This is a somewhat subjective
process that depends not only on the content o f the sample’s arguments but the level o f detail the
researcher wishes to consider. Once the codes are defined, assigning them is relatively
straightforward. Arguments that do not have explicitly named stakeholders are left without a
stakeholder code. Allowing that stakeholders can wear more than one hat, a single source in an
argument can be assigned more than one code. For example, our example statement by the
DuPont scientist was coded “industry” and “scientist.” Many arguments contain multiple
stakeholders. The example below was coded “U.S. government,” “industry,” and “scientists.”
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“NASA, which will provide most o f the money, will be joined in the effort by at
least three other Federal science agencies; the Chemical Manufacturers
Association; scientists from Harvard University, the University o f Denver, and
the University o f Washington, and the governments o f Argentina, Chile, France,
New Zealand and Britain” (NASA team plans to investigate ozone hole above the Antarctic
1987).

Intercoder Reliability. The true value o f our descriptive policy model lies in its potential
to be effectively replicated and used by others. In their article on assessing and reporting
intercoder reliability in mass communication content analysis, Lombard, Snyder-Duch and
Bracken (2002, 589) define intercoder reliability as “the extent to which independent coders
evaluate a characteristic o f a message or artifact and reach the same conclusion.” They note that
when intercoder reliability is not established, the data and its interpretations o f the data “can
never be considered valid” (2002, 589). As noted earlier, in this study, we subscribe to a
definition o f validity that Schwandt (1997) calls “fallibilistic validity”: “Here validity is
understood as a test o f whether an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it
refers. Yet no claim is made that... a valid account is absolutely certain. Defenders o f this view
hold that one can have good reasons for accepting an account as true or false, yet an account is
always fallible” (Schwandt 1997, 169).
We tested our method by having two senior undergraduate students and an
author/researcher independently code a subset o f our sample (49 o f the 90 articles) after
undergoing five hours o f training - which included coding five separate articles each - to
familiarize themselves with the method and calibrate their judgment. After coding the five test
articles, the team discussed the results and compiled some additional guidelines to help handle
“tough calls” specific to their subject matter. The coding results discussed in this paper are those
conducted by the researcher alone on the 90 article sample.
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Lombard and colleagues (2002, 588) note that “there are few standards or guidelines
available concerning how to properly calculate and report intercoder reliability” and few
established standards for what constitutes acceptable intercoder reliability. To measure intercoder
reliability, we chose both the commonly used percent agreement and the more rigorous Cohen’s
kappa test. For both measures, .00 = no agreement and 1.00 = perfect agreement. Percent
agreement “is the percentage of all coding decisions made by pairs o f coders on which the coders
agree” (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002, 590). A kappa score is “a measure o f
agreement between two observers taking into account agreement that could occur by chance
(expected agreement)” (Kappa 2000). Because o f this, kappa scores, which are more conservative,
are consistently lower than percent agreement scores. Given Lombard’s definition o f intercoder
reliability, cited earlier, we can conclude that high scores indicate coders understand the coding
categories in a similar way and apply them to get similar results.
There are few hard and fast rules for what constitutes an acceptable level o f reliability.
For percent agreement, we concur with “rules o f thumb” from several methodologists compiled
by Neuendorf (2002, 143) who writes that “coefficients o f .90 or greater would be acceptable to
all, .80 acceptable in most situations, and below that there exists great disagreement.” She notes
that more liberal criteria are used for more conservative measures, including kappa. We chose the
following criteria by Landis and Koch (1977, 165) for interpreting the results o f kappa tests:
Poor = .0-.19; Fair = ,2-.39; Moderate = ,4-.59; Substantial = .6-.79; Almost Perfect .8-1. In Table
4 we report the percent and kappa scores for the level o f agreement between our student coders
and between the researcher and each student respectively for two categories o f rhetorical
direction; six categories o f rhetorical substance; the aggregate direction and substance; and the
aggregate policy issue criteria.
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Table 6. Summary o f Intercoder Reliability Results

Coder 1/Coder 2

Control/ Coder 1

Control/ Coder 2

Code

Kappa

Percent

Kappa

Percent

Kappa

Percent

For

0.66

0.85

0.65

0.84

0.73

0.88

Against

0.45

0.94

0.39

0.91

0.34

0.92

Economic

0.37

0.90

0.43

0.90

0.46

0.92

Political

0.38

0.80

0.47

0.80

0.58

0.83

Social

0.79

0.93

0.65

0.90

0.66

0.90

Natural

0.86

0.94

0.79

0.91

0.85

0.94

Local

0.11

0.92

0.34

0.93

0.33

0.93

Transboundary

0.71

0.87

0.62

0.83

0.71

0.87

Direction &
Substance (N =
784)

Above eight
categories

0.66

0.89

0.62

0.88

0.68

0.90

Policy Issue
Criteria (N =
245)

Combined five
policy issue
categories

0.56

0.78

0.55

0.78

0.55

0.77

Direction Across
eight variations
o f each code (N
= 392)

Substance
Across four
variations o f
each code (N=
196)

Substance
Across eight
variations (N=
392)

(We did not test intercoder reliability for identifying stakeholders groups because it is
found in explicit content and requires little, if any, judgment.) Note that the scores for direction
and substance codes are based on a more thorough test o f all of their possible combinations, as
opposed to a more basic test o f their individual presence or absence in the 49 articles. For
example, the kappa and percent score for the code “For” collectively tests results for: FEL, FET,
FPL, FPT, FSL, FST, FNL and FNT. Thus, the sample size is 392; that is eight possible
combinations multiplied by 49 news articles. Likewise, scores for Economic codes are based on a
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test o f all four possible combinations: FEL, FET, AEL and AET. The sample size here is 196;
four possible code combinations multiplied by 49.
On the aggregate or overall direction and substance o f arguments, the kappa test revealed
a “substantial” level o f agreement among all three coders. By our criteria, percent agreements
were well within the “acceptable” range. Agreement among coders on the overall set o f policy
issue criteria was in the “moderate” range. Neuendorf lists four broad factors that can threaten
reliability: a poorly executed coding scheme, inadequate coder training, coder fatigue and the
presence o f a rogue coder. We took care to avoid all o f these by practicing, limiting our coding
time to 90 minutes with breaks, and familiarizing ourselves with our own environmental biases.
Fair to moderate kappa scores and percent agreement in the low 80s reveal a need for
improvement in the Political category. In the Economic and Local categories, we also netted only
fair to moderate kappa scores but very high percent scores. This split is an artifact o f the relative
dearth o f Economic and Local arguments in our data set and the kappa statistic formula itself.
Kappa requires not only a demonstration that coders can agree when something is not present in
the data but that that they also can agree when it is. In our case, the coders agreed
overwhelmingly that Economic and Local arguments were absent from many articles in our data
set. Because the sample o f possible matches for present Economic and Local arguments was quite
small, any mismatches in detecting the presence o f these arguments carried a greater weight given
how the kappa statistic is computed. The remedy for this could be more training on a data set
richer in these types o f arguments. However, to the extent news coverage is focused away from
one or more o f our substance categories and heavily on something else - as reports on specific
topics are likely to do - this effect may again appear in our kappa scores. The more coders train
and the wider variety of arguments they encounter, the more likely they will agree.

Coder Orientation. Though the coders follow the same instructions, they are also making
subjective judgment calls which could be influenced by personal beliefs about the environment
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and how humans interact with it. Dryzek notes that everyone subscribes to one or more
environmental discourses. Because coders’ varied environmental discourses have the potential to
skew our intercoder reliability results, we had the students and researcher rate their agreement or
disagreement - on a scale o f 1-10 - with summaries o f Dryzek’s nine environmental discourses
(Dryzek 1997).
For the purposes o f our analyses in this paper, we identify our two student coders as
“Coder 1” and “Coder 2,” and the researcher as “Control.” To assess the similarity between the
raters’ endorsement o f Dryzek’s nine discourses, a Pearson r (SPSS, 2003) was performed on the
nine scores for each pair o f coders with the following results: Coder 1/Coder 2 = .602; Control /
Coder 1 = .878; and Control/ Coder 2 = .831. Overall, there is pretty high consistency among all
three coders in preference levels for the nine discourses. We conclude from this that it would be
hard to link any differences in news article coding outcomes to different environmental discourse
preferences.

Policy-relevant “maps” o f news reportage about the Montreal Protocol
Our categorical system yielded useful maps o f the rhetorical landscape o f the Montreal
Protocol as manifested in news reporting. Here are the leading features o f these maps. Are the
arguments supportive, or opposed to the goals and/or principles o f the policy? In all, we identified
and coded 294 arguments. O f those, the vast majority (79 percent or 231 arguments) were “For”
the Montreal Protocol’s goals and principles. The remaining 21 percent (63 arguments) were
coded “Against.” In what proportion are the arguments international or domestic, and economic,
political, social, or environmental in nature? We found that scientific and environmental (natural)
arguments supporting the protocol’s goals and principles predominated, followed closely by
political and social arguments. Results were as follows: “Natural” (39 percent, 114 arguments),
followed by “Political” (31 percent, 91 arguments), “Social” (19 percent, 56 arguments) and then
“Economic” (11 percent, 33 arguments). International arguments outnumbered domestic
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arguments more than five-to-one and largely focused on the environmental consequences o f the
policy problem. “Transboundary” arguments (84 percent, or 247 arguments) predominated, as
opposed to “Local” arguments (16 percent, 47 arguments). This was not surprising because our
study examines a transboundary environmental problem. What stakeholder groups are main
sources/ subjects o f the arguments? The analysis identified principal stakeholder groups in our
sample listed here in order o f their relative prevalence as a percent o f total arguments to which
they are linked: scientists and researchers (35 percent, 113 arguments), U.S. Government officials
and agencies (29 percent, 92 arguments), industry officials (10 percent, 32 claims), European
officials (9 percent, 29 claims), the public in general (7 percent, 22 claims), the United Nations (7
percent, 22 claims), and environmentalists (3 percent, 10 claims). We also identified relationships
between arguments and policy-related issues: definition o f the problem; appropriate solutions;
political support; technical feasibility; and accountability for implementation. Recall that more
than one policy issue criteria code can be assigned to a single argument. Thus the percentages for
the five categories o f the whole sample (294 arguments) do not add up to 100. The percentage
distributions follow: problem (59 percent, 172 claims), policy (35 percent, 103 claims), support
(31 percent, 92 claims), feasibility (20 percent, 58 claims), and accountability (2 percent, 5
claims).
When examining these results it is useful to look at the distribution o f substance codes
(Economic, Political, Social and Natural) across each policy issue category to understand which
kinds o f arguments are more relevant to each respective policy issue criteria. Figure 1 shows the
raw number o f arguments between 1980 and 1987 that fell into each o f our five policy issue
criteria categories by direction and substance.
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Figure 5. Policy issue criteria by direction and substance o f arguments in news reports

We can ask, for example, if a discussion about the policy problem is mostly about economics or
about natural science. We find that it is mostly about natural science. It is also useful, in some
instances, to know what percent of a given substance category comprises the data assigned to a
particular criterion. For example, a stack o f economic arguments in the feasibility category might
seem relatively small at first glance, but it represents the largest concentration o f economic
arguments among the five policy issue categories. We can claim that economic arguments are
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more closely tied to feasibility than any o f the other issue criteria. Let’s examine what the data
tell us about each o f the five policy issue criteria.
A majority o f the arguments in the news reports were focused on the policy problem
itself. Within that category arguments were predominantly about the natural environment (60
percent o f 172 arguments) and cancer risks to society (30 percent o f 172). When we examine the
number o f Natural and Social claims in the problem category as a percentage o f the total number
o f each in our data the percentages jump to 90 and 93 respectively. In other words, more than
nine out o f 10 claims in both the Natural and Social categories have relevance to the policy
problem. In contrast, Political arguments predominated on the policy issue (62 percent o f a total
103 claims), followed by Economic and Natural arguments (15 and 14 percent, respectively of
103). Political arguments predominated on the support issue (63 percent o f 92 claims), followed
distantly by Economic and Natural arguments. Economic and Political arguments virtually tied on
the issue o f feasibility (45 percent and 47 percent respectively o f 58 claims). The importance o f
Economic arguments to feasibility issues becomes clear when we consider that 26 o f 33
Economic arguments in the entire data set are linked to feasibility. Put another way, more than
three out o f four Economic claims were relevant to feasibility. We found very few arguments (5
claims) related to accountability issues. The near absence o f arguments related to that issue might
be explained by the fact that the policy was new and that implementation monitoring and
enforcement had not been initiated during the period o f the study. It might also reflect a relative
lack o f interest in these matters on the part o f the news media.

Discussion

We contend that our methodology for mapping the rhetorical landscape o f policy-relevant
news reportage (1) has utility for users o f the policy sciences analytic framework, (2) improves
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upon other category systems and (3) raises important methodological issues. We shall discuss
these in turn.

Utility for users o f the policy sciences framework. The data appearing on our rhetorical
landscape map can be used to chart an understanding o f the social and decision processes
surrounding the Montreal Protocol. Our system can inform understanding o f at least five o f the
seven elements o f the social process as defined by Lasswell and colleagues: (1) Participants: these
are the people and organizations with a stake in the policy; (2) Perspectives: the varied
viewpoints o f these stakeholders; (3) Situations: the situations in which the stakeholders interact;
(4) Base Values: assets used by stakeholders to pursue their goals (power, wealth, enlightenment,
skill, well-being, affection, respect and rectitude); (5) Strategies: the approaches stakeholders use
to achieve their goals (Clark 2002, 33-34). We do not list the sixth and seventh elements o f the
social process - the short-term “outcomes” and long-term “effects” - because our study is limited
to news accounts written during the run-up to the actual adoption o f the Montreal Protocol and
the months just after its approval. We chose this time frame because we wanted to observe the
social process during the policy’s development. Our data therefore has little to say about
outcomes and nothing to say about long-term changes. For the same reason, the demonstration o f
our method in this article is limited to the first two o f the seven decision process elements: (1)
Intelligence gathering: how information is obtained to make decisions, and (2) Promotion:
defined by Clark as “recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives” (Clark 2002,
61). As the policy itself progresses, we can expect news reports to say more about the remaining
five decision process categories: prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination.
To demonstrate the utility of our data for informing the social and decision processes, we
will focus primarily on the largest group o f participants (stakeholders) in our sample - scientists.
Scientists took the lion’s share o f the media spotlight, appearing in 113 arguments, or 35 percent
o f the total. A quick review of these arguments shows that scientists represented a wide array o f
105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

institutions, including universities in the United States and abroad, U.S. government agencies
such as NASA and NOAA, and associations such as the National Science Foundation and the
United Nations’ World Meteorological Organization. A minority o f scientists quoted in news
reports worked for the chemical industry. Figures 2 gives data about the perspectives o f our five
biggest stakeholder groups over the entire sample period - from 1980 to 1987 - by tallying the
direction and substance o f the arguments to which they are linked.
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Figure 6. Stakeholders' arguments by substance in news reports on the ozone hole 1980-1987.
We can see immediately that the scientist profile in Figure 2 is a very close match in
structure and size to the “problem” profile in Figure 1. Scientists’ arguments were
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overwhelmingly, and understandably, grounded in research on the environment. By more than a
two-to-one margin, their arguments supported the protocol’s aims, whether manifested as direct
quotes or as boilerplate background statements. This tells us much about the intelligence
gathering function in the decision process. The following argument was typical:

Scientists have strongly suspected for a decade that chlorine, and particularly the
chlorofluorocarbons used in refrigeration, aerosols and other commercial applications,
destroys ozone molecules and thus depletes the stratospheric blanket that filters out most
ultraviolet radiation from the sun (Freudenheim, Clarity, and Mansnerus 1986).

Scientists’ arguments coded “Against” the protocol typically presented alternative
theories to ozone destruction or urged a wait-and-see approach, both o f which run counter to the
protocol’s goals o f quickly cutting back CFCs. By searching the code combination “scientists”
“Against” “Natural” “problem” - we can focus on specific arguments and explore the reasoning
behind them. The above search combination gets 22 hits, among them a claim from a Clarkson
University professor that wind patterns were to blame for ozone destruction. The data we coded
as backing this claim provides useful information: “‘The observed 40 percent decline in Antarctic
column density o f ozone between 1979 and 1985 can be caused by a 16 degree Celsius (29
degrees Fahrenheit) cooling in the lower stratosphere. Such a temperature change has in fact
occurred,’ he said” (Darst 1987).
The data w e’ve examined so far also can tell us a good deal about the situations o f our
stakeholders disclosed through the arguments. Scientists, for their part, mostly presented research
results while politicians debated and promoted policy. Figure 3 shows that government officials
were linked in far greater proportion than scientists to arguments relevant to policy and support —
codes that collectively provide a gauge o f the promotion function in the decision process.
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Figure 7. Top five stakeholder arguments by policy issue criteria in news reports 1987.
Figure 3 also shows some exceptions among scientists. By searching the corresponding
code combination - “scientists” “For” “Natural” “policy” - we find that Sherwood Rowland, a
pioneer in CFC-ozone research from the University o f Califomia-Irvine, urged U.S. senators at a
hearing a month after the Montreal Protocol’s approval to do more: “We need to act now and
impose severe restrictions on CFC emissions immediately if we want to bring the chlorine
concentrations in the atmosphere under control by early in the next century” (Goeller 1987). Our
methodology enables us to focus in on Rowland’s remarks, while our results tell us that among
his peers his stance was the exception and not the rule - a rare example o f policy promotion
among scientists quoted in the news media.
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While reviewing arguments, we can often discern the context or situation in which our
stakeholders interacted. Scientists’ efforts and opinions were a constant staple o f news coverage.
They often were cited in the release o f new research findings or at the launching o f research
studies. Scientists also spoke at Congressional hearings and in interviews from research stations.
As a whole, they were portrayed as busy, systematic, pursuers o f data using high-flying airplanes,
satellites, and computers in an effort to save the planet. We also find that some research scientists
find themselves in a competitive situation. ‘“People always disagree with the competition,”’
chemist Igor Eberstein told The AP in a story entitled “Theory Blames Ozone Loss on Snowballs
from Space.” Said Eberstein, who devised the theory with colleague physicist Maurice Dubin,
“Like many new theories, it generates hostility from people who have established views” (Siegel
1987).
Examining the context o f claims also provides insight into the base values o f our
stakeholder groups. Our data show that scientists command the bulk o f news media attention
regarding the stratospheric ozone problem, and that is an important form o f power - the power to
make one’s message heard. Because o f scientists’ enlightenment about atmospheric chemistry
and their skill at researching the problem o f ozone destruction, they had the ear o f policy making
bodies, including Congress, which financed much o f their research. Their wealth is in the form o f
government grants to pay salaries, launch and operate satellites, and sustain expeditions at the
South Pole. Rectitude is apparent among scientists to the extent their comments reflect the ethics
o f their profession - such as not rushing to conclusions on limited data. Rowland, for his part,
broke with convention by recommending a policy o f “severe” cutbacks in CFCs. This was
motivated by his concern for public Well-being. While doubtless important to scientists, little is
mentioned in our problem context about the remaining base values o f respect and affection.
The strategies element o f the social process is difficult to illuminate with our data, but we can see
political maneuvers used to capture the media’s attention. Several stories in our sample focused
on a controversial suggestion by Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel that the U.S. government
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consider promoting use o f hats and sunglasses as an alternative to an ozone treaty and the reaction
to it: “Environmentalists and members o f both parties in Congress denounced the purported plan
Friday as irresponsible and absurd” (Darst 1987).
On the other hand, we could not find (as did Benedick 1998, 5) the close collaboration
between politicians and scientists, “who were drawn out o f their laboratories and into the
negotiation process,” credited with raising the knowledge base about the ozone problem and
communicating the need for a solution to the public. Benedick reports that this coordination was
central to large media and diplomatic campaigns by the U.S. government and the UNEP for a
global ozone treaty, but we found no explicit reference to this coordination. However, our data do
show strong support for the protocol among scientists and government officials that certainly
comports with Benedick’s observations. Our data reveal elements o f the social and decision
processes, but also can, to some extent, conceal manifestations o f those elements. For example,
absent entirely from news accounts are voices o f lay citizens. Instead, they are referred to by
scientists and politicians as potential victims in sweeping statements about the public welfare and
health o f “Americans.” For this, we created the stakeholder category entitled “public.” Our data
shows the public was overwhelmingly invoked in arguments favoring the protocol about the
“problem” and “Social” danger of skin cancer. Environmentalist-related arguments barely
registered in news reports. (They were attached to three percent o f the claims.) The relative
absence o f these groups says much about who the news media chooses to listen to and who to
ignore.
Let’s now consider some o f the policy-related trends disclosed in our data. We know that
on balance the news reporting is overwhelmingly supportive o f the goals and principles o f the
Montreal Protocol. More than half o f all the arguments were about the problem. The problem is
defined in the media as CFCs causing the ozone hole, leading to a human skin cancer risk. The
bulk o f articles (exactly two-thirds) were published in the busy last year o f our sample, 1987.
Examining the data over time, we see that spikes in news coverage - and by extension, spikes in
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rhetorical arguments - correspond with big news events such as international policy conferences,
reports o f scientific expedition results, and political controversies.
A plot o f all arguments in 1987 - again, the busiest year o f our sample - shows spikes in
rhetorical arguments relevant to the protocol in March, May, September, and December. A
review o f these arguments enables us to assemble a timeline of what happened. In March,
American scientists reported results from a large expedition to the South Pole. In May, a
convergence of events attracted media attention, among them a UNEP conference in Geneva to
negotiate a stratospheric ozone protocol, a Senate hearing on potential ozone regulations, and the
fracas over Interior Secretary Hodel’s “hat’s and sunglasses” approach to ozone policy.
September was the month o f the Montreal Protocol’s adoption. December turned to reporting on
U.S. efforts to comply with the protocol. Against this backdrop, we can ask what the evolution o f
scientists’ public rhetoric looked like in terms o f direction and emphasis on the issues o f policy
formation and prescription.
Figures 4a and 4b show us a map o f the evolution o f scientists’ rhetoric in 1987. Figure
4a displays the total number o f claims by policy issue criteria without direction. Figure 4b
displays direction as a differential between “For” and “Against” claims, leaving us with a single
landscape where peaks indicate cumulative arguments “For” and valleys indicate cumulative
arguments “Against.” Together, these figures confirm that throughout 1987 scientists’ public
rhetoric was consistently focused on the problem and strongly in favor o f the protocol throughout
the events o f May, March, and September.
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Figure 8 . Scientists’ arguments 1987 a) in aggregate b) as a differential (“For” - “Against”)

In Figure 4a, an additional peak is visible in October. A look at the coded arguments
reveals why we see a dip for that month in Figure 4b: Scientists warned at a Senate hearing that
the ozone hole was worsening and that the newly minted Montreal Protocol was not up to the task
o f fixing it. Reported the New York Times: “The atmosphere's protective ozone layer is so
depleted over Antarctica in the springtime that there is cause for concern about the safety of
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scientists and support personnel there” (Sullivan 1987). Thus, we can focus in on peaks and
valleys to understand what they mean and match them with a timeline. What emerges is a picture
o f the evolution o f a specific participant groups’ role in the social process as captured in news
media reports. It can be compared with those o f other groups and placed in context with larger
trends in the data source. This format for visualizing the data can be useful, especially when
comparing arguments across actors and substance categories. For example, in our study,
politicians’ arguments in 1987 were heavier and more evenly divided by direction, and had a
greater emphasis on policy solutions.
These findings can help a policy practitioner understand who is getting across what
message and when, and what structure the messages take relative to a set o f policy goals and
principles. For example, in our study arguments from scientists skeptical o f the theory linking
CFCs to stratospheric ozone destruction were overwhelmed by those who backed it. We can see
when, where and by how much. As noted above, the substance o f these competing arguments and
their context - how they are justified and where they were presented - yields much information
about the intelligence gathering process. The same is true for policy promotion. This is not
surprising, we have noted, because our sample is focused on the intelligence gathering and
promotion phases o f the Montreal protocol process. But policy practitioners can use this data to
reassess and make better decisions about their own intelligence gathering and promotion efforts
relative to the public debate on specific issues o f interest. For example, policymakers opposed to
efforts to ban CFCs would see that science debunking the argument that CFCs destroyed ozone
was overwhelmed by reports to the contrary, and they would also see that their promotion efforts
were also lagging. Environmental groups backing a tough treaty might despair to see themselves
quoted so little in the news reports. But they would know from the data that the balance o f public
rhetoric in the news media is on their side. It might serve as a gauge o f their behind-the-scenes
efforts to influence the news media and public opinion. The group o f collaborating scientists and
government officials referred to by Benedick would also see that their public efforts are paying
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off. Additionally, these interests could see how they are doing relative to one another on a
monthly basis and adjust their strategies accordingly.
Separately, analysts could use maps o f the rhetorical landscape to test out their own
policy goals and guiding principles against recent news coverage. Or they could revisit past
policies to conduct a post mortem. For example, a much smaller pilot study o f a sample o f articles
about the Clinton administration’s ill-fated BTU (British Thermal Unit) tax proposal found that
arguments “Against” the proposal outnumbered those “For” nearly three-to-one, and were
centered on concern about the domestic economy (Howland, Becker, and Sahagian 2001). A
closer look at the arguments chosen for coding revealed confusion across Washington about the
purpose o f the policy itself: Was it a deficit reduction tool or a cure for global warming? For the
policy practitioner in the heat o f making recommendations, this method could help illuminate
such problems before they have a chance to make trouble. It might also help light the way to
better strategies for finding and implementing solutions.

A comparison o f category systems. A variety o f research approaches have been taken to
content analysis ranging from highly qualitative and interpretive studies to quantitative
hypothesis tests. There is less-than-universal agreement among researchers about what
constitutes “content analysis.” Weber (1990,9) writes: “Content analysis is a research method
that uses a set o f procedures to make valid inferences from text.” By contrast, Neuendorf (2002)
contends that to qualify for the moniker “content analysis,” a content analysis system should meet
the standards o f the scientific method” which include establishing intersubjectivity, an a-priori
design, reliability, generalizability, and replicability. Our method meets these standards, but our
interest in studying the policy process does not involve hypothesis testing. Rather, we purse
research questions that disclose policy-relevant patterns and trends in our data.
To compare our approach with other content analysis methods, we identified studies that
examined news coverage o f global environmental issues using categorical coding systems similar
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to our own. Most examined global climate change which has similarities with the stratospheric
ozone problem. We contrasted the methods used in these studies with our own according to
purpose and structure. While we argue that our category system is best suited for the purpose o f
informing research studies using the policy sciences analytic framework, we make no claim that it
is superior to others given their distinctive, respective purposes. Given our purpose, however, we
have formulated a category system that maps argument structures in terms o f their substance,
direction, and especially their relevance to issues in the policy process.
Limned throughout this comparison are the issues o f sample size and intercoder
reliability. Comparing reliability measures across studies is not always easy. The studies we will
examine all report reliability results at varying levels o f rigor. For example, Bengston and
colleagues (1999) and Wilkins (1993) report percent measures only, one o f them for a computer
coding program. Others by McComas and Shanahan (1999) and Trumbo (1996) report measures
using Scott’s Pi, similar to the kappa we use because it accounts for chance agreement. The fact
that these studies report intercoder reliability results at all reflects well on them as recent research
shows between one third to half o f content analysis studies in mass communication are published
without them. Lombard and colleagues’ study (2002) o f 200 research reports published in the
communication literature between 1994 and 1998 found that only 69 percent o f studies using
content analysis reported intercoder reliability results. O f these the lowest reported score was .40
and the mean minimum acceptable reliability level was .75. Our test o f three coders exceeded this
minimum (by percent) in all coding categories.
The method used by Trumbo (1996, 270) to examine headlines and leads in news articles
about climate change sought to understand “who gains access to media representation; and what
overall themes emerge in the media treatment o f an issue.” The study examined 252 articles
written between 1985 and 1994 in the Washington Post, LA Times, Christian Science Monitor,
and the Wall Street Journal. The researchers identified relationships over time between three
groups o f claims makers - scientists, politicians, and interest groups - and the principal news
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frame o f each story, defined as “the claim that is being made by the media at the top o f the
inverted pyramid” (Trumbo 1996, 271). Four recurrent themes were found: 1) defining problems,
2) diagnosing causes, 3) making moral judgments, and 4) suggesting remedies. Additionally, the
study discerned from the data three phases in the news coverage - pre-controversy, controversy,
and post-controversy.
Trumbo concludes, among other findings, that scientists were largely associated with the
problem and causes frames. Further, he found that “scientists found themselves sharing a
shrinking proportion o f growing news media attention during an important part o f the public
debate over climate change” (Trumbo 1996, 281). For intercoder reliability, the study reports a
Scott’s Pi score o f .78. Like ours, this method provides a way to monitor the activity o f a
stakeholder group relative to news media content and it features some categories similar to our
own. But for our purposes, it is a comparatively incomplete and blunt instrument. Unlike our
system, it cannot focus on the content’s direction relative to a specific policy. It has far fewer
substance categories - four versus 21 - and is used only to examine headlines and leads. We can
assign multiple substance codes to a single article. This method assigns only one per story. Thus,
our categorical system yields more finely scaled maps o f the rhetorical landscape.
Bengston and colleagues monitored “the social environment for natural resource
management” using a computer content analysis o f 30,000 online news articles (Bengston, Fan,
and Celarier 1999, 181). They coded articles for words and phrases associated with recreational,
commodity, ecological, and aesthetic values o f forests and then graphed the frequency o f
expressions in each categoiy to map trends by quarter between 1992 and 1996. Their computer
program successfully coded phrases between 85 and 87 percent o f the time. The researchers
found that expressions in the recreational and aesthetic categories trended upwards. Similar to our
study, this one plots trends in the news media over time in predetermined categories. The size o f
their data sample, made possible by use o f computer algorithms, is impressive. The key
difference is that this method codes only for four mutually exclusive substance categories. The
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method does not compare content relative to a specific policy and does not take into account
direction, stakeholders, or the policy process. Again, our categorical system exposes more
dimensions o f the rhetorical landscape.
In a study o f news articles about climate change, McComas explores whether “narrative
factors explain change in media coverage o f global warming over time” (McComas and Shanahan
1999,38). The study o f 312 articles, written between 1980 and 1985 in the New York Times and
Washington Post, records the presence o f eight “themes.” Three o f them - international relations,
economics/costs o f remedy, and domestic politics - match three o f our substance categories. In
addition, the authors kept tabs on two “consequences” o f climate change: change in temperatures
predicted and the time range predicted for changes to occur. In an extensive accounting o f their
efforts to ensure intercoder reliability, the authors report scores o f . 6 for coding themes and .79
for consequences using Scott’s Pi. Themes and consequences were compared to the frequency o f
climate change news coverage in the sample.
The study found, among other things, that during a phase o f increasing news coverage,
stories focused great attention on the consequences and implied danger o f climate change. “From
a narrative standpoint,” wrote the authors, “news coverage in the late 1980s had set up an
atmosphere in which global warming was an imminent disaster” (McComas and Shanahan 1999,
52). The discussion considers the implication that such prediction could discourage media
attention to the issue. This approach is useful for gauging the tenor o f news coverage surrounding
a policy problem. In the case o f its “consequences” categories, and themes related to research and
science, it is capable o f providing very specific information on intelligence gathering efforts. That
said, this system, like the others discussed so far, is not designed for evaluating the direction o f
arguments specific to a policy’s goals. Moreover, apart from a theme that explicitly tracks
“controversy among scientists,” the method has no means of discerning other participants and so
cannot be used to comprehensively map the rhetorical landscape that is relevant to the policy
sciences framework’s social or decision processes.
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A study by Wilkins (1993) analyzed U.S. news stories about climate change from 1987 to
1989 to discern values that help frame news about the greenhouse effect. The author billed this
study as a “qualitative analysis with (quantitative supporting information)” (Wilkins, 1993, 75). A
wide array o f information was collected:

Coding categories included the media outlet, the month and year the story was produced,
whether the stories were news, feature or opinion, the number and type o f sources cited, the
news peg, the amount o f coverage devoted to the greenhouse in each story, the metaphors
used, whether the story discussed the future, and how politics was treated in each piece
(Wilkins 1993, 75)

In all, 1441 articles from the New York Times, LA Times, Washington Post, The AP and
Time Magazine were coded with intercoder reliability measured at .85 using a straight percent
measure. The study concluded that three yet unexplained values help frame news coverage o f
climate change: progress, the institutionalization o f knowledge, and innocence. The sample size
and scope o f information collected for this study by human coders is considerable. In addition to
enabling an analysis o f themes, this approach seems to have potential for describing social
process within the coverage, for example, by comparing actor data with news pegs and metaphors.
But it’s unclear from the article whether these can be linked, as Trumbo’s study linked news
frames with actors. Like the previously described methods, this one is not designed to seek and
code arguments focused on any selected policy. Moreover, it does not enable layered coding o f
these arguments to describe or link them to the policy process.
In a study o f news coverage o f climate change from 1986 to 1995, Zehr (2000, 85)
reports that the news media used the theme o f scientific uncertainty in climate change reports “to
create an exclusionary boundary between ‘the public’ and climate change scientists” which
“delegitimated lay knowledge.” Unlike the previous studies, the methodology here is not
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thoroughly explained. Codes are not listed and no measures o f reliability are reported. By contrast,
we stress transparency, and have adhered as much as possible to the standards outlined by
Neuendorf.
Finally, we want to address the methodology o f news media trend analysis that has
gained widespread attention in the popular press and in the for-profit analysis market. Often cited
is the work o f Naisbitt (1982), whose systematic analysis o f news media content sparked an
industry o f trend analysis o f economics, government, and society to the benefit o f decision
makers. Fundamental to this approach is monitoring what appears in the “news hole” - that
essentially fixed amount o f space the news media has to fill with reports.

In this forced-choice situation, societies add new preoccupations and forget old ones. In
keeping track o f the ones that are added and the ones that are given up, we are in a sense
measuring the changing share o f the market that competing social concerns command
(Naisbitt 1982, 4)

Merriam and Makower (1988, 4) explain that trend watching using this approach is
essentially taking measure o f “what the public is learning, what it wants to know, and what it
chooses to ignore.” It is essentially a modem adaptation o f the approach taken by the military in
World War II, with Lasswell’s help, to understand the Germans. Taking for granted the fact that
what appears in the “news hole” reflects and influences public opinion, our approach applies
additional, original filters for disclosing what is relevant to a specific set o f policy goals and
principles. That makes our approach unique and valuable for policy analysis. Further, our method
is not proprietary. It is an open source code for all to use and it is highly transparent.
In sum, the above studies demonstrate an array o f coding systems that encompass elements of
our approach. Each system is highly appropriate for its respective task. But each falls well short
o f providing a categoiy system that fulfills the purpose for which we designed our method: to
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describe and map trends surrounding the development o f specific policies using the categories o f
LasswelPs policy sciences analytic framework.

Methodological issues. The introduction o f our categorical coding system would not be complete
without an accounting o f the difficult issues that have arisen in light o f our experience with this
application. We provide responses to those issues here as a vehicle for further exploring our
method’s assumptions and limitations.
News articles are not an objective form o f data. They are subjective. We have collected
our data from news organizations with experienced reporters, codified ethical standards, and a
wide audience. However, regardless o f whether their prose is objective, we are interested in the
arguments contained within them, which, beyond being biased, are capable o f directly influencing
policy (Nelkin 1995) and, thus, are essential to any conclusions an analyst might reach about the
rhetorical landscape. Content analysis neither gets at excluded positions nor is sensitive to the
possibility that positions on issues are represented disproportionately in journalistic accounts.
Indeed on some occasions, journalists, in the laudable name o f objectivity, promote as equal in
size less popular positions in an effort to give balance to alterative views on issues (Jamieson and
Campbell 1988).
News media articles offer only a limited sample o f information and opinions. We are
engaged in what qualitative researchers call “purposeful” or “criterion-based” sampling. Maxwell
(1996, 70) describes it as “a strategy in which particular settings, persons or events are selected
deliberately in order to provide important information that cannot be gotten as well from other
choices.” While the world is full of people with good ideas, we are interested in those who are
getting them across to shape policy. One o f our assumptions is that in a democratic society with
competitive markets and press freedoms many o f those voices and ideas do appear in the news
media. This question, however, points up an import blind spot in our data. News stories generally
say nothing o f the extent o f campaigns by interest groups to gain favorable coverage. Recall that
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in the course o f making stratospheric ozone policy, U.S. government agencies worked to press
their case through the news media to educate the public and build the political will for a solution
(Benedick 1998). Efforts by sources to pitch stories or spin news coverage are often reflected in
the final product but as often are not explicitly discussed in the stories themselves along with
other factors that influence reporters’ and editors’ choices behind the scenes. This is often left to
an ombudsman - when media outlets have one - to explain in the wake o f particularly
controversial stories. This observation is based on one o f the author’s experience as a professional
news reporter, editor, and freelancer.
Your findings can be manipulated (wittingly or not) by the selection and sample size o f
your articles. For example, if you sample media in a nation opposed to the protocol, you might
get a very different picture. This is a valid point. Our method is geared to enable analysts to draw
conclusions about an international policy’s potential for success or failure within a particular
country - thus the distinction between “Local” and “Transboundary” arguments. Our data sources
- The AP, UP1, and New York Times - are based in the United States but provide international
coverage. A similar study could be conducted using French media - Le Monde and Agence Press
France, for example - with “Local” meaning within France’s borders. The conclusions would
speak to the potential for the protocol’s success in France. This is where the reliability, and more
importantly, the complete transparency o f our method is crucial. Our sampling and individual
coding decisions are there for all to see, question, and debate.
Your method is rigged to reduce complex ideas into neat little boxes for analysis. But the
real world is not a series o f “for” and “against” statements in such boxes; there is a lot o f gray.
Natural and social systems are dynamic and complex but that is no excuse for avoiding the use o f
systematic methods to characterize their complexity. Far from reductionist, our method embraces
the notion that arguments can overlap and interact over time and space. It is up to the analyst,
who has freedom to reason about what the data are telling him or her, to draw conclusions about
its significance.
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Human coding is slow. Coding can be time consuming, but what our method lacks in
efficiency, it makes up in thoroughness and transparency. Guidelines for researchers and coders
are explicit and the product o f their work at all stages - from article selection, to coding decisions,
to conclusions drawn from the data - can be made available for scrutiny.

Future Research Directions

Beyond these issues, we hope our approach inspires others to use news media content
analysis to inform policy sciences investigations. As many studies have affirmed, content
analysis as a methodology has a place in informing policy decisions, and news reports are an
ideal source o f data rich in context and consequence for both public opinion and policy making,
in this article, we introduced a systematic, transparent and rigorous news media content analysis
system to take advantage o f this potential, specifically, for use with the policy sciences analytic
framework. A review o f content analysis literature shows that a combination o f assets sets our
approach apart - in both structure and purpose - from other methodologies.
We are extending this study on the Montreal Protocol to articles written up to the end o f
2004 and are working on a parallel study o f news coverage relevant to the Kyoto Protocol o f the
international climate change policy regime. These efforts include structured interviews with news
reporters and policy makers involved with both protocols to place our findings in deeper context.
So far, the younger Kyoto accord has failed to win acceptance by the U.S. government and we are
interested to know what differences exist between the rhetorical landscapes surrounding each
policy. Hidden here, in the elements o f social and decision processes that we can extract from
our data maps, are lessons about what has made the Montreal Protocol a relative success in the
United States and the Kyoto Protocol a failure.
Communication scholars and policy scientists alike acknowledge a debt to Lasswell for
pioneering the use o f content analysis and the policy sciences analytic framework. But few, if any,
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have taken him up on his suggestion to build bridges between them. We hope our small
contribution can help scholars begin to realize the benefits Lasswell saw in doing just that.

Expanded Methodology for Case Comparison

Sampling Strategy

In both the climate change and ozone case studies, articles by The AP, UP1 and New
York Times published between October 1, 1980 - the first date all three sources were available
online - and Dec 31, 2004 were drawn from the Lexis-Nexis database. The same keywords used
in the pilot study were used for the larger ozone case study: “stratospheric ozone,” and/or “ozone
hole” and/or “Montreal Protocol.” The following terms were used for the climate case: “climate
change,” and/or “global warming” and/or “Kyoto Protocol.” In order to return a sample size more
easily handled by a single coder, the search was scaled back from full article text to one that
included headlines, leads and Lexis-Nexis search terms. An initial search using the ozone terms,
turned up more than 500 articles from 1980 to 2004. After removing duplicates, the sample size
dropped to a manageable 343 articles. O f those, 35 lacked codeable arguments and so a total o f
308 articles were coded. By contrast, the climate search initially turned up more than 21,000
articles. Figure 2 shows the results o f the initial search results over the 24-year sample:
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Figure 9. Raw Climate Article Sample
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Because it was impractical to tackle this entire set climate o f articles, it became clear that a
random sampling strategy was needed - one that could reduce the climate article sample to a
manageable number for coding while preserving annual variation in the intensity o f news
coverage. It was determined that the best approach was to sample 5 percent of the articles (after
correcting the overall sample size for duplicates) in a double stratified sample - by year and news
service - with a five-article annual minimum per news service.

Accounting for Duplicates. The raw sample o f 21,637 news articles included many
duplicates, especially from The AP and UPI which often move identical or near identical stories
for AM and PM news cycles. In the sample above, the number o f duplicate articles from the AP
spiked in 1997, the year The AP introduced its Associated Press Online service. A random
sample using a straight percentage o f the 21,637 articles would have oversampled the AP articles.
Thus, the overall sample size needed to be adjusted to account for duplicates in advance o f the
final sample selection. Arriving at a manageable final sample with no duplicates that fairly
preserved the proportion o f unique articles by news service required estimating the proportion of
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duplicate to non duplicate articles by news service. This task was complicated by the fact that
duplicates appear chronologically in pairs and clusters and not randomly throughout the sample.
As a result, the proportion o f duplicates could not be fairly estimated by adding them up in a
randomly selected sample as they would have been greatly underestimated.
To handle this problem, it was decided that the focus should be on the biggest
discrepancy in the data - the spike in AP articles in 1997 - and estimating the percentage of
duplicates for each news service before and after this spike. Using random starting dates, groups
o f 50 articles were selected in chronological order from each news service in two time periods before and after the spike in AP articles - October 1, 1980 to December 31,1996 and January 1,
1997 to July 31, 2004. The percentage o f duplicates in each group of 50 articles was then
calculated. These percentages, shown in the table below, were then subtracted from the raw
sample to get a more representative picture o f what that sample might look like without
duplicates. For example, from 1980-1996, 90 percent o f UPI articles were not duplicates. Thus,
those years’ UPI figures were multiplied by .9 to arrive at a sample size that is 90 percent o f the
original. This calculation is shown in the table below. Its effect on the overall sample is seen in
the following Figure.

Table 7 Climate Duplicates Sampled

1980-1997

1997-2004

UPI

NYT

AP

UPI

NYT

AP

Randomly
Selected
Starting
Month

Jan
1981

Jan
1988

April
1988

June
1997

Feb
2001

Nov
1998

Number o f
articles

50

50

50

50

50

50
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1980-1997
UPI
Number o f
duplicates
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Percent o f
duplicates

1997-2004
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Figure 10. Climate Sample Adjusted for Duplicates
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Preserving annual variability. Corrected for duplicates - the overall sample size dropped
from 21,637 to 14,787. But it still needed to be reduced to a manageable size for coding. To
preserve the annual variability in the sample, it was decided in advance to randomly select articles
by year rather than from the entire sample. Stratifying the sample by year gave a better
representation o f the year-to-year variability that might otherwise be lost by sampling articles
over the entire sample. For example, the news coverage was lean in the early 1980s but crucial to
setting the tone for events in later years, where the coverage is heavy. Annual sampling helped
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ensure that articles written in these early years and subsequent lulls in the debate were included in
our sample. Further, it was decided to sample by news service, to keep the largest - The AP from eclipsing the others. To further ensure that informative early articles were not needlessly
lost, a five-article minimum was established for each news service for each year o f our sample.
Finally, a sampling figure o f 5 percent was chosen and rule established that any year’s article
tally that returns less than five be made equal to five. The figures in the Table above were
multiplied by .05 to derive our final climate case sample shown in the figure below.

Figure 11. Final Climate Sample
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Random Selection. Finally, equipped with the number o f articles that needed to be
sampled for each year from each of the three news services, a random number generator in Excel
was used to determine which articles would be selected. For example, in 1992 the sample
required six articles (out of a potential 125) from the UPI, 12 (out o f 334) from the New York
Times and six (out o f 152) from The AP. Duplicates articles were eliminated until the pre
determined number o f articles was selected for each year. These were then inputted in text format
into the Atlas program for coding. In all, 829 articles were selected for coding. O f those, 61
lacked codeable arguments and so a total o f 768 articles were coded.
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Timeline and Notetaking

As with the 90-article ozone pilot study, it was helpful to construct a timeline o f events in
the news coverage, including the release o f significant scientific studies, political debates,
international meetings and other happenings central to the evolution o f ozone or climate policy in
the United States. This task was aided by the construction o f a monthly timeline in Excel that
noted also the current president, Congressional session, the political balance in the House and
Senate and its current leaders. Timeline entries included two- to four-sentence summaries o f news
stories or, in many cases, the verbatim leads o f the stories in quotes with the reference number
and date o f the article summarized. Separately, and in the Atlas coding program, memo categories
were created to group article summaries and the researcher/coder’s observations about the news
coverage. These could be cross referenced to enable later analysis. Among the memo categories
that proved useful in both case studies were those that grouped coverage o f research studies,
international meetings, state and local government initiatives and federal initiatives. In addition,
memo categories were created to file examples o f arguments that fit clearly into one or more o f
Dryzek’s nine environmental discourses discussed in the Background Chapter. Another memo
category provided a space for the researcher/coder to record impressions o f the coverage and
ideas for future lines o f analysis.

Interview Protocol.

To add context and depth to the study’s results, a protocol was included for conducting
structured interviews with experts in the ozone and climate change issues. This was approved by
the University o f New Hampshire’s Institutional Review Board (IRB# 2866). IRB-related
documents - the original research protocol, its amendments and IRB approval letters - can be
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found in the Appendix. The plan was to interview a number o f selected key informants that
include government officials, scientists, news reporters, industry representatives and
environmentalists who were familiar with or have played a role in the policy process o f one or
both o f the problems. After looking for subjects noted in the literature as participants in the ozone
and climate change debate in the areas above, the author drew up a list o f potential subjects and,
per the IRB approved protocol, arranged to interview them.
In all, seven key informants were interviewed, among them a world-renown atmospheric
researcher and leader in both the climate change and ozone regimes, Robert Watson; former U.S.
climate negotiator and Natural Resource Defense Council lawyer David Doniger; industry
lobbyist and former Global Climate Coalition spokesman Frank Maisano; and veteran Associated
Press Congressional and environmental news reporter Josef Hebert. Two other national
environmental news reporters and a member o f Congress, who chose not to be named, also
granted interviews for this study. With the exception o f Doniger, who was interviewed by phone,
the interviews were conducted in person after each subject signed a consent form. All o f the
interviews were recorded by an MP3 recorder and back-up audio tape recorder and transcribed by
the author. The subjects were given the opportunity to review and make changes to their own
transcripts. After signing the consent form (see Appendix), the subjects were read the following
preamble:

I am studying the evolution o f the United States’ role in international policy efforts to address
the global climate change and stratospheric ozone problems. Many groups and individuals
have played a role in this process among them, scientists, government officials, industry
officials, environmentalists, the news media and the public at large. As a participant in this
process, you offer a unique perspective. I will ask you some basic questions relevant to my
study and use your answers to inform my understanding o f the issues from your perspective. I
will use your insights to draw some larger conclusions and recommendations about the
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policies themselves. I don’t want to keep you any longer than 45 minutes, but would be
happy to extend the interview if you would like more time.

The author then asked the six questions listed below. In some cases, impromptu but
related follow-up questions were posed.

5. Please briefly describe your experience with climate change and/or ozone issues.
6

. What role do you think [again, pick only the interviewee’s group - i.e. scientists,
government officials, industry officials, environmentalists, the news media] have played
and will play in the future with regard to US involvement in the climate change and/or
ozone regimes?

7. What role do you think the news media has played and will play in the future with regard
to US involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?
8

. Please outline what you think are the strengths and weaknesses o f each policy effort climate change and/or ozone. What would you recommend, if anything, be done to
improve them?

9.

Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a few ways, if any, you
think it has affected and/or will affect US involvement in either policy effort.

10. What do you think the future holds for each policy?

Reporting and Integrating Results

Coding Chapter. Coding results for the ozone and climate cases are reported and
discussed side by side using 13 tables that report aggregate results in terms o f the number o f
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arguments per coding category by totals and percentages. In addition to a master table
summarizing sample-wide code totals for each case, tables were compiled for results specific to
each o f the five policy issue criterion and the seven established participant groups - scientists, US
government, industry, the United Nations, the public, environmental organizations and European
governments. Each table is accompanied by a brief discussion o f its key findings, including trends
within that category over the 24-year sample, and, where helpful, examples o f arguments from
the articles. To aid the comparison o f data within and across cases, the degree to which arguments
are “For” or “Against” and “Local” or “Transboundary” is described on a scale ranging from
“Slight” to “Extremely Strong” outlined below.

Table 8 . Scale for Rating Relative Argument Strength

Descriptor o f Argument’s Relative
Strength (“For” vs “Against” or “Local” vs
“Transboundary”) in a given category

Percent o f
argument

Approximate range of
Corresponding Ratios

Equal

50

1:1

Almost Equal

51-52

-1.04:1 to -1.1:1

Slight

53-57

-1.1:1 to -1.3:1

Moderate

58-66

-1.3:1 t o -1.9:1

Strong

67-74

- 2 : 1 t o - 2 .8 : 1

Very Strong

75-89

-3:1 to -8:1

Extremely Strong

90-100

1 0:1

and higher

For example, if 60 percent o f arguments o f any given category are coded “For” the Montreal
Protocol, then it is reported that arguments in that category ran “moderately” for the policy, or
that support for the policy in that category was “moderate.” Likewise, if 60 percent o f arguments
were coded “Against,” it would be reported that opposition was “moderate.” A result that comes
within two percentage points o f a category cut-off is described using both terms. For example, if
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economic arguments “Against” outweigh those “For” 74 to 26 percent, it would be reported that
economic arguments were “strongly to very strongly against” the policy. The purpose o f this
scale is to bring some consistency to the qualitative description o f quantitative data. The cut-offs
between categories are based on ratios that are intended to make common sense. For example, it
is fair to say that when arguments “For” outnumber arguments “Against” by a two-to-one margin,
that arguments “For” are “strongly” represented; and when that ratio climbs to three-to-one that
they are “very strong.” Likewise, an argument’s relative strength is considered “weak” until it is
at least a third more voluminous that its counterpart at which point it is “moderate.” The coding
results - reported in charts, graphics and narrative form - are used in the final chapter to inform
the description o f conditions and trends in social and decision process surrounding the two cases.

Interviews Chapter. The interview chapter summarizes the interview subjects’ answers to
the questions in a narrative comprising seven sections - one section for each o f the six questions
posed - and a summarizing conclusion. Like the coding results, the interviews collectively
represent a research product that can stand on its own. The two are combined, sorted and
supplemented by findings from other studies in the final chapter.

Discussion and Conclusions Chapter. The Policy Sciences article outlined a system to
integrate coding results with the policy sciences analytic framework, enabling a description o f
several elements o f the social and decision processes, conditions and trends surrounding
participant groups. This approach is used in the larger case study comparison. The principal
participant groups and their roles in shaping the evolution o f the policy processes in each o f the
two cases are examined side by side. Unlike the smaller pilot study, the case comparison is
enriched by interview data. Thus, after an introduction, the Discussion and Conclusions chapter
opens with an examination o f the social and decision process, conditions and trends surrounding
the most prominent participant group in both cases - the scientific community. The analysis
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moves on to the remaining groups including the U.S. government, industry and the public. The
study’s most salient findings are summarized in a conclusion. Separately, as in the Policy
Sciences article, methodological challenges, limitations, and lessons learned in the larger case
study comparison are discussed.
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CHAPTER III

CODING RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter reports the results o f an analysis o f arguments in 1,076 news articles about
stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change written between 1980 and 2004 by The New
York Times, The Associated Press and United Press International. The ozone case sample
comprises 308 articles with a total o f 774 arguments coded, and the climate case sample
comprises 768 articles with 1,962 arguments coded. Recall from Table 4 (Chapter I) that the
content analysis is geared to answer five fundamental questions:

1. Are the arguments supportive or opposed to the goals and/or principles o f the policy?
2.

In what proportion are the arguments international or domestic, and economic, political,
social or environmental in nature?

3.

What stakeholder groups are main sources/ subjects o f the arguments?

4.

What are the arguments’ relevance to one or more o f five policy issue criteria?

5.

What are the trends over time in the above categories?

These questions are addressed in three sections in this chapter that report and discuss the results
side-by-side - in aggregate and over the 24-year sample. The first section, Code Totals, discusses
the broadest findings o f the analysis reported in Table 9. This table, as with eleven additional
results tables to follow, shows how coded arguments in the Montreal and Kyoto cases stack up by
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total number and percent. This section also includes examples o f typical claims in each o f the 16
direction and substance categories for both cases. The second section, Policy Issue Criteria,
breaks down the findings by the five policy issue criteria - problem (Table 10), policy (Table 11),
support (Table 12), feasibility (Table 13) and accountability (Table 14). The third section,
Stakeholders, examines those findings by each o f the seven stakeholder group categories scientists (Table 15), U.S. Government (Table 16), Industry (Table 17), United Nations (Table
18), Public (Table 19), Environment (Table 20) and Europe (Table 21). Where useful, figures
illustrate argument totals, totals over time, and differentials over time, between “For” and
“Against” arguments. The most salient findings o f the three sections are summarized in (
Table 22) in the Conclusions section, which serves as a useful reference for the larger
analysis in the dissertation’s final chapter.

Code Totals

Overview

The first major finding o f this study is that on balance arguments in news coverage o f
both the ozone and climate change problems ran in favor o f the goals and principles o f both the
Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, taken as a whole, the coverage has
been more positive than negative in both cases. But Table 9 shows that the reporting on the ozone
hole has been a good deal more positive. Ozone case arguments ran “very strongly” in favor o f
the protocol, by a 3:1 ratio. By contrast, climate change arguments were “moderately” in favor
with a ratio of just 2:1. In both cases, arguments are more focused on transboundary than local
issues, which is not surprising given that both address global environmental problems. But the
ozone case arguments bordered on “extremely” transboundary (7:1) versus “moderately”
transboundary in the climate case (about 3 :2).
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Table 9. All Code Totals
Montreal Case
All Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

581

75

1225

63

Against

193

25

735

37

774

100

1960

100

Local

95

12

776

40

Trans

679

88

1184

60

774

100

1960

100

Economic

116

15

407

21

Political

213

28

610

31

Social

159

21

326

17

Natural

286

37

617

31

774

100

1960

100

Total

Total

Total

(The 16 three-letter code combinations below are form ed by joining one
code from each o f the three code groupings above. For example, FEL =
For + Economic + Local; FPT = For + Political + Transboundary;
ANL = Against + Natural + Local.)
FEL

8

1

110

6

FET

47

6

93

5

FPL

25

3

133

7

FPT

127

16

189

10

FSL

13

2

83

4

FST

122

16

157

8

FNL

6

1

67

3

FNT

233

30

393

20

AEL

19

2

140

7

AET

42

5

64

3

APL

14

2

143

7

APT

47

6

145

7

ASL

7

1

53

3
2

AST

17

2

33

ANL

3

0

47

2

ANT

44

6

110

6

774

100

1960

100

Total
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Montreal Case
All Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Problem

409

39

878

26

Policy

271

26

966

29

Support

130

12

732

22

Feasibility

116

11

715

21

Accountability

119

11

82

2

1045

100

3373

100

340

45

643

26

US Govt

177

23

761

30

Industry

70

9

337

13

UN

53

7

111

4

Public

52

7

371

15

Environment

42

6

190

8

Europe

28

4

105

4

762

100

2518

100

Total
Scientists

Total

Table 9 Cont.

A look at the four substance categories shows that environmental and scientific arguments topped
both cases, followed by political arguments. This, too, is not surprising because environmental
concern and scientific research are central to both problems and intertwined with the politics of
finding solutions. But in the climate case, economic arguments took third place, while social
arguments took a back seat. This reflects a larger preoccupation with the economic costs o f the
Kyoto treaty. In the ozone case, social arguments predominated, reflecting a concern about the
human health effects o f increased ultraviolet radiation. A closer look at all 16 possible substance
code combinations in each case - shown in Figure 12 and Figure 1 - reveals that the climate
chase had a higher proportion o f local arguments across the board, and a lower proportion o f
transboundary environmental and political arguments in favor o f its protocol. To provide a sense
o f the arguments behind the numbers and coding categories, as well as a point o f reference for
future discussion, this section lists below examples o f arguments in each o f the 16 three-letter
coding categories. The list follows the order in the data tables, with the eight “For” code
combinations followed by the eight “Against” combinations. Each includes an ozone case and a
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climate case example, and a word or two about their significance and/or links to other common
codes.
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Figure 12. Ozone Case Claims by Direction and Substance
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Figure 13. Climate Case Claims by Direction and Substance
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FEL - “For/ Economic/ Local”
Ozone example: “The administration announcement, which has been expected since last
week, came as the American Institute o f Architects Tuesday urged that CFC's be banned from
new construction projects” (Heilbronner 1992).
Climate example: “Cleaner energy sources such as the wind, the sun and the ocean tides
would go a long way toward cleaning up our air and streams, says Alan Nogee, but he says
there’s a better reason the state should emphasize renewable energy sources: saving money”
(McElhenny 2001).
Comments: The ozone example above is one o f only eight domestic economic arguments
in favor o f the protocol. Here, a major domestic consumer o f CFC-containing products has
weighed in against the chemicals. Both local and transboundary For/Economic arguments share
the themes o f shedding o f CFC use and developing and adopting substitutes. The climate example
above captures an ongoing theme in domestic arguments - the move away from fossil fuel
reliance. In this case, a member o f the Union o f Concerned Scientists in Massachusetts cites
economic reasons.

FET - “For/ Economic/ Transboundary”
Ozone example: “‘Many farmers worldwide successfully grow crops without methyl
bromide,’ said Margot Wallstrom, the environment commissioner for the European Union.
‘Substitutes are available for the majority o f its uses. Methyl bromide exemptions should be
agreed only where alternatives are not available and not on any other basis’ ” (Revkin 2003).
Climate example: “It seems too good to be true: Companies around the world retool their
factories, make deep cuts in greenhouse gases and rake in profits at the same time. Many business
people say it’s just a dream. But environmentalists at the Kyoto climate conference say it’s more
than just possible - in some places, it’s already happening” (Coleman 1997).
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Comments: Examples o f ozone case FET arguments included warnings that the ozone
hole could lead to crop damage and thus economic damage. They also ranged from international
pledges o f money to help developing nations phase out CFCs, to arguments against weakening
restrictions on the soil fumigant methyl bromide, as cited above. FET climate claims included a
similar variety, from warnings o f economic harm from climate change, support for developing
nations, and optimistic arguments - such as the one above from the 1997 Kyoto conference which echo the FEL example.

FPL - “For/ Political/ Local”
Ozone example: “President Reagan asked the Senate Monday to ratify an international
agreement signed in September to control emissions o f certain chemicals blamed for depletion o f
the protective ozone layer around the Earth” (Washington News 1987).
Climate example: “Eleven states asked a federal appeals court Thursday to force the
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions” (Gillespie 2003).
Comments: Ozone case FPL daims focused mostly on U.S. government efforts to
negotiate and support the ozone treaty and included arguments against backpedaling within the
Regan administration. Reagan’s request o f the Senate to ratify the treaty, after much infighting,
stood out as one o f the most important arguments in this category. Climate case FPL claims
included arguments within different presidential administrations for U.S. participation and
leadership in the climate treaty. A major theme o f this coding category, however, is growing
support within states for federal action on greenhouse gases - exemplified in the argument above
from Northeastern states concerned about air pollution and climate change.

FPT - “For/ Political/ Transboundary”
Ozone example: “An international agreement signed in 1987, known as the Montreal
Protocol, calls for an end to CFC production by the year 2000. Scientists and environmentalists
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have urged governments to move faster and halt CFC production as soon as possible” (Ozone
hole closes 1992).
Climate example: “Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Kyoto international
climate treaty last week, which puts it into effect early next year without U.S. participation. The
treaty requires industrial nations to reduce emissions o f greenhouse gases below 1990 levels”
(Heilprin 2004).
Comments'. These above examples, acknowledgements o f the protocols’ successful
ratifications, were among a variety o f FPT arguments in both cases that document the
international political support for each. Most are linked to political leaders in the United States,
Europe and the United Nations.

FSL - “For/ Social/ Local”
Ozone example: “The Environmental Protection Agency has been studying the potential
health effects o f the thinning o f the stratospheric ozone layer, which shields the earth from most
o f the sun's ultraviolet radiation. A draft assessment disclosed by agency officials last week
included a stark warning: Over the next

88

years, ozone depletion could result in 40 million cases

o f skin cancer in the United States, 800,000 o f which would end in death” (Mansnerus and
Roberts 1986).
Climate example: “Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas Reilly said [greenhouse]
gases are causing serious environmental and health problems. ‘You're seeing the erosion o f our
beaches. You're seeing salt water contaminate our drinking water. You see damage to our
infrastructure, to our roads and our causeways and our bridges,’ he said” (Gillespie 2003).
Comments: In the ozone case, For/Social claims were overwhelmingly concerned with
the human health effects o f lower stratospheric ozone levels, especially cancer. The argument
above is specific to the United States. Likewise, For/Social climate case arguments - both local
and transboundary - comprise mostly warnings o f negative societal consequences o f the
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environmental problem, as above. Some FSL climate arguments tout the societal virtues of
conservation and renewable energy.

FST - “For/ Social/ Transboundary”
Ozone example: “Scientists say the destruction o f the ozone layer is causing increased
skin cancer and eye damage and poses a danger to the world's food chain” (Huuhtanen 1989).
Climate example: “Rising temperatures could trigger shifts in weather patterns, causing
natural disasters such as droughts, more frequent tropical cyclones and rising sea levels; this in
turn could cause flooding, loss o f land and damage to fish stocks, agriculture and water supplies,
the report said” (Mwangi 2001).
Comments: The above examples are typical of this category in both cases. Recall that
FST arguments were twice as prominent in the ozone case as in the climate case.

FNL - “For/ Natural/ Local”
Ozone example: “The life-protecting ozone layer may now be thinning above President
Bush's summer home in Kennebunkport, Me., as well as other parts o f the Northern Hemisphere.
That gives Mr. Bush a compelling personal reason to regain the initiative on an issue of global
importance” (The Ozone Hole Over Mr. Bush's Head 1992).
Climate example: “A University o f Washington scientist says the Pacific Northwest will
be 5 degrees warmer by the year 2050, resulting in wetter winters, less spring snowpack, lower
summer streamflows, hardship to salmon, and more forest fires” (State and Regional 2000)
Comments: Because both ozone and climate change are global environmental problems,
the vast majority o f scientific and environmental arguments are not local. Nonetheless, arguments
that focus on the domestic concerns o f either issue, as those above, fall into this category.

FNT - “For/ Natural/ Transboundary”
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Ozone example: “Mounting evidence indicates CFCs are responsible for the worldwide
loss o f roughly 1 percent o f Earth's ozone shield and the formation o f a hole that forms in the
ozone layer above Antarctica for a few months starting every September” (Siegel 1988).
Climate example: “Carbon dioxide, which is released in the burning fossil fuels, is the
most potent greenhouse gas, accounting for more than half o f the pollution that many scientists
believe is causing a warming o f the earth” (Hebert 1994).
Comments'. The majority o f these arguments in both cases are statements o f the
environmental problem - the latest scientific findings that underscore the need for the protocols
or a rehash o f earlier such findings. In both cases, it is by a wide margin the single largest o f the
16 categories, and scientists are understandably the largest source o f these arguments.

AFT. - “Against/ Economic/ Local”
Ozone example: “Small family farms in the United States would be hurt by a complete
phase-out o f methyl bromide by 2005 because they have not found viable alternatives, said Mark
Murai, chairman o f the California Strawberry Commission, a growers organization” (Maliti 2003).
Climate example: ‘“The U.S. economy could lose millions o f jobs,’ said the industrybacked Global Climate Coalition. “In addition, it means higher costs to Americans for everyday
necessities” (Henson 1996).
Comments: In the ozone case, this category includes industry arguments in the 1980s that
phasing out CFCs would hurt the U.S. economy, a theme revisited recently by farm operators, in
the example above, who sought an exemption to the Montreal Protocol’s rules on methyl bromide.
Domestic economic arguments play a much larger role in the climate case and center on the costs
o f cutting fossil fuel use under the Kyoto Protocol.

AET - “Against/ Economic/ Transboundary”
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Ozone example: “Japan, Korea, Mexico and others require treatment o f California food
exports with methyl bromide,” (McKinley 1995).
Climate example: “While an ice-free Arctic Ocean would most likely disrupt the global
environment, researchers said, it could have positive economic aspects. It could shorten shipping
routes, for example, and expand the range o f offshore oil drillers. Rich new fishing areas would
probably appear, though established fisheries to the south could decline” (Gibbs 2000).
Comments: The ozone argument above shows international economic forces at work
against the protocol’s methyl bromide provisions. The climate AET argument above is a bit
unconventional as it argues, in effect, that global warming could be good for the economy.
Nonetheless it qualifies as an economic argument against the goals and principles o f the Kyoto
treaty. Most other climate AET arguments are an extension o f the domestic argument that the
Kyoto Protocol is bad for the U.S. economy and argue additionally that developing nations
exempt from mandatory greenhouse gas cuts - specifically China and India - would have a
competitive advantage over America.

APL - “Against/ Political/ Local”
Ozone example: “Although most scientists now accept the [stratospheric ozone
destruction] thesis, it still has influential critics outside the scientific community. Republicans in
Congress, for instance, have introduced legislation to overturn the United States’ participation in
the international ban on the production o f chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs” (Stevens 1995).
Climate example: “The White House's Office o f Management and Budget has changed
the text o f testimony scheduled to be delivered to Congress by a top Government scientist, over
his protests, making his conclusions about the effects of global warming seem less serious and
certain than he intended” (Shabecoff 1989).
Comments: APL arguments were far scarcer in the ozone case than the climate case.
Domestic political arguments against the ozone treaty focused on sporadic attempts to frustrate
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the negotiation process, including the methyl bromide issue. In the climate case, domestic
political arguments against the protocol spanned a wide range o f topics. These include
Congressional opposition to the treaty, the rejection o f the treaty by George W. Bush and the
subsequent weakening o f air quality regulations and support for the fossil fuel industry under his
administration. The argument above alludes to political tinkering with conclusions by renowned
NASA climate researcher James Hansen during the administration o f George H. W. Bush - a
problem Hansen has alleged under the current Bush administration (Revkin 2006a).

APT - “Against/ Political/ Transboundary”
Ozone example'. “The world's two most populous nations are slated in coming years to
become large CFC producers, but do not want to be subject to a ban on chemicals that helped
industrialized nations to develop” (Kelliher 1990).
Climate example: “The U.S. refusal to ratify has loomed large over the 12-day conference.
For the treaty to take effect, industrialized countries ratifying it must together account for at least
55 percent o f the global greenhouse gas emissions in 1990, the baseline year for the protocol”
(Backus 2003).
Comments: The ozone case argument above reflects a fundamental challenge to both the
Montreal and Kyoto treaties - winning meaningful participation from large developing nations,
particularly China and India. Many APT arguments flow from reports and commentary on
international negotiation sessions in both policy regimes.

ASL - “Against/ Social/ Local”
Ozone example: ‘“We went with the essential amount o f this very important substance
that the United States needs to ensure safe and affordable agricultural and food products for
Americans,’ Mr. Connaughton said” (Revkin 2003)
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Climate example: “Americans are so discouraged by the difficulty o f solving Earth’s
environmental problems that they have begun losing interest, researchers say. That conclusion
came from a review o f public opinion surveys. ‘If you keep telling people that global warming is
dangerous, they’re just going to get frustrated,’ said John Immerwahr, an administrator at
Villanova University who led the review” (Donn 1999).
Comments: The ozone case example above, one o f only seven arguments in this category,
revisits the methyl bromide issue. Here the need to keep American food products safe is invoked
in opposition o f the protocol cutbacks o f the chemical. Many climate case ASL arguments
parallel economic concerns about cutting fossil fuel use - for example, jobs would be lost and
rate-payers would be stuck with higher bills. The example argument above is a different kind o f
social concern.

AST - “Against/ Social/ Transboundary”
Ozone example: “Indeed, for many people it will be hard to imagine that there is a causal
relationship between the facts that 80 percent o f CFC’s are emitted in the Northern Hemisphere
and that the ozone hole occurs in the Southern Hemisphere” (Fransen 1993).
Climate example: “Blake said other more insidious pollutants, particularly those caused
by auto emissions, also pose a serious threat to earth’s atmosphere and contribute to the warming
trend that threatens to permanently change earth’s climate. ‘Unfortunately we can't ask people to
give up their cars,’ he said” (Ricks 1986).
Comments: The above ozone argument, an excerpt from a New York Times letter to the
editor, highlights a stumbling block to public understanding o f the ozone hole. Other arguments
in this category quote everyday citizens as unconcerned about depleted stratospheric ozone. The
most important climate case arguments in this category are those that underscore, as above, the
intractability o f fossil fuels from every day life.
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ANL - “Against/ Natural/ Local”
Ozone example'. “NASA is ending a satellite mission that kept tabs on the hole in Earth's
ozone layer because the space agency can't afford the $10 million-a-year bill” (Bridges 2001).
Climate example: “But isn’t all o f this worth it to save the planet from the melting ice
caps and rising sea levels supposedly brought on by global warming? The fact is that North
Carolina could do all that the Kyoto Protocol requires and more, and it would have no perceptible
effect on global climate. Any action that North Carolina could take would involve all costs and no
benefits” (Cordato 2003).
Comments'. As with FNL arguments, ANL arguments are dwarfed by their transboundary
counterparts. The ozone case example above is only one o f three arguments in its category. The
climate argument echoes the concern noted in the ASL example - that Americans are discouraged
about solving the problem o f global warming. In this case, the author fosters that pessimism - a
strategy used also by opponents o f the ozone policy regime.

ANT - “Against/ Natural/ Transboundary”
Ozone example: “All acknowledge that chlorofluorocarbons break down ozone when they
rise into the stratosphere, but they have not proved that the chemicals - used as refrigerants, in
plastic foams and, in some countries, in aerosol sprays - were the specific cause o f the Antarctic
problem. Some suggest other pollutants, atmospheric currents or sunspots were the cause”
(Hanley 1987).
Climate example: McGowan said there is not enough data to say for sure that the
warming o f the coastal waters is caused by global warming, a planetwide increase in temperature
thought to be caused by increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. ‘It is consistent with global
warming, but we can't attribute it to that,’ he said. ‘If global warming occurs, it would probably
look something like this’ ” (Recer 1998).
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Comments'. The overwhelming number o f arguments in this category in both the ozone
and climate change cases cast doubt on the veracity o f science driving the respective treaty
processes. The arguments range from direct contradictions o f mainstream findings - by scientists,
politicians or interest group spokespeople - to more mundane but ubiquitous statements of
uncertainty, as in the climate case example above.

Code Total Trends

While the tallies and percentages in this chapter’s tables are useful for characterizing the
overall body o f arguments, they say nothing about the evolution o f arguments over the 24-year
sample period. Figure 14 and Figure 15 demonstrate one way to do this by displaying the number
o f arguments present in eight general substance categories each year o f the sample. These
topographic style maps in two- and three-dimensions (similar to those presented in the pilot study
in the previous chapter) reveal the level o f attention each category received in a given year. The
element o f direction is introduced in Figure 16 and Figure 17, which display difference between
“For” and “Against” arguments in each category in each year. Flere darker blue valleys indicate
progressively negative (“Against”) territory and darker brown mountains progressively positive
(“For”) territory. Thus, while the first two grayscale figures show the intensity o f arguments in
the news reports by year, the color maps show their directional differential. Together they show,
in terms o f sheer numbers, whether “For” or “Against” arguments present in a given category in a
given year prevailed or fought to a draw.
Taking the four figures in turn, each tells a story about the evolution o f arguments in the
ozone and climate change news reports. Figure 14 shows that in the ozone case, arguments
spiked in years o f significant news coverage o f big events - mostly the negotiation o f
amendments named for the cities where they took place - in 1987 (Montreal Protocol), 1990
(London Amendments), 1992 (Copenhagen Amendments), 1995 (Vienna Amendments) and 2003
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(when the U.S. sought methyl bromide exemptions). These spikes represent mostly transboundaiy
environmental, social and political arguments. Figure 16 shows that when the difference was
taken between “For” and “Against” arguments on that map, the “For” claims consistently
prevailed. This includes a steady ridge o f transboundary environmental/scientific arguments
warning o f the threat o f CFCs to stratospheric ozone. From this it can be concluded that scientific,
political and social arguments in the news media reflected support for the protocol’s goals and
principles at key times o f the protocol’s development with one glaring exception: economic
arguments in 2003 supporting an exemption to protocol restrictions on methyl bromide.
The landscape of arguments in the climate case shares one striking feature: a prominent
ridge o f transboundary/scientific and environmental claims (Figure 15) that holds up in the
differential (Figure 16). This shows that scientific arguments in news media coverage also ran
strongly in favor o f the climate change treaty. But the rest is quite different. The climate case
landscape is dominated by large, spikes in international political and domestic economic
arguments in 2001. This is the year George W. Bush walked away from the Kyoto Protocol and it
made big news. In the differential figure, the political spike melts down to just below zero and
the domestic economic spike drops to -24 - that’s 24 more AEL arguments than FEL arguments
in a single year. This shows that a remarkable amount o f political argument appeared in the
papers in 2 0 0 1 and - in terms o f numbers alone - essentially cancelled themselves out, while two
dozen economic arguments opposed to the protocol went unchecked.
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Policy Issue Criteria

Overview

Recall that the policy issue criteria categories were created to aid in describing an
argument’s relevance to the policy making process. For example, an argument that is relevant to
defining the policy problem is coded “problem” and an argument relevant to promoting a
particular policy solution is coded “support.” Arguments can be relevant to one or several o f the
five policy issue criteria. This section examines the distribution o f arguments that fall into each o f
the five criteria. Before taking each in turn, it is worth comparing their overall proportions as
listed in Table 9. Most noticeable is that by about a 3:2 margin a greater proportion o f arguments
in the ozone case were focused on debating the “problem” o f the ozone hole, than were
arguments in the climate case focused on the “problem” o f climate change. But in the climate
case, nearly twice as many arguments, as a percentage o f all five criteria, were linked to the
“support” and “feasibility” codes - meaning a greater proportion o f arguments in climate change
coverage were devoted to lobbying and discussion of the feasibility o f solving the problem. By
about a 5:1 margin, a greater proportion o f ozone arguments were linked to accountability. Figure
18 and Figure 19 show the breakdown o f arguments in the policy issue criteria categories by
direction and substance.
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Figure 19. Climate Case PIC by Direction and Substance
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The distribution of arguments in the “problem” category was strikingly similar across the
two cases, with For/Natural arguments dominating in both. This is so because “Natural”
arguments are by definition scientific and environmental arguments. In both cases they were
overwhelmingly concerned with the policy “problem,” and - as it turned out - they were
overwhelmingly favorable to the protocols. The distribution o f Social arguments within the
problem category is also similar. But a noticeable shift occurred in the distribution o f arguments
in the next three criteria. The proportion o f For/Political arguments in three key categories policy, support and feasibility -w as higher in the ozone case than the climate case. Conversely,
the proportion o f Against/Political arguments in the climate case was higher across the three
criteria than in the ozone case. In other words, political arguments in news reports relevant to
selecting, promoting and debating the feasibility o f policy solutions were proportionally more
favorable in the ozone case than the climate case and more negative in the climate case than the
ozone case. Finally, “accountability” arguments are far more prominent in the ozone case due to a
proportionally larger number o f For/Political arguments in that category. Next, this section lists
the more detailed results for each o f the five policy issue criteria. The following five tables are
each preceded by brief comments describing some o f their major features.

Problem

Table 10 reveals that arguments in the problem category in both cases ran “very strongly”
in favor o f the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. The ozone arguments are “extremely”
transboundary and the climate arguments “strongly” so. In both cases, scientists monopolized this
category o f argument - 64 percent o f ozone arguments were linked to scientists versus 46 for
climate change.
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Table 10. Problem Code Totals
Montreal Case
Problem
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

338

83

662

75

Against

71

17

216

25

409

100

878

100

Local

21

5

225

26

Trans

388

95

653

74

409

100

878

100

Economic

14

3

62

7

Political

47

11

73

8

Social

115

28

218

25

Natural

233

57

525

60

409

100

878

100

FEL

0

0

15

2

FET

4

1

23

3

FPL

2

0

23

3

FPT

36

9

24

3

FSL

7

2

51

6

FST

95

23

128

15

FNL

3

1

45

5

FNT .

191

47

353

40

AEL

2

0

11

1

AET

8

2

13

1

APL

3

1

21

2

APT

6

1

5

1

ASL

2

0

20

2

AST

11

3

19

2

ANL

2

0

39

4

ANT

37

9

88

10

409

100

878

100

Total

Total

Total

Total
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Montreal Case
Problem
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Scientists

246

64

489

46

US Govt

55

14

172

16

Industry

12

3

78

7

UN

26

7

48

5

Public

23

6

174

16

Environment

14

4

73

7

Europe

8

2

27

3

384

100

1061

100

Total

Table 10 Cont.

Policy

Table 11 shows that in the policy categoiy, ozone arguments were “strongly” in favor o f
the Montreal Protocol while climate change arguments were only “slightly” so. Ozone arguments
were “very strongly” transboundary and climate arguments were only “slightly” so.

Table 11. Policy Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

184

68

523

54

Against

87

32

443

46

271

100

966

100

Local

48

18

508

53

Trans

223

82

458

47

271

100

966

100

Policy Codes

Total

Total

161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Montreal Case
Policy Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Economic

52

19

284

29

Political

149

55

487

50

Social

15

6

76

8

Natural

55

20

119

12

271

100

966

100

FEL

1

0

80

8

FET

16

6

60

6

FPL

15

6

no

11

FPT

95

35

157

16

FSL

3

1

23

2

FST

6

2

22

2

FNL

2

1

27

3

FNT

46

17

44

5

AEL

12

4

103

11

AET

23

8

41

4

APL

10

4

119

12

APT

29

11

101

10

ASL

3

1

22

2

AST

3

1

9

1

ANL

2

1

24

2

ANT

5

2

24

2

271

100

966

100

Scientists

45

19

119

9

US Govt

91

39

533

42

Industry

29

13

224

18

UN

23

10

57

4

Public

9

4

159

13

Environment

19

8

99

8

Europe

16

7

78

6

232

100

1269

100

Total

Total

Total
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Support

Table 12 shows a similar pattern exists in the “support” category. Here ozone arguments
were “strongly” in favor o f the ozone treaty while climate arguments only “slightly” so. Ozone
arguments were “very strongly” transboundary and climate arguments “slightly” transboundary.

Table 12. Support Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kyoto Case

Support Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

101

78

394

54

Against

29

22

338

46

130

100

732

100

Local

28

22

367

50

Trans

102

78

365

50

130

100

732

100

Economic

20

15

193

26

Political

86

66

417

57

Social

11

8

66

9

Natural

13

10

56

8

130

100

732

100

FEL

2

2

45

6

FET

11

8

37

5

FPL

15

12

85

12

FPT

49

38

155

21

FSL

3

2

22

3

FST

8

6

15

2

FNL

2

2

12

2

Total

Total

Total
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Montreal Case

Kyoto Case

Support Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

FNT

11

8

23

3

AEL

2

2

86

12

AET

5

4

25

3

APL

4

3

86

12

APT

18

14

91

12

ASL

0

0

22

3

AST

0

0

7

1

ANL

0

0

9

1

ANT

0

0

12

2

130

100

732

100

Scientists

24

19

55

6

US Govt

49

39

413

43

Industry

18

14

167

17

UN

11

9

41

4

Public

8

6

125

13

Environment

3

2

81

8

Europe

12

10

73

8

125

100

955

100

Total

Total

Feasibility

Table 13 shows that “For” claims in the ozone case dropped in the feasibility category to
the “slight” level. Feasibility arguments focused on the possibility o f actually carrying out a
policy prescription and were heavy on economic and political claims. As a result of this mix, the
margin was simply closer. The same was so for the climate case in which these arguments dipped
slightly into negative territory in the “almost equal” category. Ozone arguments were “very
strongly” transboundary” and climate arguments just “slightly” transboundary.
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Table 13. Feasibility Code Totals
Montreal Case
Feasibility
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

66

57

342

48

Against

50

43

373

52

116

100

715

100

Local

20

17

386

54

Trans

96

83

329

46

116

100

715

100

Economic

48

41

281

39

Political

50

43

329

46

Social

6

5

59

8

Natural

12

10

46

6

116

100

715

100

FEL

2

2

80

11

FET

24

21

57

8

FPL

3

3

69

10

FPT

25

22

83

12

FSL

1

1

16

2

FST

2

2

10

1

FNL

1

1

12

2

FNT

8

7

15

2

AEL

7

6

99

14

AET

15

13

45

6

APL

3

3

79

11

APT

19

16

98

14

ASL

2

2

23

3

AST

1

1

10

1

ANL

1

1

8

1

ANT

2

2

11

2

116

100

715

100

17

16

68

7

Total

Total

Total

Total

Scientists
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Montreal Case
Feasibility
Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

US Govt

30

28

388

40

Industry

25

23

209

22

UN

11

10

43

4

Public

6

6

126

13

Environment

10

9

74

8

Europe

10

9

62

6

109

100

970

100

Total

Table 13 Cont.

Accountability

The starkest feature o f the accountability category is that ozone arguments here - as
nowhere else - outnumber climate arguments. This indicates at a minimum that accountability
was a bigger topic within ozone coverage. These arguments ran “very strongly” in favor o f the
ozone treaty and “slightly” in favor o f the climate treaty. Ozone arguments were ‘‘very strongly”
transboundary and climate arguments “slightly” so.

Table 14. Accountability Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Accountability
Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

98

82

46

56

Against

21

18

36

44

119

100

82

100

Local

16

13

35

43

Trans

103

87

47________ 57

119

100

82

Total

Total

100
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Montreal Case

Kyoto Case

Accountability
Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Economic

10

8

30

37

Political

97

82

36

44

Social

8

7

9

11

Natural

4

3

7

9

119

100

82

100

FEL

0

0

10

12

FET

9

8

7

9

FPL

9

8

5

6

FPT

68

57

17

21

FSL

2

2

1

1

FST

6

5

3

4

FNL

1

1

2

2

FNT

3

3

1

1

AEL

0

0

9

11

AET

1

1

4

5

APL

4

3

5

6

APT

16

13

9

11

ASL

0

0

2

2

AST

0

0

3

4

ANL

0

0

1

1

ANT

0

0

3

4

119

100

82

100

Scientists

17

16

5

5

US Govt

45

43

43

42

Industry

6

6

16

16

UN

15

14

7

7

Public

7

7

10

10

Environment

8

8

11

11

Europe

7

7

10

10

105

100

102

100

Total

Total

Total
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Table 14 Cont.

Policy Issue Criteria Trends

The policy issue criteria landscape maps in Figure 20 and Figure 21 look similar to the
substance landscape maps with spikes in arguments in the same years, only in different categories.
Figure 20 shows similar spikes in arguments in the ozone case in 1987, 1992, 1995 and 2003.
This map shows that the policy was the dominant topic in the year of the Montreal Protocol
(1987) and that discussion o f the problem, took precedence during the 1992 Copenhagen
Amendments and 1995 Vienna Amendments. Policy was the biggest topic o f 2003, when the
United States pressed for methyl bromide exemptions. Figure 21 shows again that 2001, when
the U.S. left the Kyoto Protocol, was the busiest year for arguments in the climate case. The
greatest concentration o f arguments that year was in “policy,” followed by “support,”
%

“feasibility” and then “problem.” Smaller spikes are visible in the “policy” category in 1997 (the
year the Kyoto Protocol was created), 1993 (when Clinton failed to win an energy tax) and 1990
(when George FI.W. Bush backed away from climate efforts). The differential graphs, Figure 22
and Figure 23, show how arguments settled out across the categories in both cases. Figure 22
shows that in the ozone case, the biggest spike in positive territory was in “policy” the year the
Montreal Protocol was approved. A steady emphasis on the “problem” persists from 1987 to the
end o f the sample - reflecting the drumbeat o f scientific/environmental arguments captured in the
substance landscape map in Figure 16. The biggest valley on the ozone PIC map happens in 2003
in the “policy” category, reflecting the U.S. quest for methyl bromide exemptions - a debate
captured as a deep economic valley on the landscape map. Figure 23 shows that arguments in the
climate case about the “problem” stayed well in positive territory, reflecting the wall o f
scientific/environmental arguments seen in the climate substance landscape map in Figure 17. A
deep valley in the “feasibility” category in 2 0 0 1 corresponds with the economic arguments
lodged against the Kyoto Protocol documented in the substance landscape map.
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Figure 21. Climate Case PIC Over Time
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Figure 23. Climate Case PIC Differential Over TimeStakeholders
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Stakeholders

Having examined aggregate results and annual trends in substance and policy issue
criteria, what remains is an accounting o f results by stakeholder group. This final step enables an
understanding o f what groups are behind the results seen thus far. Some have already been
alluded to, such as the role o f scientists in producing the overwhelming number o f
scientific/environmental arguments about the “problem” - and most o f those favorable to both
goals o f both case protocols. As with the preceding sections, this one deals primarily with
numeric results. Examples o f specific arguments linked to stakeholders are drawn upon in the
discussion section (Chapter V) where they are placed in context with trends and interview results
using the policy analytic framework.
Table 9 shows the percent breakdown by stakeholder group across the cases. Recall that
a stakeholder group is assigned to an argument if the argument is made by or is substantially
about a stakeholder group. Recall also that a single argument could be sorted into one or more
stakeholder categories, as with DuPont’s Dr. Steed in Chapter II, who was a scientist and an
industry representative. In both cases, arguments sorted to the “Scientists” stakeholder group
included those attributed to an array o f research organizations. These include scientists with the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), National Academy o f Sciences (NAS), NASA,
NOAA, the EPA and a large number o f universities around the world. In the ozone case,
scientists comprised the biggest stakeholder group - linked to 45 percent o f all arguments. They
took second place in the climate case at 26 percent. Arguments coded “U.S. Government”
included an array o f federal, state or local government officials or their organizations. Common
were arguments attributed to presidential “administration” officials. In the climate case, American
government officials topped the list at 30 percent while they were linked to nearly a quarter o f
arguments in the ozone case. “Industry” stakeholders were linked to only about 9 percent o f
ozone case arguments and included chemical companies, their umbrella lobbying organizations or
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politicians speaking on industry’s behalf. The code also extended to farmers in the methyl
bromide debate. In climate change, “industry” referred to oil companies, the auto industry,
manufacturers and their lobbying outfits, including the Global Climate Change Coalition.
Industry’s voice was a bit louder in this case at 13 percent. The “United Nations” group, while
central to both the ozone and climate cases, weighed in at 7 percent and 4 percent respectively.
This included several U.N. organizations active in the cases including the UNEP, the General
Assembly and the ozone and climate secretariats. Arguments coded “Public” referred to direct
references to the public, public health, Americans or voters and included writers o f letters to the
editor, which were a small part o f the sample of New York Times articles. The “environment”
category included references to environmentalists and organizations such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club and the Union o f Concerned Scientists.
Arguments coded “Europe” included any o f the European nations, but also the larger European
Community.
It should be understood that these groups - and individuals coded as members o f them are not a monolith and that opinions and agendas within them often conflict. Thus, numeric
conclusions o f stakeholders’ arguments have a potential to be misleading. They are intended to
point up broader trends and to serve as an entree to a more detailed qualitative analysis that
involves returning to the source articles to see exactly who said what. The choice o f the seven
principal stakeholder groups in this study emerged from the Montreal Protocol pilot study. These
categories by no means encompass the whole of sources and subjects - obviously, there are more
than seven players and many more nations that could be individually named - but these are the
ones that dominate the American news reports. Two additional and more general stakeholder
codes, “developed nations” and “developing nations,” were used to capture arguments that might
otherwise fall through the cracks. For example. Pacific Island states fearing flooding brought on
by global warming have lobbied hard for a climate treaty. To the extent their concerns are not
captured by the “U.N.” or “environmentalist” codes, they are included in the “developing
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nations” category. These codes are not reported on here, but they are used to enrich and place in
further context the discussion in Chapter V.
Four figures enable a broad visual comparison o f the seven stakeholder groups. Figure
24 and Figure 25 show arguments by stakeholders broken down by direction and substance.
Figure 26 and Figure 27 show them broken down by direction and policy issue criteria. A few key
findings stand out in each. Looking left to right across all four figures, it is plan to see that
scientists’ arguments are grouped in very similar fashion in both cases - across both direction and
substance categories and policy issue criteria. This suggests that scientists were playing a similar
role in the debate about both policies. Figure 24 and Figure 25 show that in both cases they were
focused on describing scientific and environmental phenomenon and the balance of their
arguments were “very strongly” favorable to the protocols. This balance extends to discussion of
the “social” consequences o f each. A key difference between scientists’ arguments in the cases is
that the ozone case had a higher proportion o f political arguments and lower proportion o f
economic arguments than the climate case. Figure 26 and Figure 27 show that in both cases
scientists’ arguments were by a wide margin more relevant to defining the policy “problem” than
finding a “policy” solution for the problem. Findings for the U.S. Government and Industry
stakeholder groups are a bit more varied. But there is one critical difference between the cases
here: they are split by direction. In the ozone case, U.S. government arguments were “strongly”
favorable to the Montreal Protocol and industry arguments were “slightly” so. In the climate case,
both group’s arguments run “slightly” against the Kyoto Protocol. Broadly, then, it can be said
that while scientists’ arguments in the news media were similarly favorable to the Kyoto and
Montreal Protocols, American Government and industry' were split - in favor o f the ozone treaty,
but against the climate treaty. Separately, a comparison o f “public” stakeholder arguments shows
that For/Social arguments were more common in the ozone case than in the climate case (~2:1).
This suggests a greater relative preoccupation with public welfare in the ozone case in this
category, which was focused on skin cancer. This section now turns to a brief look at the
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stakeholder data tables, providing additional insights about each group. A short section about
trends follows.

Figure 24. Ozone Case Stakeholders by Direction and Substance
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Europe

Figure 25. Climate Case Stakeholders by Direction and Substance
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Figure 26. Ozone Case Stakeholders by Direction and PIC
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Figure 27. Climate Case Stakeholders by Direction and PIC
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Europe

Scientists

Table 15 below shows scientists’ arguments ran at the high end o f “very strong” support
for the Montreal Protocol and the low end o f “very strong” for the Kyoto Protocol. Respectively,
they were “extremely” domestic and “very strongly domestic.” Proportionally, both were heavy
on FNT arguments but ANT arguments were nearly twice as prominent in the climate case.

Table 15. Scientist Code Totals
Montreal Case
Scientist
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

298

88

484

75

Against

42

12

159

25

340

100

643

100

Local

14

4

107

17

Trans

326

96

536

83

340

100

643

100

Economic

9

3

52

8

Political

45

13

46

7

Social

65

19

118

18

Natural

223

65

427

66

342

100

643

100

FEL

0

0

21

3

FET

4

1

22

3

FPL

2

1

11

2

FPT

40

12

21

3

FSL

5

1

22

3

FST

54

16

82

13

FNL

4

1

31

5

FNT

189

56

274

43

Total

Total

Total
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Montreal Case
Scientist
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

AEL

0

0

1

0

AET

5

1

8

1

APL

0

0

8

1

APT

1

0

6

1

ASL

2

1

2

0

AST

4

1

12

2

ANL

1

0

11

2

ANT

29

9

111

17

340

100

643

100

For

221

90

406

83

Against

25

10

83

17

246

100

489

100

For

40

89

88

• 74

Against

5

11

31

26

45

100

119

100

For

23

96

42

76

Against

1

4

13

24

24

100

55

100

For

13

76

50

74

Against

4

24

18

26

17

100

68

100

For

17

100

3

60

Against

0

0

2

40

17

100

5

100

Total
Problem

Total
Policy

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total
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Table 15 Cont.

U.S. Government

Table 16 shows the directional split between cases in U.S. Government arguments.
Ozone arguments ran “strongly” in favor o f the ozone treaty while climate arguments ran
“slightly” against. Both, however, were in transboundary territory - “strongly” in the ozone case
and “moderately” in the climate case. Within the ozone case, political arguments in favor o f the
protocol were transboundaiy by a more than

2 :1

margin whereas in the climate case they were

local by a 3:2 margin. This shows that in terms o f arguments, the politics supporting the ozone
treaty were largely international (e.g. federal efforts to back the protocol) while on balance
domestic political arguments accounted for the most support for the climate treaty (e.g. state and
local officials calling for federal action or taking action themselves). In the climate case, again,
arguments across the problem, policy, support and feasibility categories ran from “slightly” to
“moderately” against the Kyoto Protocol. This data, especially, reflects the demise o f the Kyoto
Protocol in the United States.

Table 16. U.S. Government Totals
Montreal Case
U-SCodes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

125

71

349

46

Against

52

29

412

54

177

100

761

100

Local

58

33

459

60

Trans

119

67

302

40

177

100

761

100

Economic

22

13

185

24

Political

90

53

402

53

Total

Total
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Montreal Case
U.S. Govt
Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Social

19

11

52

7

Natural

38

22

122

16

169

100

761

100

FEL

4

2

58

8

FET

3

2

27

4

FPL

21

12

102

13

FPT

48

27

64

8

FSL

3

2

20

3

FST

11

6

12

2

FNL

3

2

25

3

FNT

32

18

41

5

AEL

9

5

86

11

AET

6

3

14

2

APL

12

7

123

16

APT

17

10

113

15

ASL

4

2

14

2

AST

1

1

6

1

ANL

2

1

31

4

ANT

1

1

25

3

177

100

761

100

For

46

84

102

59

Against

9

16

70

41

55

100

172

100

For

62

68

242

45

Against

29

32

291

55

91

100

533

100

For

36

73

168

41

Against

13

27

245

59

49

100

413

100

Total

Total
Problem

Total
Policy

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility
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U.S. Govt. Cont.

Montreal Case
U.S. Govt
Codes

Number

Kvoto Case

Percent

Number

Percent

For

17

57

158

41

Against

13

43

230

59

30

100

388

100

For

36

80

22

51

Against

9

20

21

49

45

100

43

100

Total

U.S. Govt. Cont.

Accountability

Total

Industry
Table 17 shows that industry-linked arguments in the ozone case were “slightly” in favor
o f the ozone treaty and in the climate case “moderately” against the climate treaty. The former is
in positive territory because many arguments focused on the invention o f substitutes by industry,
which supported the treaty’s goals. Arguments in the ozone case were “strongly” international
while in the climate case they were “strongly” local. This conforms to industry’s aggressive
opposition to the climate treaty on domestic economic and political grounds. At the same time,
economic arguments in favor o f the climate treaty (e.g. cost-savings from efficiency and
renewable energy investment) were also more local.

Table 17. Industry Code Totals
Montreal Case
Industry
Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

39

56

136

40

Against

31

44

201

60

70

100

337

100

Total
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Montreal Case
Industry
Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Local

19

27

225

67

Trans

51

73

112

33

70

100

337

100

Economic

43

62

185

55

Political

6

9

66

20

Social

8

12

38

11

Natural

12

17

48

14

69

100

337

100

FEL

4

6

46

14

FET

20

29

29

9

FPL

0

0

17

5

FPT

4

6

6

2

FSL

2

3

7

2

FST

4

6

5

1

FNL

0

0

8

2

FNT

5

7

18

5

AEL

11

16

78

23

AET

8

11

32

9

APL

1

1

39

12

APT

2

3

4

1

ASL

0

0

23

7

AST

2

3

3

1

ANL

1

1

7

2

ANT

6

9

15

4

70

100

337

100

For

6

50

31

40

Against

6

50

47

60

12

100

78

100

For

11

38

87

39

Against

18

62

137

61

Total

Total

Total
Problem

Total
Policy
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Industry Cont.

Montreal Case
Industry
Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

29

100

224

100

For

13

72

61

37

Against

5

28

106

63

18

100

167

100

For

14

56

91

44

Against

11

44

118

56

25

100

209

100

For

5

83

8

50

Against

1

17

8

50

6

100

16

100

Total

Industry Cont.

Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total

United Nations

Table 18 shows that arguments linked to the United Nations in both cases were
remarkably similar over most coding categories. Both were “very strongly” in favor o f the
protocols and both “extremely” international. This is not surprising since the United Nations,
international organization, sponsored the process.

Table 18. UN Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

42

79

94

85

Against

11

21

17

15

53

100

111

100

UN Codes

Total
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Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Local

1

2

2

2

Trans

52

98

109

98

53

100

111

100

Economic

9

17

10

9

Political

26

49

52

47

Social

2

4

19

17

Natural

16

30

30

27

53

100

111

100

FEL

0

0

1

1

FET

4

8

7

6

FPL

0

0

1

1

FPT

20

38

41

37

FSL

0

0

0

0

FST

2

4

16

14

FNL

0

0

0

0

FNT

16

30

28

25

AEL

1

2

0

0

AET

4

8

2

2

APL

0

0

0

0

APT

6

11

10

9

ASL

0

0

0

0

AST

0

0

3

3

ANL

0

0

0

0

ANT

0

0

2

2

53

100

111

100

For

25

96

46

96

Against

1

4

2

4

26

100

48

100

For

16

70

44

77

Against

7

30

13

23

UN Codes

Total

Total

Total

Problem

Total
Policy
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UN Cont.

Montreal Case
UN Codes

Kyoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

23

100

57

100

For

8

73

36

88

Against

3

27

5

12

11

100

41

100

For

7

64

28

65

Against

4

36

15

35

11

100

43

100

For

11

73

5

71

Against

4

27

2

29

15

100

7

100

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total

Public

Table 19 shows that public-linked arguments ran “strongly” in favor o f the ozone
protocol and “moderately” so in the climate case. They were “strongly” international in the ozone
case and, by contrast, “moderately” local in the climate case. FSL and FST arguments accounted
for 58 percent of public arguments in the ozone case, compared with 34 percent for climate,
showing again that ozone arguments packed a proportionately more potent social punch in favor
o f the protocol.
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Table 19. Public Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

38

73

238

64

Against

14

27

133

36

52

100

371

100

Local

14

27

230

62

Trans

38

73

141

38

52

100

371

100

Economic

3

5

82

22

Political

7

13

39

11

Social

39

71

197

53

Natural

6

11

53

14

55

100

371

100

FEL

1

2

31

8

FET

1

2

11

3

FPL

3

6

21

6

FPT

1

2

9

2

FSL

6

12

61

16

FST

24

46

66

18

FNL

0

0

16

4

FNT

2

4

23

6

AEL

0

0

33

9

AET

1

2

7

2

APL

0

0

8

2

APT

0

0

1

0

ASL

3

6

52

14

AST

6

12

18

5

ANL

1

2

8

2

ANT

3

6

6

2

52

100

371

100

Public Codes

Total

Total

Total

Total

Problem
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Montreal Case
Public Codes

Kvoto Case

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

19

83

132

76

Against

4

17

42

24

23

100

174

100

For

5

56

97

61

Against

4

44

62

39

9

100

159

100

For

8

100

72

58

Against

0

0

53

42

8

100

125

100

For

3

50

62

49

Against

3

50

64

51

6

100

126

100

For

7

100

7

70

Against

0

0

3

30

7

100

10

100

Total
Policy

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total

Environmentalists

Table 20 shows that arguments linked to environmentalists were “moderately” supportive
o f the ozone treaty and “strongly” supportive o f the climate treaty. Ozone arguments were
“extremely” transboundary and climate arguments “slightly” transboundary. Ozone arguments
focused more on politics than climate arguments (by nearly 3:2) while the climate case
emphasized science and environmental arguments more than ozone (2:1). They were about
equally attentive to economics. Other than confirming that environmentalists, like the UN, were
in support o f the ozone and climate treaties, this shows that environmentalists in the ozone case
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were reported in the press to focus more energy on politics and the economy while in the climate
case they split that between economics, politics and science.

Table 20. Environmentalist Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Environmental
Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

26

62

146

77

Against

16

38

44

23

42

100

190

100

Local

4

10

84

44

Trans

38

90

106

56

42

100

190

100

Economic

10

24

40

21

Political

21

51

69

36

Social

5

12

36

19

Natural

5

12

45

24

41

100

190

100

FEL

0

0

16

8

FET

3

7

13

7

FPL

2

5

25

13

FPT

13

31

26

14

FSL

1

2

14

7

FST

3

7

16

8

FNL

0

0

6

3

FNT

4

10

30

16

AEL

0

0

5

3

AET

7

17

6

3

APL

1

2

9

5

APT

6

14

9

5

ASL

0

0

4

2

Total

Total

Total
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Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Environmental
Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

AST

1

2

2

1

ANL

0

0

5

3

ANT

1

2

4

2

42

100

190

100

For

10

71

60

82

Against

4

29

13

18

14

100

73

100

For

12

63

71

72

Against

7

37

28

28

19

100

99

100

For

2

67

67

83

Against

1

33

14

17

3

100

81

100

For

4

40

51

69

Against

6

60

23

31

10

100

74

100

For

6

75

7

64

Against

2

25

4

36

8

100

11

100

Total
Problem

Total
Policy

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total

Europe

Table 21 shows that the European stakeholder group had a remarkably similar structure across the
cases. Both cases were “very strongly” in favor o f the protocols and “extremely” transboundary.
The level o f support in the ozone case is notable, because several European nations at first
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opposed an ozone treaty with binding limits. These “Against” arguments were overwhelmed over
the life the sample.

Table 21. Europe Code Totals
Montreal Case

Kvoto Case

Europe Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

For

21

75

79

75

Against

7

25

26

25

28

100

105

100

Local

1

4

0

0

Trans

27

96

105

100

28

100

105

100

Economic

6

21

8

8

Political

17

61

75

71

Social

2

7

11

10

Natural

3

11

11

10

28

100

105

100

FEL

0

0

0

0

FET

2

7

8

8

FPL

0

0

0

0

FPT

14

50

51

49

FSL

0

0

0

0

FST

2

7

11

10

FNL

0

0

0

0

FNT

3

11

9

9

AEL

1

4

0

0

AET

3

11

0

0

APL

0

0

0

0

APT

3

11

24

23

ASL

0

0

0

0

AST

0

0

0

0

ANL

0

0

0

0

Total

Total

Total
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Montreal Case

Kyoto Case

Europe Codes

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

ANT

0

0

2

2

28

100

105

100

For

8

100

25

93

Against

0

0

2

7

8

100

27

100

For

13

81

60

77

Against

3

19

18

23

16

100

78

100

For

9

75

57

78

Against

3

25

16

22

12

100

73

100

For

4

40

41

66

Against

6

60

21

34

10

100

62

100

For

7

100

7

70

Against

0

0

3

30

7

100

10

100

Total

Europe Cont.

Problem

Total
Policy

Total
Support

Total
Feasibility

Total
Accountability

Total

Stakeholder Trends

This section examines the evolution o f arguments from the two biggest stakeholder
groups - scientists and the U.S. government - as they relate to the policy process o f both cases.
Recall from the preceding trend sections, that “Natural” and “problem” claims persisted in
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positive territory in both cases - showing that scientific and environmental arguments largely
supported both protocols. Recall also that “Political” arguments, and “policy,” “support” and
“feasibility” arguments split between cases at key times in their evolution - with ozone claims
rising into positive “For” territory during the Montreal Protocol’s approval and subsequent
amendments, and climate claims dropping into negative, “Against” territory, especially in 2001,
when the United States walked away from it. These features come into sharper relief when sorted
into the scientists and U.S. Government stakeholder groups. Figure 28 shows the PIC differential
for ozone case scientists and the U.S. government groups in three dimensions with spikes and
valleys labeled by key events on the timeline. Figure 29 does the same for the climate case.
Together these figures show that arguments o f scientists in both ozone and climate change news
coverage were focused on defining the “problem” and were solidly and consistently supportive o f
the Montreal and Kyoto Protocol’s goals and principles. By contrast, U.S. government arguments
were spit between the two cases. Figure 28b shows that in the ozone case government arguments
were supportive when it arguably counted most - in the year o f the Montreal Protocol’s approval.
After that, they dropped off the map and formed a valley o f opposition in 2003 in the “policy”
and “support” categories over the methyl bromide issue. Figure 29b shows the fate o f the Kyoto
Protocol in terms o f government arguments. There were small flashes o f support in the early
going, including the 1983 EPA and NSA climate change reports, which led to a positive spike in
“problem” arguments, and the 1997 U.S.-aided negotiation o f the protocol, which left a small
ridge o f “policy” and “support” arguments. But then a chasm opened up in 2001, when the Bush
administration abruptly pulled away from the Kyoto Protocol process. A surge o f arguments
hostile to the protocol on “policy,” “support” and “feasibility” grounds filled the news.
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Figure 28. Ozone Case PIC Differentials a) Scientists b) U.S. Govt.
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Figure 29. Climate Case PIC Differentials a) Scientists b) U.S. Govt.
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Summary

The Excel program used to generate the above maps enabled the examination o f scores o f data
combinations - o f totals and differentials in aggregate and time series among the categories of
direction, substance, PIC and stakeholders. The data presented and analyzed in this chapter
answers the research questions outlined for it at the beginning o f the chapter and in Section B o f
Table 4. The data set is large, however, and holds the promise for additional lines o f inquiry for
separate studies.
Table 22 summarizes below the main conclusions from this chapter’s three previous
sections - code totals, policy issue criteria and stakeholders - and can serve as a useful reference
throughout the study. These results are combined with historical information from the first
chapter (Background) and insights from the next chapter (Interviews) to paint a more
comprehensive picture o f trends, conditions and the interaction o f key players in the policy
process o f both cases.

Table 22. Summary o f Key Findings o f Case Comparison

Related Tables &
Figures

A. Code Totals

1.

Arguments in both cases ran in favor o f their protocols. But ozone
“very strongly” and climate only “moderately.”

2. Ozone arguments were “extremely” international while climate
arguments only “moderately” so.

Table 9, Figure
12 and Figure 1
Table 9, Figure
12 and Figure 1
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Related Tables &
Figures

A. Code Totals

3.

Environmental and scientific arguments dominated the coverage o f
both cases followed by political arguments. Economic arguments
were more prominent in climate coverage (e.g. costs of Kyoto) than
social arguments (e.g. disruption from sea levels rise). In the ozone
case, social arguments (skin cancer scare) got more play.

Table 9, Figure 12
and Figure 1

4.

In terms of trends over the 24-year sample, arguments spiked in
both cases in years o f intense media attention.

Figure 14

5.

In the ozone case, spikes in For/Natural, For/Political and
For/Social categories rose in years o f the protocol’s approval and
subsequent revisions.

Figure 16

6. Climate economic and political arguments dropped precipitously in
2001 when the U.S. walked away from the Kyoto protocol. Political
arguments mostly cancelled out but negative economic arguments
prevailed.

Figure 17

B. Policy Issue Criteria

Related Tables &
Figures

1. By about a 3:2 margin, a greater proportion o f arguments in the
ozone case were focused on the “problem” o f the ozone hole, than
were arguments in the climate case focused on the “problem” o f
climate change.

Table 9, Figure 18
and Figure 19

2. The distribution o f arguments in the “problem” category was
strikingly similar across the two cases. For/Natural arguments
predominated, followed by For/Social arguments.

Table 9, Table 10,
Figure 18, Figure
19

3.

Political arguments in news reports relevant to selecting,
promoting, and debating the feasibility o f policy solutions
(“policy,” “support,” and “feasibility” codes respectively) were
proportionally more favorable in the ozone case than the climate
case and more negative in the climate case than the ozone case.

Table 9, Table 11,
Table 12, Table
13, Figure 18 and
Figure 19

4.

“Accountability” arguments were more prominent in the ozone case
are mostly political and favorable to the Montreal Protocol

Table 9, Table 14
and Figure 18 and
Figure 19
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B. Policy Issue Criteria

5.

Related Tables &
Figures

In the ozone case, the dominant feature o f the PIC landscape
differential map was a positive spike in “policy” arguments the year
the Montreal Protocol was approved. A steady positive emphasis
on the “problem” persists from 1987 to the end o f the sample,
corresponding to positive scientific/environmental arguments.

Figure 22

6 . In the climate case, a similar wall o f positive “problem” arguments
was also seen. A deep valley in the “feasibility” category in 2001
corresponds with the economic arguments lodged against the Kyoto
Protocol.

Figure 23

Related Tables &
Figures

C. Stakeholders

1. In the ozone case, scientists were linked to 45 percent o f ozone case
arguments, the U.S. government to nearly a quarter o f all
arguments, and industry 9 percent. In the climate case, American
government officials topped the list at 30 percent followed by
scientists at 26 percent and industry at 13 percent.

Table 9, Figure 24
and Figure 25

2.

Scientists’ arguments in both cases were focused on describing
scientific and environmental phenomenon. Remarkably similar in
direction, substance and PIC, their arguments were “very strongly”
favorable to the protocols and were by far most relevant to defining
the policy “problem” followed by debating the proper “policy”
solution for the problem.

Table 15, Figure
24, Figure 25,
Figure 26 and
Figure 27

3. In the ozone case, U.S. government arguments were “strongly”
favorable to the Montreal Protocol and industry arguments were
“slightly” so. But in the climate case both group’s arguments run
“slightly” against the Kyoto Protocol. Broadly, then, it can be said
that American government and industry was split between the cases
- in favor o f the ozone treaty, but against the climate treaty.

Table 16, Table
17, Figure 24,
Figure 25, Figure
26 and Figure 27

4. United Nations and European arguments were remarkably similar
across both cases. Not surprisingly, they were both “very strongly”
in favor o f the protocols and “extremely” transboundary.

Table 18, Table
21, Figure 24,
Figure 25, Figure
26 and Figure 27
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Related Tables &
Figures

C. Stakeholders

5.

In the “public” stakeholder category, there were more “social”
arguments in favor o f the treaty in the ozone case than the climate
case by about 2:1 .The ozone For/Social arguments were mostly
about skin cancer.

Table 19, Figure
24, Figure 25,
Figure 26 and
Figure 27

6. Environmentalists, like the UN and Europe, were in support o f the
ozone and climate treaties. In the ozone case, environmental
arguments focused mostly on politics and the economy while in the
climate case they split between economics, politics and science.

Table 20, Figure
24, Figure 25,
Figure 26 and
Figure 27

7.

Figure 28 and
Figure 29

Over the 24-year sample, arguments o f scientists in both ozone and
climate change news coverage were focused on defining the
“problem” and were solidly and consistently supportive o f the
Montreal and Kyoto Protocol’s goals and principles. Peaks in these
arguments corresponded with protocol conferences and the release
o f major scientific reports.

8. In the ozone case, U.S. government arguments were strongest in
favor o f the protocol when it arguably counted most - in the year o f
the Montreal Protocol’s approval. In 2003, they dropped into
negative territory in the “policy” and “support” categories over the
methyl bromide issue.

Figure 28

9.

Figure 29

In the climate case, the lack o f U.S. government support was clear.
With the exception o f small upticks in “For” territory in 1983 and
1997, the U.S. government PIC landscape differential hovers close
to zero until it drops into a deep, broad hole in 2001 across the
“policy,” “support” and “feasibility” categories when the Bush
administration abruptly pulled away from the Kyoto Protocol
process.
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CHAPTER IV

INTERVIEWS

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the content o f interviews with seven key informants who are
highly familiar with at least one o f this study’s two cases - the ozone hole or climate change. The
interview subjects were chosen to represent a cross section o f the major stakeholder groups
examined in this study - scientists, U.S. government officials, industry, environmentalists and the
news media itself - and to offer perspectives that can add valuable context to understanding the
social and decision processes at work in the evolution o f the two cases. Their observations serve
as additional data and also an informal check against the primary source o f information for this
study - the mainstream news media. Recall from Neuendorfs typology that the news media
analysis in the preceding chapter is a study o f message alone. The following accounts comprise
data from both the senders o f the message (news reporters and their sources) and receivers o f the
message (policy makers and interest group members). By themselves the interviews are rich in
description and analysis and are all the more powerful when combined in the final chapter in an
analysis with the coding results and additional studies from scholars in the field. That said, the
use o f this limited subject pool should not be mistaken for an attempt to formally test the media
coding results for any causal relationships, as in agenda setting research. Rather, the reader is
asked to consider how what the subjects have to say begins to fill out the picture painted by the
preceding content analysis and, additionally, what it says about the creation o f the news itself and
the evolution o f the U.S. role in the ozone and climate cases.
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The interviewees are: Robert Watson, a world-renown atmospheric researcher and leader
in both the climate change and ozone regimes; a member o f the U.S. Congress who asked not to
be named; David Doniger, a longtime lawyer with Natural Resources Defense Council; Frank
Maisano, an industry lobbyist and former spokesman for the Global Climate Coalition; Josef
Hebert, a veteran Associated Press environmental news reporter; and two national environmental
news reporters who asked not to be named. Taking each subject in turn by the participant group
they best represent - scientists, U.S. government, industry, environmentalists, and the media this chapter provides a straight-forward account o f each interview with an emphasis on the
subjects’ own words. Each subject was asked the following six questions (also listed in Table 4):

1. Please briefly describe your experience with climate change and/or ozone issues.
2.

What role do you think your group has played and will play in the future with regard to
U.S. involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?

3.

What role do you think the news media has played and will play in the future with regard
to U.S. involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?

4. Please outline what you think are the strengths and weaknesses o f each policy effort climate change and/or ozone. What would you recommend, if anything, be done to
improve them?
5.

Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a few ways, if any, you
think it has affected and/or will affect U.S. involvement in either policy effort.

6. What do you think the future holds for each policy?

The answers and the amount o f time devoted to each question varied greatly among those
interviewed. Six o f the seven interviews ranged from 20 minutes to just over an hour; the shortest
interview was about 12 minutes. Despite identical core questions, discrete themes emerged within
each response. Thus the varied subheadings under each o f the five respondent sections reflect
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both the length o f the interviews and the diversity of the subjects’ responses. As with the previous
chapter, an effort has been made to gather the key results into a useful reference table. This
chapter concludes with a summary section that comprises the six-part Table 23 - one part for
each o f the interview questions asked - which distills major points made by each interviewee. It
is intended as an aide to accessing the comprehensive observations that unfold below.

Robert Watson. Atmospheric Scientist

Robert Watson, currently the chief scientist at the World Bank, has had a long and highlevel involvement in the development o f science and policy in the ozone and climate change
problems. As an atmospheric scientist and NA SA’s upper atmosphere research program manager,
he led efforts in the 1980s in the United States and at the United Nations to investigate the ozone
hole. He later worked as a White House science aide in the first Clinton administration, and
served a term as chairman o f the IPCC until 2002. Watson was frequently quoted in news
coverage o f the ozone hole and climate change issues and his views appeared in many articles in
this study’s sample. He described his role in both cases as being primarily “a cheerleader to the
scientific community,” encouraging international scientific assessments followed up by efforts to
translate the results “into sort o f what I call an understandable language for policymakers or
decision makers in general.” Watson said the work o f scientists in this regard was “absolutely
critical.”

Separate Problems

Watson stressed early in the interview that he considered the ozone and climate change
cases fundamentally different in terms o f their scientific and policy evolution. He said that in the
ozone case scientists conducted solid research and spoke with one voice that was heard clearly by
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policy makers who moved swiftly to enact progressively tougher measures to respond to the
problem. “Now, to be honest, I call it yesterday’s issue because not only have developed, but
developing countries have already agreed to phase out literally all long-lived chlorine and
bromine containing compounds,” he said. “There’s still a little bit o f work to be done to finalize
that phaseout, but fundamentally we’re well on track.” Watson called the evolution o f ozone
science and policy - from the development o f the initial theory ozone destruction by CFCs to the
latest protocol amendments - “an incredible story o f good science interpreted through an
international assessment” that drew a positive response from world governments and the private
sector. Watson described the process:

The original international convention on ozone was done, I would call it, on model
calculations. Then the Montreal Protocol was also largely based on what the theoretical
projections were. We showed there was chlorine in the atmosphere, we showed it was long
lived from the fluorocarbons and, again, the Montreal Protocol was largely in response to the
observation o f chlorine in the atmosphere and the fact that all the models projected a
significant loss o f ozone. Then o f course we found the Antarctic ozone hole and we
demonstrated - in my opinion, beyond a doubt - that effectively the ozone hole was due to
human activities. That led even to a revision o f the Montreal Protocol, and I believe that was
in London, if I remember the sequence correctly. Then we discovered that there was a loss o f
ozone globally or at least primarily in the mid and high latitudes and primarily in winter.
There wasn’t any in the tropics and subtropics. So it was a global scale. That then also
stimulated further regulations. Then we found - and we found that for both satellite and
ground based data - then we found, obviously, that we were seeing large depletions o f ozone
occasionally in the winter hemisphere o f the Arctic. So the evidence just built up and every
time there’s more evidence the policy makers responded.
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Aiding the solution was an ability and willingness on the part o f the chemical industry to
develop and introduce substitute chemicals on the market. By contrast, said Watson, the climate
change problem has been more complicated for many reasons:

The climate situation is much, much tougher. First, the climate change is predominantly
caused by two big issues: one is land use change and the other dominant one is energy use.
This is not simply an issue for the northern hemisphere or industrialized countries. It’s an
issue and it affects both developed and developing countries. Also it’s got a much larger
economic impact when you change energy and land use policies [rather] than just changing
gases for refrigeration, air conditioning, solvents etcetera. And therefore the dynamics around
the climate issue are much more complex.

The Media’s Role

Watson’s views on the role and importance o f the news media echoed those o f scholars
quoted in this study’s first two chapters - that the news media both reflects influences public
opinion and policy making. He said, “If we live in a democracy, which I would argue we do in
the U.S., then public opinion is absolutely critical for policy formation by government. It’s also
critical as a message to the private sector as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in
the products they produce.” In the ozone case, he said the news media “told middle America
there’s a threat to your human health or your child’s human health.” The media also showed
visual imagery o f the ozone hole itself, making the threat seems more concrete. Said Watson:

If there’s one word in the English dictionary or the American dictionary that scares the hell
out o f people it is probably the word “cancer.” So as soon as you linked an environmental
issue to cancer, people - and especially cancer in white Caucasians, light skinned people,

,

#
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that’s middle class America - people suddenly said, “Wait a second, what’s happening?” And
when they realized there were cost-effective solutions to the ozone-depleting gases we were
putting in - again knowledge through the media - they called for action.

On the climate change issue, Watson said the news media has come up short. “In
general,” he said. “I do not believe that the media is doing a particularly good job o f explaining
environmental issues to the American public. There’s some superb media, but there’s a lot that’s
just sensationalism. It either overplays the issue or significantly underplays the issue.”
Specifically, Watson criticized the attention paid by the news media to climate change skeptics,
who he has perceived as receiving an unfairly equal proportion o f attention in light o f
overwhelming scientific consensus that human-induced climate change is real. “And the minority
view,” Watson said, “which might be one percent or five percent, is given equal weighting to the
majority view and the public is as confused as hell. Quite often it’s the same in a Congressional
hearing or on a television interview.” Watson said part o f the problem is that climate change is a
complicated subject and few reporters - with the exception o f some who specialize in the topic
for large newspapers - are familiar with the science or the policy. “I’ve certainly been called to
say, ‘Bob, I’m doing a story on ozone could you sort o f give me some information on it? Give me
the story o f the Kyoto Protocol.’ And the first question is, ‘By the way, what is climate change?
What is ozone depletion?’ or ‘This Kyoto Protocol, what is it?’ And you really are trying to
educate from zero. And to write a good story you really have to have some basic knowledge.”
Watson said he wished the American news media paid more attention to environmental issues to
help inform citizens and empower them to demand change from political leaders. He added that
American news outlets have been “almost silent” on the issue compared to their European
counterparts.
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And the question is why? Is it the people that own the newspapers and the television don’t
think the environment is an important issue? Is it they don’t think it’s politically correct at the
moment? But for whatever reason, the media is not playing a very proactive role at this
moment in time in the U.S. As I say, given that we live in a democracy I believe the media
should step up to the plate and really try to report these issues in a fair and balanced way admitting we don’t know everything, admitting there are some uncertainties but trying to
explain to the public what are the issues and what are the options for change.

Globalization and Social Equity

Asked for his definition o f globalization, Waston replied: “To me globalization simply
means that the world is becoming smaller and smaller.” Specifically, he said, the growth of
markets across international boundaries has had an enormous impact on people and the
environment with consequences that bring into sharp relief both social inequities (he noted thatl .3
billion people living on less than a dollar are seeing next to none o f globalization’s economic
benefits) and the need for cooperative international solutions led by the developed world. Said
Watson:

A good example is that we in America are rich - not everyone in America is rich or middle
class - we demand fruits year round. We demand shrimp year round. We demand vegetables
year round, and where do we get them if they’re not in the growing season? America, we get
them from all over the world. So we have a footprint on the rest o f the world. In general
issues such as ozone depletion and issues such as global warming, climate change - whether
w e’re in a globalized economy or not - the only way to deal with these issues is collectively.
They are global commons issues. That means to say given that all countries do emit at all
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levels greenhouse gases, if we need a 60 to 80 percent reduction in emissions relative to today,
then you have to have all large emitters on board. Europe can’t solve it alone. The U.S. can’t
solve it alone. China or India can’t solve it alone. It forces us to work together. Because you
need an international regime to address ozone depletion - which w e’ve got and works very
well - or to address climate change.

Watson noted that “the industrialized world became rich through economic development that
used cheap energy” and thus it bears a responsibility for helping the developing world. “So if we
indeed need China and India to also reduce their emissions over time, then what’s our
responsibility in OECD countries to help them get the energy they need to fight poverty but to
also be climate friendly at the same time?” Watson answered that a “globalized way” is needed
to help developing nations acquire the technologies they need to help in the fight against climate
change.
A strong theme o f social and environmental justice ran through his remarks as he noted
that from the local to the global level, poor and disadvantaged people are most vulnerable to
environmental damage, which is often caused by the consumptive patterns o f the affluent. For
example, asked why the ozone policy process has enjoyed greater success than the climate change
process, Watson shared what he called “truly simplistic analysis o f it” grounded in social equity
concerns:

First, both climate change and ozone depletion were predominantly caused by industrialized
activities o f the OECD countries. It was the OECD countries that were predominantly
emitting chlorine and bromine containing compounds. Now I’m not blaming industry, I don’t
mean that, I mean we, we society, wanted these products. So it’s not an anti-industry
comment but we use chlorine and bromine containing compounds. We’re also the biggest
producer o f carbon dioxide. So in both cases the major driving force was our choice of
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activities in the North. In both cases they’re long-term issues, but there’s a huge, huge
difference. And that is on ozone depletion the major threat was to human health in North
America and Europe. It was skin cancer and that really worries Americans and Europeans.
They don’t want cancer. Therefore they demanded change. Climate change predominantly
affects poor people in developing countries - not middle class rich people in OECD countries.
And therefore, so, it’s very straight foreword. The American public demanded action on
stratospheric ozone depletion ‘cause the threat was to them. On climate change the threat isn’t
- the predominant threat - isn’t to them. The predominant threat is to poor people in
developing countries. And therefore if climate change, hypothetically, had been effective, the
results or the implication that climate change had been cancer o f one form or another in
America - I’m absolutely convinced we would have seen action way before now. I think it’s
almost as simple as that.

The Future

Looking to the future, Watson praised the course o f both the international stratospheric
ozone and the climate policy regimes. Existing measures to address the ozone hole, he said, were
correct and “we just have to finalize implementation o f the phaseout.” He called the Kyoto
Protocol “a very important first step toward what will eventually need to be a very significant
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.” Watson said to stabilize the earth’s climate at an
acceptable level would require moving from on-average 5-percent reductions in developed
nations to worldwide 60 to 80 percent reductions - a move that would necessitate cleaner power
generation and higher energy efficiency. He described a systematic approach that would give
policymakers options to choose from depending on their desired outcomes.
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So I believe the governments around the world should have a serious conversation about
setting a long term target: What is an acceptable change in the earth’s climate, which would
lead to what is an acceptable change in the atmospheric concentration o f C 0 2. So if we could
set ourselves a target o f the global mean surface temperature - [i.e. it] should be changed no
more than X, the rate o f change should be no more than Y degrees Celsius per decade - this
would mean, based on the best knowledge today ... this is what we have to do for emissions.
And then you would have to have an equitable allocation o f emission rights between
developed and developing countries and that would mean you would have to develop
technologies and policies to meet those goals.

Despite the major social and political barriers he outlined in the climate case, Watson said the
growing strength o f scientific evidence o f the problem, coupled with signs o f interest from the
private sector in addressing the issue give him reason for optimism.

I have to remain optimistic that we will indeed address the climate change issue in a sensible
way. The question is, “How long will it take us?” The longer we take the more w e’re
committed more and more to climate change. Once you put carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere it has a residence time o f one or two hundred years. So for every decade we wait
to seriously address climate change means w e’re committing ourselves to a warmer, and
warmer and warmer world. The solution therefore is government must get together with the
private sector, must get together with civil society and developed nations must work with
developing nations. We need people to understand that the cost o f inaction is actually greater
than the cost o f action and that revolutionizing our energy system is not a threat to the
economic structure. It’s actually an opportunity.
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A Member o f the U.S. Congress

The member o f Congress interviewed for this study has been involved with climate
change issues for three years. Like many other lawmakers on Capitol Hill, this member has
followed discussions about the Clean Air Act amendments and a number o f proposals to address
greenhouse gas emissions - from voluntary measures to the McCain/Liebermann bill - which
reflect ambivalence about the issue across Washington. “There’s been no consensus around what
the United States should do in response to President Clinton and Vice President Gore’s signing
the Kyoto Protocol,” the lawmaker said. “In fact, the Senate, by a unanimous vote as I recall after the President Clinton and Gore signed the Protocol - voted against it. There have been two
votes on McCain/Lieberman in the Senate. They’ve lost votes in the ’05 vote - 1 think it was ’05,
right? - so, that’s sort o f where the process is right now.”

The Media and the Protocol

On the question o f the quality o f the news media’s reporting on climate change, the
lawmaker gave it a grade o f “Incomplete,” and said that it lacks a “comprehensive look at the
claims by both sides on the debate” - specifically, how enacting the Kyoto Protocol in the United
States would effect the economy, energy production, energy use and the lifestyles o f Americans.
The Congress member said the Kyoto Protocol was not viable and suggested a climate strategy in
the United States that begins with “doing the easy things first.” The lawmaker said:

Well, I think that, in terms o f public policy, the United States should be focused on trying to
pick the low-hanging fruits and doing things that make sense, that are cost effective, that
drive technology in a way that we can reduce levels o f C 02 without harming the economy.
And that we can also push the envelope in terms o f technology. And so initiatives are already
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underway in this country in terms o f - you know - voluntary trading arrangements I think
make some sense. I see that as a good first step. Possibly expand that somewhat with tax
incentives for voluntary measures. That would be something that is probably worthy o f
debate. And then, going beyond that, looking possibly toward initiatives that perhaps focus
on levels o f compliance that can be done without having a negative impact on the economy
and on energy production.

The Congressperson faulted Kyoto for failing to include the developing nations o f India and
China. “First and foremost it doesn’t include two o f the world’s largest countries that are going to
be increasing all the time their consumption o f fossil fuels and that needs to be rectified,” said the
lawmaker. “I think we have to include countries like China and India, probably Brazil. For it to
apply to so-called industrial countries only is a major flaw in Kyoto.”

Globalization

Asked about the role o f globalization, the lawmaker offered a perspective that took into account
both economic and environmental issues.

Well, most people refer to globalization as an integration o f the world’s economies, and free
trade, the free exchange o f goods and services - products. And certainly, when I think o f
globalization, 1 think o f that. Obviously, when you talk about the big four pollutants - socalled pollutants - sulfur, nitrogen, mercury, C 0 2 - the first three are much more regional in
their effect. C 0 2 isn’t really a pollutant, it’s a greenhouse gas, which is why a worldwide
bank and trade system that the United States would and has started to enter voluntarily,
makes quite a bit o f sense.
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The Future

Asked about the future course o f the climate change issue, the Congressperson noted that
the problem was likely to get more attention in the future. Underlying this, as with previous
remarks, was an emphasis on balancing concern for the environment with protecting the nation’s
market economy.

I think that even though the United States has not indicated a willingness to sign on to the
Kyoto Protocol, and the treaty that’s involved, that more and more American businesses are
expecting at some point in time, in the future, C 0 2 regulations. And so that’s why I think it is
important that we encourage technology that would limit C 0 2, that we have a bank and trade
program, that we start to talk about tax incentives for voluntary compliance because there is
a growing body o f scientific evidence that points to the need to reduce C 0 2. Yet there are
those who would dispute that and so we have to also better understand the actual science of,
you know, greenhouse gases, and how that may or may not impact climate change. But those
are 1 think some o f the things where we ought to focus, and that’s a positive agenda that
protects our environment and takes some initial steps toward mitigating the possible impact
o f global warming without doing harm to the American economy.

Frank Maisano. Industry Spokesman. Strategist

As head o f the media relations program for the Global Climate Coalition, Frank Maisano
oversaw the campaign o f the coal, oil and automobile industries to keep the United States from
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. He took the job in 1997, the year the protocol was created. Maisano
is currently the Director o f Strategic Communications at the Washington office o f the Bracewell
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& Giuliani lawfirm. As a key spokesman for the industry position on the climate change issue,
Maisano was frequently quoted by the news media and his remarks appear in many articles in this
study’s sample. In the interview for this study, Maisano touched on wide range o f issues - from
the necessity o f fossil fuels to the economy and the industry perspective on the Kyoto process, to
the public relations strategy against the treaty and the dynamic o f intra-industry competition that
has emerged since its defeat in the United States. Like Watson, Maisano opened the interview by
underscoring the differences between the ozone and climate change problems. Maisano noted that
in the case o f CFCs, industry was able to change its practices - albeit at some expense - to
address the problem o f the ozone hole. Climate change, he said, is far more intractable. Said
Maisano:

You could virtually remove CFCs by taking them out o f the product stream, by changing the
way that it operated. You can’t do that with carbon. And that inherently is one o f the
problems we face with this much larger global warming protocol. You can’t do some o f the
things that you can do with, you know, things like CFCs, or - in the current examples o f
where we are with scrubbing NOx and SOx, you know, pollutants that cause acid rain, things
like that. You can scrub those from the emissions stream. You cannot scrub carbon. Carbon
happens when you combust fossil fuels. Now you can combust fossil fuels more efficiently so
that you produce more energy out o f the same amount o f fossil fuels ... But currently, we
don’t have any real method o f eliminating fossil fuels from the stream and that’s just a
stationary source. When we get to mobile sources and natural CO2 emissions it even becomes
more complex.
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Targeting the Protocol

In discussing the role o f the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), Maisano stressed that its
post-Kyoto mission was built not around arguing against the science o f climate change, but
against the treaty itself. “Previously to my entrance onto the scene, the GCC was always seen as a
black hat, you know, the industry guys who denied that global warming was happening,” he said.
“And I think as o f about the Kyoto treaty, industry started to make a shift away from that denying
global warming was happening to saying, ‘We need to do something about this.’” The coalition
disbanded in 2002 after the Bush administration walked away from the protocol. But before that,
the protocol had provided a common threat for a diverse group o f industries - many in
competition with each other - to rally together against. Said Maisano:

I think our goal was to stop the Kyoto Protocol because it was bad for consumers; it was bad
for our economy; it was bad for the environment in terms of overall accomplishing a goal o f
reducing emissions, and it was bad for technology, because, you know, when you have to
reduce emissions you switch fuels. You don’t try and develop the new technology when you
have to do it in a time frame that’s too short.

Maisano was critical o f the process that took the climate change issue from the realm o f a
scientific debate to policymaking, creating a treaty that he argued is primarily an economic pact
that gave other nations an unfair advantage over the United States - a theme he elaborated on
later in the interview. Specifically, Maisano found fault with the distillation o f reams o f scientific
research reviewed by the IPCC into highly-consequential, pithy statements in summaries for
policymakers [i.e. “the balance o f evidence suggests a discemable human influence on global
climate” (IPCC cited in Raustiala 2001)] which he said were negotiated word-for-word by
politicians and scientists “who act as politicians in a sense.”
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Well look, here’s the problem: The EPCC is inherently a scientific body. If you read the three
phone-book-sized volumes o f scientific evidence, you get a very complex, confusing picture
o f the science behind climate change, which is very uncertain, no matter what anybody thinks.
There are things we know; there are things that we don’t know; and there are the things that
we don’t know that we don’t know - to borrow phrases from our defense secretary. And the
things that we don’t know that we don’t know are the most scary in this debate. Because
every time that w e’ve opened a door into something that we think we know, now, w e’ve
opened a whole panoply o f new things that we didn’t know that we don’t know. And that
type o f complexity in science has really made the issue o f science one that is hard to grapple
with, which is why environmentalists to this day are still trying to prove that global warming
science is certain - in that, you know —they’ve been trying to prove that for 15 years in the
debate and, frankly, the debate has moved well beyond that with the emergence in 1997 of
the Kyoto Protocol ... What is the fascinating thing that the Kyoto Protocol brought about
was that there is something that we think that we ought to do now.

Economics and Fairness

Critical to Maisano’s perspective is the assumption that carbon emissions are themselves
an indicator of economic health and that cutting back emissions is tantamount to cutting back the
economy. Emissions, he said “go up or down depending on the state o f the economy.”

In the case o f carbon, you don’t really have a vehicle to reduce emissions other than
constraining the carbon, constraining supply o f energy ... So, w e’ve actually reduced
emissions in the United States between 2000 and 2003. Well, w e’ve done that because our
economy was not good. And clearly, that’s not the situation that we want to be in. The
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Europeans have struggled to make emissions reductions and part o f that is because their
economy is in the tank. And what would happen with their emissions reductions that they
can’t meet currently if their economy started to grow some?

This fundamental threat seen by Maisano to the economy is compounded, he said, by an unfair
advantage the Kyoto Protocol’s year 1990 emissions baseline provides Europe and Russia in
carrying out emission reductions.

Why is that significant? It’s significant because, that allows Germany and Eastern Europe and
Russia and Britain to take advantage o f things that were outside o f normal pollution control
that caused them to change their emissions mix in a way that gave a false reduction. OK? The
eastern European countries fell apart in the late 1980s -1989 is when Europe fell. Well the
collapse o f all those polluting economies meant all those emissions were gone. So now
Germany has reduced emissions by 20 percent, or whatever the number is - it was some high
number like that - by just picking the 1990 baseline as the thing from which you judge. I’m
going to reduce my emissions by seven percent or ten percent beyond the 1990 emissions.
Well their 1990 emissions are already lower because o f the collapse of those economies. At
the same time, the same thing applied to Russia, although the Germans didn’t want to let the
Russians take advantage o f all those hot air emissions in trading. Inherently, it’s why w e’ve
always argued the U.S. is at a disadvantage and the Australians are at a disadvantage because
they don’t have, you know - the baseline didn’t work for them, they didn’t have any - we
would actually have to reduce those emissions to meet the target.

Moreover, as Watson and the member o f Congress noted, developing nations would also have to
be part o f the solution. From the industry perspective, the absence o f binding emissions reduction
commitments from these nations was a fatal flaw. “Everybody knows that developed countries
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are needed to reduce emissions,” Maisano said. “But also everybody also knows that the
developing countries, who have very competitive economies now - China, India, Mexico, South
Korea, people like that - those competitive, developing economies, who are much less efficient
than us, are going to be the future growth problem. OK? Maybe not today, but in 20 - by the next
period, the 2012 period - they will begin to surpass us.”

PR Strategy Explained

The Global Climate Coalition’s strategy to defeat the Kyoto Protocol in the United States
was grounded in the economics and fairness issues described above. It was executed, Maisano
explained, through a comprehensive campaign o f public advertising and lobbying that focused on
the potential costs o f the Kyoto Protocol to Americans and the American economy. Central to
this effort was an industry-funded study by the Boston-based Whatron Econometric Forecasting
Associates firm (WEFA), which provided state-by-state cost estimates o f the treaty along with its
potential cost to major cities. Said Maisano:

And that had a real definite impact because we were able to take those documents to the
media. We were able to take those documents to the Hill and say, “Look, this global warming
is a very abstract issue. It’s very complex and hard to understand and it’s very complex to see.
Environmentalists will tell you that a hurricane is because of global warming. Well, that’s not
necessarily true.” And what we - that’s the way they try and impact it. What we would say is,
“Here’s what the price o f global warming is to your state, to your city.”

The second part o f the strategy was emphasizing “the fairness argument.” In the following
explanation, Maisano pulled together the threads o f this approach, noting how it countered
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environmentalists’ arguments in favor o f the protocol with an image o f a growing expense bill
that could never be paid - a bill for what industry framed as a self-destructive errand:

Developing counties never wanted a part o f this. They wanted the developed world to act first
because they were the ones who caused the problem ... But what we [the GCC] did, what we
kind o f did is set up this dichotomy which put the environmentalists in a spot of saying, “Oh
yeah, this is just a first step, we need to do more [emissions cutting],” then put a price tag on
it - what the first step is. And then put, not only a price tag with it, but build back into that
argument o f this-is-only-a-first-step-we-have-to-do-more, this is what the cost is o f the first
part o f this. And guess what? We’re only going to do a sliver. This is only the tip o f the
iceberg, and it costs this much to do the tip o f the iceberg. How much is it going to cost to do
the whole iceberg? You know? And that will never fly in a representative government.

The Media’s Role

Maisano is an experienced source for news reporters working to cover the climate change
problem. Like Watson, he said some news reporters who specialize in the issue have done
excellent work. Maisano said the media’s greatest weakness in covering climate change is its
“inability to explain the complexity o f the issue” and its “ability to be played by sensationalism.”
He provided an example:

This whole argument about this link between hurricanes and global warming which has
pervaded because w e’ve had a number o f hurricanes - that’s just a microcosm o f what has
been a problem all along. You know, an island saying that they’re about to go under water
because of rising sea levels, when, I mean, that’s really kind o f hyperbole. They’re not really
going under water because o f rising sea levels. There are many things that are issues that
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affect us, you know, dying coral, you know there are many things that affect these things and
it’s just easy to say, “Oh, it must be global warming,” because they can erect some study by
running numbers through a computer that says, “Oh yeah, well it does seems like it’s
happening that way.”

Maisano added that the media has come in for criticism from both sides o f the debate and
described himself as “an apologist for the media more often than not.” He said he thinks the news
media has been misunderstood to a degree by both the industry and environmentalist camps. “I
would tell you one hundred percent that the guys that I work for feel the media has been unfair,”
he said, adding that so too do environmentalists “who say when they [the media] include an
industry position that they’re kowtowing to the skeptics o f climate change when [the science o f
climate change is] all so obvious.” Maisano praised news reporters covering climate change for
trying to find new story angles and said: “And sometimes that works and sometimes it doesn’t.”
He made two other important points regarding the news media. First, Maisano noted and rejected
a critique that the news media has given “too much credence to the fairness and the economic
issues in lieu o f the science issues” saying that science probably figures less in the calculus o f
policymaking judgments than do economic and political “realities.” Second, he said: “I discount
media coverage - some - o f this issue [climate change] because it’s only one small factor in
many other factors that we need to understand.”

Kyoto’s Rejection and Industry Competition

The Global Climate Coalition folded up shop in 2002, a year after the Bush
administration walked away from the Kyoto treaty. Referring to the political criticism it provoked,
Maisano described Bush’s move as “walking into a hornet’s nest.” But, he said, it also “made
great policy sense because for four years, the Clinton administration basically kowtowed to the
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world community about how we would get involved in Kyoto, knowing full well that it was never
going to pass in the Senate. It was never going to be ratified. There was no circumstance that
would ever allow the Kyoto Protocol to be passed in the Senate.” About this time, however,
Maisano said the energy industry’s unified front - formed to fight the protocol - began to crack
and pre-Kyoto divisions along competitive lines reemerged.

You have so many industries that have competitive advantages that they have, you know, the
oil industry versus - 1 mean you just have to look at the utility industry itself. It’s got so much
competition within it. Nuclear utilities, they’re all for carbon reduction in carbon emissions.
Natural gas utilities were always, you know Enron, the Enron’s o f the world - they were the
lead utilities in the Clinton administration saying, “Oh yeah, let’s get some carbon restraints.”
O f course, because they have a lower carbon portfolio than someone like Southern Company,
who has a lot o f coal plants and uses a lot o f c o a l... You have a dramatic inter industry,
intra-industry competition that is always going on. Ford, GM and Chrysler - before it was
Daimler-Chrysler - is a big example o f this. These guys would sit in a room and argue and
hate each other and fight each other to the death. Then Andy Card [Clinton’s former chief o f
staff] would walk out o f the room and hold a press conference and give the industry position.

Maisano was quick to note that to the degree environmentalists see industry embracing ecofriendly measures on the fossil fuel front, it is because they are seeking a competitive advantage.

An Alternative Approach

Asked about the strengths and weaknesses o f the Kyoto Protocol and its likely future,
Maisano referred to efforts to pursue the treaty as “like trying to fix a broken toy or a broken car
that is never going to be fixed. It’s not worth the price o f investing to try and fix it.” Said
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Maisano: “In other words, you can talk about reducing your emissions all you want. Unless you
figure out how to do that in a way that isn’t economically divisive, and one that can include
developing countries, you will never be able to achieve step one o f this multi-process step. That
inherently is its problem.” He hinted at an alternative in remarks about the treaty’s strengths.

Its strength is that it’s driven the world in a direction on an issue that it sees as an important
issue - to varying degrees. Even the United States has demanded and admitted that this is a
very important issue, a significant challenge. And I know as back as far as 1998, as an
industry spokesman, I have been saying that climate change is a very serious issue and we
take it very seriously. We think that there’s a better solution than constraining our emissions,
constraining our economy. We think a better solution is one that allows technology to
continue to grow and develop so that we change the way we use energy in the future. OK?
And environmentalists will say, “Oh, well that’s not going to work. That’s not fast enough.”
That’s because that’s not in their mindset to do that. It never has been. It never will be.

Maisano said he sees opportunity in the margins o f the Kyoto process, for example, “ingenuity that environmentalists and industry working together can develop mechanisms to try and find
new ways to reduce costs and things like that.” But a wholesale alternative is needed, he said,
such as the establishment o f an Asian Pacific Partnership which could enable India, China and
other nations to receive energy-efficient technologies from the United States - an arrangement
that would “focus more on results and solutions versus emissions reductions.” Maisano said
globalization - “the fact that we no longer really have borders in terms o f our business, in terms
o f our technology, in terms o f our ability to be affected by what other countries are doing” - can
aid in moving that technology around the world.
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That’s the low-hanging fruit. That’s the future o f how this goes. How do we engage the
developing world and get them to buy in? And 1 argue vociferously that technology
development is that vehicle. Technology transfer is that vehicle. Putting these technologies
that w e’re using here, that we will develop in the next ten years here, and getting them to be
used in [other] places. And I would argue that that is what the U.N. process should be about,
versus trying to force people to reduce emissions.

David Doniger. Environmental Lawyer

David Doniger is a veteran attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a Washington-based international environmental advocacy group with feet both firmly
in the ozone and climate change issues. The NRDC has been active in lobbying, treaty
negotiations and legal advocacy in both cases. Among other activities, it brought suit against the
EPA to force it to regulate CFCs and halons and lobbied for a policy o f phasing out the chemicals
in international negotiations that led to the Montreal Protocol. “On global warming, w e’re playing
something o f the same role now, though it’s part o f a much larger effort,” said Doniger. “NRDC
was one o f only a couple groups working on ozone depletion in the 80s and now we’re essentially
the only one - the only national group on ozone depletion. On global warming there’s a much
larger array o f environmental organizations that are working on this and we work with them in
coalition.” Like Watson and Maisano, Doniger has a lot o f experience with the news media.
While Watson was sought by reporters as a representative o f the mainstream scientific
community, and Maisano o f industry, Doniger was a prime source o f information from the
environmentalist community.

Strengths and Weaknesses
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Doniger shared the prevailing view among those interviewed that the policy process to
address the stratospheric ozone problem was well established and on its way to achieving its
goals. O f the Montreal Protocol, he said:

It’s very comprehensive. It’s comprehensive in its coverage. It’s comprehensive in the
countries that are included. Compliance is quite high. There are a number o f reasons for this:
The alternatives are there, the risk is clear. Although it was not undisputed at the beginning,
now it’s broadly accepted. There’s a high degree o f consensus that we need to carry out this
treaty. So much so that when the United States has attempted to balk, under this
administration, regarding the last important chemical - which is called methyl bromide - they
found themselves constrained by how widely accepted the Montreal Protocol is and how bad
it would look for them to walk away from it.

By contrast, Doniger called the Kyoto Protocol a “qualified success.” He said Kyoto has stalled
in the United States because o f what he termed “ferocious industrial resistance” principally from
the coal, oil, auto and electric industries. But he said there is reason for optimism:

We’re pretty far along but not yet as far along as with ozone. We’re getting very broad,
approaching universal, agreement on the scientific risks at least for action. There’s a marketbased structure, built up from the acid rain program ... and even though the Kyoto Protocol the United States at this point in time is not likely to join the Kyoto Protocol - that same
market based cap-and-trade structure lies at the heart o f all domestic proposals and may be at
the heart o f any future international agreements as well. So those are some o f the strengths.
Obviously one o f the strengths o f Kyoto is that everybody but the United States is going
ahead with it.
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The Media’s Role

Doniger spoke at length about the role o f the news media in the climate change case. He
gave the press high marks for drawing the public’s attention to the problem but faulted journalists
for their pursuit o f balance.

More often than not the role o f the media has been to tell the story o f the scientific results ...
communicating that there’s a big problem out there and new findings have been made about it.
The drawback is that the media often are constrained by the “he-said she-said” or the need to
tell so-called “two sides” o f the story - to put up somebody who’s not sure [about climate
change] or somebody who denies. There have been periods o f time - the period o f 1992 to
1995, for example - where the dominant [news] coverage was [saying] we didn’t know
anything, everything was confusing. And it was a very big failure, an institutional failure, I
think, on the part o f the media to not be able to distinguish between when there is a dominant
consensus view and then there are a few outliers, many o f them who are funded by fossil fuel
industries. The job o f these outliers is simply to get into the papers and be quoted fuzzing
things up. And the news media has fallen prey to that and they do from time to time. You end
up with a confused public who thinks there is a legitimate scientific dispute out there, when in
fact it’s all one way.

Asked if the news media had given environmentalists a fair amount o f play relative to other
interests, Doniger described the challenges o f making his group’s message heard to the public.

You have to work at it - work hard at it. Nobody gets news [coverage] without having a good
idea. And so you need in this modem age to spend a lot o f time focusing on messages and
strategies ... and how you’re going to get them picked up. Sometimes we hit, sometimes we
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miss. As I said, it’s frustrating when the media go into its “he-said she-said” motif, so that
just because w e’re from an environmental group, many reporters feel that they can’t talk to us
without, quote, balancing, unquote, their story by talking to somebody with a contrary view.
Just a little anecdote: This year, there were a reasonable number o f interviews that I was
given on TV. They were from the McNeal/Leherer News Hour and C-Span and a couple o f
other outlets. But everywhere I went, like a shadow, one or two people from the Competitive
Enterprise Institute, a couple of other organizations, would also be invited to quote, balance,
what it was I had to say. And that is frustrating because it uses up half the air time on [those
people] whose objective in life is to confuse what I have to say. That is their objective. They
wouldn’t get on TV on their own. They only get on TV in sort o f balancing reflection o f the
viewpoints o f people like me and their goal is to just make things confusing. And I have to
end up using some sort of, I have to figure out - whether it’s print or radio or TV - how to
get the message through and, and how to jujitsu what they think to make the message come
through.

Globalization

Doniger called the ozone and climate change problems “the greatest examples” of
globalized environmental problems and said they need global solutions. Echoing Watson’s view
he said that process requires leadership and investment from the nation’s most responsible for the
problem. Said Doniger, “And then, having taken a confidence building first step, those nations
can turn to less capable and smaller contributors - including the ones that are coming on big and
fast, like China and India.” Doniger explained how globalization, while part o f the problem, is
also critical to the solution.
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The Kyoto Protocol illustrates how you can set up environmental protection ... that harnesses
globalized market forces - the big, global investment flow in energy development. And a lot
o f that energy development in rapidly developing countries is to provide the power to run the
factories to produce the trade goods that flow in the opposite direction. In other words, you
wouldn’t be seeing rapid electrification in China and India if you weren’t seeing the
underlying globalization that’s bringing up their economies. But those same economic forces
can be harnessed in an institution like the Kyoto Protocol or some market-based, cap-andtrade based structure. So that it makes sense for ... national trade in carbon credits and
payments that go back and forth for them. And, for example, if emission reductions are made
in China, it may be cheaper to make than the same quantity in the United States and it may be
worth an American company’s paying to produce a cleaner power generating facility in China
in order to achieve a given reduction.

The Future

Doniger termed the Montreal protocol “basically a success story all around the world.”
He noted that the agreement held despite-the challenges it faced on methyl bromide from the
United States and predicted it would “march forward towards the completion of the objective o f
phasing out the ozone depleting chemicals.” He predicted the younger Kyoto Protocol would
eventually succeed.

The science is just getting more and more compelling. And the impacts are becoming so
obvious that even USA Today in a cover story this summer proclaimed that the debate on
global warming is over. It is warming. And given those circumstances and given the fact that
businesses need to understand what the rules o f the road are going to be when they make 20and 50-year investments in plant equipment, I’d see it as inevitable that w e’re going to have
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an agreement or a set o f agreements that constrain carbon monoxide and the other global
warming pollutants and eventually work up to a very low-emitting energy economy. The
question is whether it will take 20 years longer than it should and whether the cost o f waiting
the extra 20 years, 25 years to get this regime in place - because o f the resistance that has
been felt mainly in the United States - what will the cost be in terms o f the damage you can’t
undo in the later part o f the century? I would predict that our children and our grandchildren
are going to look back at this generation and say - the political leaders and business leaders and say: “What were they thinking? How could they have missed this? How could they have
left us with this burden?”

Three National Environmental News Reporters

This section reports on the results o f interviews with three news media sources - Josef
Hebert o f The Associated Press and two unnamed writers - a Washington-based national
environmental news reporter and a former national environmental reporter. For clarity, Hebert is
referred to by name and the others are referred to, respectively, as “Reporter 2” and “Reporter 3.”
Hebert has written extensively on both the ozone and climate change issues for The AP. He
followed the emergence o f the Montreal Protocol throughout the 1990s and covered the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol in Japan in 1997. As o f 2001, Hebert has focused more on
energy issues and the nuclear industry. Reporter 2 has covered several aspects o f the climate
change story over the past several years including international negotiations, scientific research
and the approach of the current Bush administration to the issue. Reporter 2 has also covered the
ozone issue, including the methyl bromide debate. Reporter 3 wrote extensively about the
evolution o f environmental policy, including climate change, at the outset o f Bush’s first term in
office. Collectively, the responses from the three reporters to the research questions cover a lot o f
ground but dwell especially on the challenges o f gathering accurate information and reporting
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fairly and effectively on climate change - challenges central to the critiques o f the previous
interviewees. The reporters’ remarks, sorted into several themes below, figure heavily in the
critique in Chapter V o f the news media’s reporting on the issues and recommendations for
reporters and readers.
Conforming with the view of the four previous interview subjects, the three reporters
noted that the ozone hole problem has been largely solved and has thus received less attention
than climate change in the news media - a point solidly backed by the proportion o f climate to
ozone hole articles found in the initial Lexis-Nexis search for this study. That said, the primary
focus o f the reporters’ remarks was on the climate change issue. Like Watson, Maisano and
Doniger, Hebert noted that substitute chemicals provided an attractive solution to the ozone hole
problem whereas there have been no such off-the-shelf substitutes for fossil fuels. “Climate
change asks you to totally rethink your entire, almost your entire energy structure, which has
much broader implications, much broader costs, much broader upheaval o f what’s going on,”
Hebert said. “So I think that when you say that ‘Why was one [policy regime] successful and
one’s still struggling?’ to a certain extent that’s because climate is a much more difficult issue to
tackle than dealing with the ozone.”

The Media’s Role

Reporters 2 and 3 defined the news media’s role as providing information on a topic o f
vital concern to the public - conveying facts to educate and empower citizens. Said Reporter 3:

I think the media’s primary role has been to characterize the conflicting political, policy,
economic views in this country on the question o f global warming, air pollution control and
ways to reduce air pollution by industry and the utilities in this country. I think the
newspapers and magazines and TV stations, networks and all have done generally a pretty
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good job of spelling out the major issues and trying to outline what the stakes are for the
nation - and for the world. This is really one o f the most serious, important issues facing the
world today, the whole issue o f climate change and the effects on weather and on the lives of,
you know, hundreds o f millions o f people around the world. And I think people, more and
more, are becoming very concerned about the effects o f climate change as they see, you know,
destructive changes in the weather ...

On that topic, Reporter 2 said:

I think really that one o f the issues is that climate change is to many people a very abstract
issue which they’ve failed to kind o f visualize in terms o f how it affects their own lives. And
so I think the media’s most instrumental role is frankly keeping it as part o f the national
policy debate. And if you didn’t have reporters writing as extensively as they have on both
weather effects and the latest scientific developments I don’t think policy makers would feel
as compelled to debate these issues and take action.

Hebert credited the news media with bringing about a shift in public and political perception o f
the issue:

I think the only thing that you can say is there has been over the years coverage o f the issue
enough where today people are aware o f it, and politicians are aware o f it. And even
President Bush and the Bush administration, which is criticized for basically scuttling Kyoto,
as far as the United States is concerned. He, you know, he has not come out and said there is
no such thing as climate change. With some very rare exceptions, today you have a general
consensus that this is something that we have to deal with and the only thing I can say is I
think the news media has probably been responsible for raising that, for that happening.
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Challenges o f Climate Reporting

All three reporters characterized the task o f reporting and writing on climate change as
challenging - at times frustrating - for several reasons, among them, the complexity o f science
driving the debate, conflicting scientific reports, and heavy “spinning” o f the issue by interest
groups. The task is compounded, they said, by the need to meet journalistic standards o f fairness
and balance. All three said they were well aware o f criticisms o f the news media’s handling of
climate change reporting, including charges that news reports are oversimplified, give too much
attention to climate change “skeptics,” or that they under or overplay the potential dangers o f
climate change. Reporter 3 summed up the challenges many reporters face and how they cope
with them:

The material, the data, is so incredibly complicated and I think it’s difficult for a lot o f
reporters to sort o f grapple with it and evaluate it. And so in the end you have to - most
reporters have to find sort o f reliable sources, scientists, analysts, public officials, bureaucrats
who have sort o f dealt with this issue over the years. You know, and some members of
advocacy groups - some o f the environmental groups who cover this stuff, follow this stuff
intensely, you know, year round - and try to find some people you are comfortable with
whose opinion and evaluation you sort o f trust. Because otherwise, you’re really up against a
mountain o f data and studies, you know, the UN-sponsored reports and the governmentgenerated reports and then dozens and dozens o f scientific journal articles and papers
generated by the industry - utility industry in particular - all, you know, taking a different
slant or take on this issue. And, as a reporter, you feel obliged to give a balanced view o f
things.
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Said Reporter 2:

I think that where the media tends to get attacked is for failing to strike the right balance. A
lot of times 1 think that criticism is unjustified, but it certainly is something that people
struggle with: To what extent do you reveal where the people you’re quoting get their funding
from? You know, how high up do you put global warming skeptics when clearly, within the
scientific community, they’re a tiny, tiny fraction o f where most people come down. Those
are the issues that the media have grappled with.

Hebtert and Reporter 3 acknowledged that these pressures have made for some
inconsistent reporting, and even some mistakes. Hebert said climate change reporting at times has
been “uneven” and “sensational.” Some concepts introduced to the public are confusing, he said,
like the Bush administration’s plan to reduce so-called carbon intensity —“that it’s simply a
reduction in the rate o f growth [of carbon emissions] but it’s still growing.” Specifically, Hebert
faulted the press for failing to explain the concept that carbon emissions accumulate in the
atmosphere and that “all the stuff that’s going into the air now is still going to be in there for a
long time.” He echoed the frustrations o f the other reporters on the task o f striking the proper
balance in climate change stories:

How much weight do you give a report by this UN committee, which represents a whole
bunch o f people, versus maybe a couple o f scientists who very legitimately are pursuing
certain things and you report their skepticism. But when you report their skepticism, are you
then maybe skewing the whole thing just by giving their skepticism the same weight as what
is being said by a large body o f scientists? And I think that in terms o f the climate debate,
that’s been very difficult.
♦
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By contrast, Hebert said ozone was “a simpler story” with a greater amount scientific
consensus, and far less industry opposition.

Kyoto Obstacles

Given his long experience with the climate change and the ozone hole problems, Hebert
offered an analysis o f the strengths and weaknesses o f their respective policy regimes. The other
writers declined to answer the question. Hebert said from his perspective as a reporter covering
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations, it appeared that “everybody was looking out for
themselves.” Like Maisano, Hebert noted the advantage that the 1990 emissions baseline
provided key supporters of that date. Since then, for example, Russia’s economy had collapsed
and thus its fossil fuel use dropped steeply; West Germany unified with the East, whose coal-fired
industry sector shut down; and England had swapped its heavy use o f coal for natural gas.

So there you’ve got three major countries that are players in this who all are saying “Yeah,
we picked 1990, we don’t have a problem with that. You nasty Americans, what problem do
you have?” Well we didn’t have the same sort o f fudging mechanisms. But w e also had the
ability to find a whole bunch of sinks out there - because w e’re a big country - like trees,
plant trees, do all those kind of things. ... But the overall view was that if we don’t do
something, the Third World countries, particularly China, India - in terms o f industrial
development - they weren’t going to commit to anything. And they’re the ones that are
expanding the fastest. So the idea was let’s put something on the table so that the next go
around we can get the Third World countries in. But Kyoto basically, I think - unlike
Montreal - 1 think Kyoto has been sort o f a flop. You know ... it is in large part because the
United States didn’t - hasn’t participated. But I think it’s also because everybody has seemed
to have found ways - a lot o f smoke and mirrors going on there.
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Hebert said environmentalists wondered aloud what good it would do the atmosphere to have the
United States buy pollution credits from Russia in pursuit o f a goal to reduce emissions at a level
that would be “just a drop in the bucket in terms o f what really needs to take place.” Hebert noted,
as did Watson, that Kyoto’s original targets were designed mainly “to get the ball rolling” on
bigger cuts. He said he did not know what could be done to improve upon the protocol but said
any solution would have to avoid serious economic pain. “I just think that you have to find a way
to address the issue without causing such economic harm that politically it’s not palatable,” he
said. “And if politically something isn’t palatable then it just isn’t going to be done.”

Globalization

On the question o f globalization and the environment, Reporters 2 and 3 noted two
potential outcomes o f the phenomenon. Reporter 2 said that a growing international awareness o f
nations’ environmental interconnectedness can to spur global policy action to protect the
environment:

The fact is w e’re becoming more aware o f how intertwined different countries are and how
their environmental policies affect the public health and well-being o f everyone across the
globe. And so that speaks sense which I think a number o f environmental issues - you see
this with PCBs, you see this with a number o f issues, ozone is another example - where the
impact of someone’s actions very far away can actually be affecting your life and your health.
And so I think that’s why leaders are coming to the conclusion that they need to work
cooperatively to adopt policies that will level the playing field and will protect public health
and the environment.
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Reporter 3 was less optimistic and pictured the momentum of globalizing markets as a trump to
environmental efforts, including calls to have the United States join the Kyoto Protocol:

As Third World countries grow geometrically in their economic development - as countries
like China and India come into their own and move to center stage as great economic powers,
there will be more and more resistance to the kinds o f solutions that a lot o f world leaders,
especially the Europeans, say are necessary. And —you know, for every effort at controlling
greenhouse gas emissions - adding, you know, new scrubbers to utility plants, changing
CAFTA standards, you know, in the auto industry - there’s a counterweight of economic
forces to prevent it and they’re very powerful, wealthy and well-connected. And it’s this
tension that w e’re seeing playing out on the world stage now. And while the Kyoto Protocol
and these agreements essentially between European countries to try to slow the rate o f growth
of emissions may have some, you know, minor effect in the coming years, that could really
be offset by an economic power like China that has very few environmental regulations and is
not sympathetic at all to that and does not want to be part o f any kind o f international
agreement. And I think that’s one area where I sort o f have sympathy with the Bush
administration. They’re arguing that they should not - the United States should not - be
saddled with any international agreement until some o f these Third World nations are brought
into the agreement as well. And you’re not going to see that happen in our lifetime, I don’t
think.

Hebert noted the potential of globalization to be both a hindrance and a help to the cause o f global
environmental protection. He said the more that nations realize they are interconnected, “I think
maybe they will realize that they’re all in the same ballpark and they have to deal with that.”
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The Future

None o f the reporters were as certain o f the outcome o f the Kyoto policy process as
Maisano or Doniger. But they agreed, again, that the terms o f the public discussion have shifted
from whether climate change is real to what should be done about it. Among other trends, they
noted that state and local efforts to address the issue are growing in lieu o f an aggressive federal
policy and that industry is getting in on the act - if only to stay competitive. Said Hebert:

There’s no way that you can return to the old attitudes about climate. It’s just, there are just
too many people now that believe that this is an issue. Even though there’s a shortage o f data
to some extent - the data is becoming more and more pronounced. The political, the politics
o f it is becoming much more, “Yes, w e’ve got to address the issue.” The economic are such
that, for whatever reason, it’s understood that even though fossil fuels are going to stay
around for a long time, we have to find a way to make them less environmentally harmful.

Reporter 3 noted a groundswell o f state and regional concern on climate issues:

Well the trends that I see in the United States that I think are very interesting are initiatives by
individual states to address global warming absent any kind o f federal policy. And I think
w e’ve done stories showing that, you know, in a majority of the states, state legislatures and
governors have launched efforts to reduce emissions - to address global warming because it
has a terrific impact on agriculture, it has terrific impact long-term over shorelines in the
effort to salvage beachfront and coastlines around the country because a lot o f that land is
disappearing as the sea level rises and there are a lot o f scientists who think that that’s related
to global warming. So, while there seems to be an absence o f real leadership in Washington, I
find it heartening that there are a lot o f initiatives by state and local government and industry,
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utility industries around the country who see it in their own self interest to take a more
environmentally friendly approach.

Reporter 2 predicted in both government regulations and the business practices o f multi-national
corporations “a progression toward more stringent approaches to dealing with greenhouse gases.”
Then the reporter hedged just a bit: “But you know, again, there still is resistance and a lot o f this
will be determined by who ends up being in office after 2008.”

Summary

Recall that the preceding reports o f each interview were grouped by themes in order to
most accurately reflect the emphasis placed by the interviewees on varied subjects as they
answered identical questions. These differences are telling and figure significantly in the analysis
in the final chapter. However, so not to lose sight o f the original questions, and to provide a more
apples-to-apples comparison between the interview subjects, Table 23 summarizes the gist of
their responses to each question in thumbnail statements. As noted earlier, it is intended as a
quick reference and best used as a supplement, rather than a substitute, for examining the
interviewees’ longer responses above.

Table 23. Thumbnail Summaries o f Interview Answers Questions 1-6

Question 1. What is your experience with climate change and/or ozone issues?
Stakeholder

Watson (Scientist)

Thumbnail Summary

Led U.S. research program on ozone hole at NASA; active in
U.N. ozone regime; former White House adviser; former head
o f the IPCC. Frequent media source on ozone and climate
science.
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Question 1. What is your experience with climate change and/or ozone issues?
Stakeholder

Cont.

Thumbnail Summary

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Has had three years o f experience following proposals to
address climate change at the federal level.

Maisano (Industry)

Led media relations program o f industry’s Global Climate
Coalition - an alliance o f the coal, oil and automobile industries
against the Kyoto Protocol. Frequent media source on industry
stance on climate change.

Doniger (Environmentalist)

An attorney with National Resources Defense Council. Helped
negotiate the ozone treaty; has been active in climate
negotiations. Frequent media source for environmentalist
viewpoint.

Hebert and Reporters 2 and 3
(Media)

Hebert covered ozone issues in the 1980s and climate change
until 2001 for The Associated Press. Reporter 2, a national
environmental news reporter, has covered climate change and
the U.S. handling o f it; Reporter 3, a former national
environmental reporter, also covered climate change.

Question 2. What role do you think your group has played/ will play regarding U.S. involvement
in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary
*

Watson (Scientist)

Scientists play an “absolutely critical role” in developing
knowledge about the environmental problems and translating
that knowledge to policy makers.

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Congress has proposed a range o f measures to deal with climate
change - from voluntary to mandatory - and is continuing to
debate the issue.
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Question 2. What role do you think your group has played/ will play regarding U.S. involvement
in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?
Cont.
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Maisano (Industry)

The Global Climate Coalition worked to stop U.S. involvement
in the Kyoto Protocol through lobbying and public advertising.
Different sectors o f the energy industry are not always on the
same page, but some are interested in promoting and shaping an
alternative climate policy regime to Kyoto based on technology
transfer and trade.

Doniger (Environmentalist)

The Natural Resources Defense Council has played multiple
roles in both the ozone and climate change cases, including
lobbying, international negotiation, legal advocacy, and public
advertising aimed at producing strong agreements to cut
emissions in chemicals that harm the ozone layer and contribute
to climate change.

Hebert and Reporters (Media)

All three reporters viewed the media’s role in covering the
ozone hole and climate change as alerting the public to
important environmental problems and empowering readers
with knowledge about them. Hebert credited the media with
convincing the public that climate change “is something that we
have to deal with.”

Question 3. What role do you think the news media has played/will play regarding U.S.
involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Watson (Scientist)

The media effectively alerted the public to the dangers o f the
ozone hole but has confused the public on climate change by
underplaying and overplaying the issue and giving undue
attention to climate skeptics.

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Media coverage o f climate change has been “incomplete” and
more reporting needed on the potential effect o f the Kyoto
Protocol on the economy, energy production, energy use, and
the lifestyles o f Americans.
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Question 3. What role do you think the news media has played/will play regarding U.S.
involvement in the climate change and/or ozone regimes?
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Cont.

Maisano (Industry)

The media has often failed to grasp the complexity o f the
climate change issue and has been “played by sensationalism”
(i.e. climate change causes hurricanes). Maisano says his
employers feel the news media is unfair but adds that he thinks
the media has been “misunderstood” by both environmental and
industry critics. Reporters are often good at finding new story
angles.

Doniger (Environmentalist)

The media has done well to publicize the fact that ozone and
climate change are problems worth attention. But it has been
bogged down by its convention o f balancing all sides equally,
which has downplayed mainstream science and confused the
public.

Hebert and Reporters (Media)

The following addresses the reporters ’ critique o f the news
media: All three reporters characterized their task as
challenging, at times frustrating, because o f the complexity o f
science driving the debate, conflicting scientific reports, and
heavy “spinning” o f the issue by interest groups. Hebert said
reporting has at times been “uneven” and “sensational.”
Despite this, Reporter 3 said: “I think the newspapers and
magazines and TV stations, networks and all have done
generally a pretty good job o f spelling out the major issues and
trying to outline what the stakes are for the nation - and for the
world.”

Question 4. What are the strengths and weaknesses o f each policy effort and what would you
recommend, if anything, be done to improve them?
Stakeholder
Watson (Scientist)

Thumbnail Summary
The ozone policy has largely been a success and is working;
The Kyoto Protocol is “a very important first step,” but will
need to grow from 5-percent reductions in developed nations to
60 to 80 percent reductions worldwide.
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Question 4. What are the strengths and weaknesses o f each policy effort and what would you
recommend, if anything, be done to improve them?
Cont.
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Kyoto’s biggest fault is failing to include the rapidly growing
nations of China and India in mandatory emissions cuts. A
“low hanging fruit” (i.e. do the easy things first) approach
should be pursued.

Maisano (Industry)

The Kyoto Protocol, a dead letter in the U.S., would irreparably
harm America’s economy and fail to solve the climate change
problem. Cutting carbon emissions effectively cuts economic
growth. Kyoto’s baseline reduction date is unfair to the United
States and, worse yet, large developing nations (China and
India) are not on the hook for reductions. An alternative “low
hanging fruit” strategy grounded in trade and transfer o f
efficient energy technologies is needed.

Doniger (Environmentalist)

The ozone treaty is comprehensive and enjoys strong
international support. The Kyoto Protocol has stalled in the
U.S. under “ferocious industrial resistance,” but existing
markets (such as the air pollution cap-and-trade system in the
U.S.) and political support (in the rest o f the world) bode well
for its future.

Hebert and Reporters 2 and 3
(Media)

While Reporters 2 and 3 declined to answer this question,
Hebert noted that Kyoto’s greatest challenge is that its goals are
a preliminary “drop in the bucket” and said, “I just think that
you have to find a way to address the issue without causing
such economic harm that politically it’s not palatable.”

Question 5. Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a few ways, if any,
you think it has affected and/or will affect US involvement in either policy effort.
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Watson (Scientist)

Globalization means “the world is becoming smaller and
smaller.” Developed nations need to lead the way in solving
environmental problems in a “globalized way” by making the
first sacrifices and sharing technology with developing nations.
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Question 5. Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a few ways, if any,
you think it has affected and/or will affect US involvement in either policy effort.
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Cont.

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Globalization is “an integration o f the world’s economies.” An
international bank and trade system for carbon makes sense.

Maisano (Industry)

Globalization represents “the fact that we no longer really have
borders in terms o f our business, in terms o f our technology, in
terms o f our ability to be affected by what other countries are
doing.” This phenomenon can aid in technology transfer to
address climate change.

Doniger (Environmentalist)

Climate change and the ozone hole are the “greatest examples”
o f globalized environmental problems. Climate change will
need to be solved with the help o f the global market system,
specifically, markets for carbon emission credits.

Hebert and Reporters (Media)

Hebert and Reporter 2 noted that a growing awareness o f
international environmental interconnectedness might further
spur global policy action to protect the environment; Reporter 3
saw the momentum o f globalizing markets and economic forces
controlled by the “very powerful, wealthy and well-connected”
as a likely trump to such efforts.

Question 6. What do you think the future holds for each policy?
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Watson (Scientist)

The ozone policy is on track for success; “I have to remain
optimistic that we will indeed address the climate change issue
in a sensible way. The question is “How long will it take us?’”

Congress Member (U.S. Govt)

Growing scientific evidence o f climate change is prompting
action in industry and government on measures including
voluntary compliance, technology transfer, tax incentives and
carbon trading.
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Question 6. What do you think the future holds for each policy?
Cont.
Stakeholder

Thumbnail Summary

Maisano (Industry)

Pursing Kyoto is like trying to fix a badly broken toy. Instead
nations “should allow technology to continue to grow and
develop so that we change the way we use energy in the future.”

Doniger (Environmentalist)

Doniger said he believes the Kyoto Protocol will succeed and
said it’s “inevitable that w e’re going to have an agreement or a
set o f agreements that constrain carbon monoxide and the other
global warming pollutants and eventually work up to a very
low-emitting energy economy.”

Hebert and Reporters (Media)

The reporters see growing support at the state and local level in
the United States for action on climate change. Reporter 2
predicted in international business and government “a
progression toward more stringent approaches to dealing with
greenhouse gases.” Said Hebert: “There’s no way that you can
return to the old attitudes about climate. It’s just, there are just
too many people now that believe that this is an issue.”
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CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The full range o f data - news article excerpts, coding totals, descriptions by interviewees
and observations from scholars - are all brought together in this chapter.
Table 24 below revisits the study’s research questions and notes where summaries of
answers to each can be quickly found.
Table 24. Research Question Answer Guide

A. Overall Guiding Questions

Summary Location

1.

How have the sources, structure and content o f
arguments carried by mainstream American print
media about the ozone hole and climate change
evolved from 1980 to 2004?

Chapter III Table 9, page 136,
through Table 22A-D, page 198
Additional context in Chap IV
Table 23 Questions 1-5, page
239. See also Conclusions
Section below, page 268

2.

What do the trends in social and decision process
emerging from this analysis reveal about the relative
success o f the Montreal Protocol in the United States
versus the failure o f the Kyoto Protocol?

Chapter V Stakeholder Analyses
and Conclusions Section, page
251

B. Coding Questions - from analysis o f 1,076 news articles
1. Are the arguments supportive or opposed to the goals and/or
principles o f the policy?

Summary Location
Chapter III Table 22A,
page 198
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B. Coding Questions - from analysis o f 1,076 news articles
2.

In what proportion are the arguments international or domestic,
and economic, political, social or environmental in nature?

Summary Location
Chapter III Table 22A,
page 198

3. What stakeholder groups are main sources/ subjects o f the
arguments?

Chapter III Table 22C,
page 200

4. What are the arguments’ relevance to one or more o f five
policy issue criteria?

Chapter III Table 22B,
page 199

5.

Chapter III Table 22 AD, page 199

What are the trends over time in the above categories?

C. Interview Questions - posed to stakeholders

Summary Location

1.

What is your experience with climate change and/or ozone
issues?

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 1, page 239

2.

What role do you think your group has played and will play in
the future with regard to US involvement in the climate change
and/or ozone regimes?

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 2, page 240

3.

What role do you think the news media has played and will
play in the future with regard to US involvement in the climate
change and/or ozone regimes? [Everyone gets this question but
news reporters who’ve already answered it]

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 3, page 241

4.

What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses o f each
policy effort —climate change and/or ozone. What would you
recommend, if anything, be done to improve them?

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 4, page 242

5.

Please describe what globalization means to you and mention a
few ways, if any, you think it has affected and/or will affect US
involvement in either policy effort.

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 5, page 243

6.

What do you think the future holds for each policy?

Chapter IV Table 23
Question 6, page 244
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D. Policy Sciences Analytic Framework Synthesis

Summary Location

1. What conditions and trends, both overall and within each cases’ Stakeholder Analysis
main participant/stakeholder groups, have led to the current
section below, page
outcomes? What direction are these trends pointing in the
251
future?
2.

What discourses are most prominent within and among the
participant/stakeholder groups and in the news media coverage
as a whole and how might that relate to outcomes?

Stakeholder Analysis
section below, page
251

3.

What lessons do these findings hold for news reporters and
editors and consumers o f news?

On the Press Section
below, page 283

4.

What are the greatest strengths and weaknesses o f this
dissertation’s methodology? How might it be improved and
used in the future?

Chapter II
Methodological Issues
section, page 120 &
Closing remarks
section below, page
290

Thus far, Chapters III and IV have gone most o f the way to addressing the first o f this
study’s two overall guiding questions: “How have the sources, structure and content o f arguments
carried by mainstream American print media about the ozone hole and climate change evolved
from 1980 to 2004?” Chapter III reported and summarized the coding data that described this
structure and content. Chapter IV added context with interviews from stakeholders immersed in
the issues. This chapter (Chapter V) tackles the second overall guiding question: “What do the
trends in social and decision process emerging from this analysis reveal about the relative success
o f the Montreal Protocol in the United States versus the failure o f the Kyoto Protocol?” It also
answers several sub-questions listed in
Table 24D.
The first of this chapter’s four sections, Stakeholder Analyses, revisits each stakeholder
groups in turn and describes their role in the larger ozone and climate change news media
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narratives using elements o f the social and decision process categories o f the policy sciences
analytic framework. The balance o f attention is paid to the two largest stakeholder groups scientists and U.S. government. The seven social process categories, first introduced in Chapter II,
enable an analysis that - as described best by Lasswell - helps reveal “who, with what intentions,
in what situations, with what assets, using what strategies, reaches what audiences, with what
result?” (1968, 62). The social process categories, again, are:

1. Participants - People and organizations with a stake in the policy.
2.

Perspectives - Varied viewpoints o f these stakeholders.

3.

Situations - Situations in which the stakeholders interact.

4.

Base Values - Assets used by stakeholders to pursue their goals (power, wealth,
enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect and rectitude).

5.

Strategies - Approaches stakeholders use to achieve their goals.

6. Outcomes - Changes in values among the stakeholders.
7.

Effects - Institutional effects o f stakeholders’ actions (Clark 2002, 33-34).

Simultaneously, this section notes the categories o f the decision process in which the
stakeholders were most involved. The seven decision process categories, introduced in Chapter II,
are:

1.

Intelligence gathering - Essentially planning, the collection and processing o f
information for policymaking),

2.

Promotion - The promoting of, lobbying for policies,

3.

Prescription - The establishment o f the rules

4.

Invocation - The enforcement o f the rules
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5. Application - The process o f shaping and keeping the prescription and invocation in
check, e.g. through appeals or lawsuits.
6. Appraisal - The “assessment o f a decision process as a whole and o f the success o f
particular prescriptions in achieving their goals” (Clark 2002, 68))
7.

Termination - The “repeal or large-scale adjustment o f a prescription” (Clark 2002, 69).

For example, scientists in the ozone and climate cases concerned themselves mostly with
intelligence gathering and politicians with prescription and promotion. Because o f stakeholders’
widely varied roles, the amount o f attention paid to each o f the analytic categories above varies
from group to group. Each stakeholder discussion is capped with a brief analysis o f the
environmental discourses most prominent in their arguments. Table 3 is reprinted below to
provide a refresher of the eight environmental discourses defined by John Dryzek in his book,
The Politics o f the Earth (1997).

(Table assembled from Dryzek 1997)
Category
Limits

Problem Solving

Discourse

Catchphrase

Survivalism

“Looming Tragedy” (1997, 21)

Promethean

“Growth Forever” (1997, 45)

Administrative Rationalism

“Leave it to the Experts” (1997, 63)

Democratic Pragmatism

“Leave it to the People” (1997, 84)

Economic Rationalism

“Leave it to the Market” (1997, 102)

Sustainable Development

“Environmentally Benign Growth”
(1997,123)

Ecological Modernization

“Industrial Society and Beyond” (1997,
136)

Green Romanticism

“Save the World through new
Consciousness” (1997, 155)

Green Rationalism

“Save the World through New Politics”
(1997, 172)

Sustainability

Green Radicalism
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This chapter’s second section, Conclusions, follows from the comprehensive mapping o f
the players. It comes in three parts: 1) a presentation o f four central findings that address the
study’s two overall guiding research questions; 2) an exploration o f the challenges in the
argument landscape to limits on fossil fuel emissions and a set o f policy recommendations to
counter those challenges; and 3) a critique o f the news media followed by some recommendations,
also based on the data, for reporters, their sources and readers of climate news coverage. The final
section o f the chapter, Closing Remarks, provides a brief description o f this study’s evolution from its back-of-the-napkin beginnings to its current form - and offers a few parting thoughts on
how its findings and methodology might be put to use in the future.
The discussion and conclusions in this chapter are necessarily general - given the sheer
size and detail o f the data sets involved - but they are sufficient to answer the research questions.
Hopefully, they will provoke debate and further exploration o f the issues they raise. The
conclusions’ value rests in the fact that they were distilled from a comprehensive and diverse pool
o f information using a reliable, systematic and, above all, transparent research methodology.
Specific examples o f arguments are culled from the coded articles and research interviews to back
up the findings presented here.

Stakeholder Analyses

Scientists

Scientists were major participants in the news coverage o f the ozone hole and climate
change cases - with links to nearly half the arguments in the ozone case and more than a quarter
o f arguments in the climate case. As noted earlier, scientists often spoke in their capacity as
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researchers at universities and major national and international organizations such as the EPA,
NASA, NOAA, the UNEP or WMO. Serving mostly in an intelligence gathering capacity, they
focused on a range o f issues including the causes o f ozone depletion and climate change and their
likely effects on the environment, society and the economy. In some instances they spoke on
behalf o f industry or environmental groups who had contracted them to conduct specific studies.
In the both the ozone and climate cases, the principle perspective o f scientists is one of
concern about the environmental problem and desire to figure them out. Scientists are cast in
many situations, from working with computers and satellites to drilling ice cores and testifying at
Congressional hearings. Every October, scientists announced the appearance o f the ozone hole
and documented its growth from the previous year - keeping it alive in the public conscience. As
“experts” whose work was subject to the rigorous peer review, scientists were given a high degree
o f attention and credibility in the stories by reporters and other stakeholder groups. Said The AP’s
Josef Hebert in his interview:

And in any o f these scientific issues, the word “peer review” seems to put things on a
different, on a new scale. I mean, I’m not a scientist, but I do know that there’s a process
involved and you have journals such as Science magazine or Nature and people like that who
take peer review very seriously. So once you have something that is somewhat, that is peer
reviewed by other scientists, you’re always going to have this back and forth but as a
journalist, you know, you give that much more credibility.

In news articles, scientists were often pitted against competing researchers and skeptics within
industry and government. In the ozone case, challenges to the fundamental science that led to the
1987 Montreal Protocol rekindled in 1995, prior to the Vienna Amendments, and again in 2003
during the methyl bromide debate. One o f the most acutely political statements from the scientific
community in either case was the awarding o f the Nobel Prize in chemistry to Sherwood
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Rowland o f the University o f Califomia-Irvine, Mario Molina o f the Massachusetts Institute o f
Technology, and Paul Crutzen, a Dutch citizen working at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry
in Germany. The Royal Swedish Academy o f Sciences in Stockholm declared: “The three
researchers have contributed to our salvation from a global environmental problem that could
have catastrophic consequences” (Allen 1995). While the reports o f the IPCC represent a
remarkable scientific consensus about climate change, scientists have come across far less unified
and clear-minded about global warming in press reports. As recently as May, 2004, UPI captured
an ugly dispute between scientists over interpreting satellite measurements o f temperature critical
to demonstrating human-induced climate change reporting and concluded: “There even remains in the United States, at least - controversy over whether global temperatures are rising and, if so,
how much” (Whipple 2004). Scientists have also fought with the White House over its alleged
suppression of climate change research for political reasons, including the work o f NASA climate
researcher James Hansen who accused the administration o f pursuing an increasingly aggressive
policy o f censorship against him. Reported the New York Times (Revkin, 2006a):

The fight between Dr. Hansen and administration officials echoes other recent disputes. At
climate laboratories o f the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for example,
many scientists who routinely took calls from reporters five years ago can now do so only if
the interview is approved by administration officials in Washington, and then only if a public
affairs officer is present or on the phone. Where scientists’ points o f view on climate policy
align with those o f the administration, however, there are few signs o f restrictions on
extracurricular lectures or writing.

Two years earlier, the Times declared in an editorial: “Although the Bush administration is hardly
the first to politicize science, no administration in recent memory has so shamelessly distorted
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scientific findings for policy reasons or suppressed them when they conflict with political goals”
(2004).
To the extent their research and opinions informed policymaking decisions, scientists
performed a prescription and promotion function. For example, as ozone research progressed,
scientists repeatedly called on Capitol Hill for cuts in CFCs. Warned Rowland at one hearing:
“We need to act now and impose severe restrictions on CFC emissions immediately if we want to
bring the chlorine concentrations in the atmosphere under control by early in the next century ... I
don’t think the global community can afford to wait for another dozen years before applying
stringent controls on CFC emissions” (Goeller 1987). In both cases, scientists joined with
environmentalists and politicians to publicize the dangers o f ozone destruction and climate
change and champion laws to address them (Layzer 2002, Benedick 1998).
In her book on science reporting in the news media, Nelkin points to a more narrow and
subtle form o f promotion and strategy on the part o f scientists in the making o f the news. Writes
Nelkin: “Industries, political institutions, professional associations, special interest groups, and
aspiring individuals all want to manage the messages that enter the cultural arena through
education, entertainment and above all the media. Scientists are no exception” (Nelkin 1995, 13).
Scientists, she said, are in a “quest for improved public understanding o f science and greater
public support” (13) and often “ventriloquate through the media to those who control their funds”
(124).
The observations above shed some light on the base values at work among scientists in
the news coverage. As noted in Chapter II, enlightenment ranks highly along with rectitude for
the part that scientists play helping policymakers understand the problems o f ozone depletion and
climate change. This is evident in Watson’s remarks about the “absolutely critical role” scientists
play in this regard. Apart from a desire for the figurative “wealth o f knowledge,” monetaiy
wealth comes to scientists in the form o f grants for research. Big media coverage helps
researchers win grants. Respect is a theme to the extent that scientist want their ideas taken
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seriously and fight for them in the press. Well-being is also a theme in the way that human and
environmental well-being is an end that scientists say they are fighting for. Watson and Doniger
summed up the outcomes and effects o f the scientific community in the cases well. In the ozone
case, scientists succeeded in getting across the message that CFCs needed to be banned.
Increasingly dire reports on the ozone hole were followed by stricter policy measures which are
on track to fix the problem. While scientific consensus on climate change has grown steadily,
scientists have not yet convinced the American public and politicians in sufficient numbers to
confront the problem through a binding global treaty.
A look at the discourses most prevalent in scientists’ arguments shows a good dose o f
Survivalism (“Looming Tragedy” ) in both the ozone hole and climate changes cases. This is
understandable, because the problems have made news for their potential to do worldwide
damage. For example, UNEP meteorologist Peter Usher said o f the Montreal Protocol: “Without
this treaty, we were on a crash course for disaster. Life on Earth was at risk within a century”
(Bradley 1987). John T. Lynch o f National Science Foundation told The New York Times: “It’s
terrifying. If these ozone holes keep growing like this, they'll eventually eat the world” (Browne
1998). Reflecting a tinge o f green romanticism, some scientist used metaphors that portrayed
earth systems as living entities. James G. Anderson, a Flarvard University professor o f chemistry
and a NASA project scientist declared that “the atmosphere's immune system is less sturdy" than
previously believed” (Recer 1992). In a story about a spat among climate change scientists and
environmentalists, Marine biologist Sylvia A. Earle argued that underwater speakers to gauge
ocean temperature would hurt whales and other marine life and used the following analogy: “If
you further damage the patient, the earth, while you try to take its temperature, then maybe the
method is flawed” (Broad 1994). But scientists also expressed views in Promethean terms, often
when proposing technological fixes to sweeping problems. Qualifying for this realm were
fantastic proposals to patch the ozone hole with a fleet o f 100 airplanes releasing hydrocarbons
(Recer 1991) and solving climate change by seeding carbon-eating ocean algae with container
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shiploads o f iron dust (Fordahl, 2000). The National Academy o f Sciences came in for criticism
in a piece by Peter Passel for the New York Times for dwelling on the language o f economic
rationalism: “If you sense something is missing here, you are not alone,” wrote Passel. “The
perspective o f the study is that o f economists and engineers: Nature is an economic tool and a
playground for humans. Therefore, rapid, irrevocable changes in the global ecology are a liability
only to the degree that they reduce productivity or upset the users o f the playground” (Passel
1991).
Finally, scholars report that an additional ingredient flavors the tone o f scientists in the
news media: an abiding predisposition toward maintaining scientific “objectivity.” This is a
notion that itself arguably constitutes a discourse. In an analysis o f climate change news
coverage from 1987 to 1990, Wilkins reported that scientists and, in turn, journalists generally
presented an Enlightenment perspective on the climate change problem grounded in a shared
notion that science and journalism “needed to be seen as rising above political, social and
economic concerns.” The Enlightenment notion o f objective truth stands in contrast to the
Pragmatist viewpoint, which proposes that “knowledge and reality are not fixed by but instead are
the result o f an evolving stream o f consciousness and learning” (Wilkins 1993). Writes Wilkins:

Scientific explanations o f the problem tend to frame the issue in “science-driven” terms,
rather than suggesting that political policy and human choices are the base o f the physical
phenomenon. With this rather central omission, it becomes possible to seek solutions to the
greenhouse effect in the “neutral” realm o f science and to make public policy choices
subservient to “scientific findings.” However, social scientists and philosophers have argued
that the reverse approach, making value choices in the form o f political and social policy as a
mitigation strategy and building scientific models on those choices, makes equally as much
sense.
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Wilkins’ study finds that the scientists and news reporters emphasized three additional
themes: progress (the advancement o f understanding), the institutionalization o f knowledge
(knowledge as the domain o f science and government) and innocence (curious humans as
removed from responsibility for the phenomenon). These themes, in the larger Enlightenment
perspective, run throughout this study’s samples in both cases.

U.S. Government

The U.S. Government category includes federal, state and local government officials,
including elected leaders, agency staff and their spokespeople. These participants’ perspectives
and situations were as varied as their roles in the debates. In the ozone case, the government
stakeholders were almost exclusively federal officials, for example, administrators and scientists
o f the EPA, NASA and NOAA, members o f Congress, the president and his inner circle. The
climate case, which featured a larger proportion o f local arguments, included the voices of state
officials including governors and lawmakers. While there is some overlap between government
and scientists’ arguments, government arguments were divided more evenly between the pro
protocol and anti-protocol categories. An analysis of officials’ perspectives, situations and
strategies can be divided along these lines. First, however, it is important to recall that on balance
government officials supported the Montreal Protocol and opposed the Kyoto Protocol. In the
ozone case, the federal government pushed the international community to adopt the Montreal
Protocol and stayed with the treaty through its several amendments. Not until 2003, did the
government attempt to reverse protocol aims on the methyl bromide issue. By contrast, with the
exception o f the Clinton administration’s adoption o f the Kyoto Protocol and a continued support
for climate change research, the federal government has been dead set against the climate treaty.
Recall that this contrast is shown dramatically in Figure 28 and Figure 29.
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With the exception o f government scientists, government officials were most engaged
with prescription, and promotion, and - further along - invocation, application, appraisal and
termination. Herein lies an important limitation o f mainstream press coverage as a data source for
the activities o f government. For many reasons, coverage o f the often tedious process o f drafting
policy - the prescription function - was sporadic and tended to focus on political controversy - be
it the haggling among treaty negotiators at international meetings or domestic squabbles.
Against a larger backdrop o f policy success in the ozone case, a few bold stands by
opponents made headlines, including that o f Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel who
environmentalists and some lawmakers accused o f trying to scuttle U.S. involvement in an ozone
hole treaty. The UPI reported that Hodel “insists he was misunderstood in published reports
saying he suggested wearing hats, suntan lotion and sunglasses could substitute for international
controls on production o f chemicals that attack the ozone layer” (Darst 1987). The report noted
that Hodel thought President Regan was getting “boxed in” by the pro-treaty positions o f the EPA
and State Department. New York Representative James H. Scheuer, quipped that that Hodel’s
policy “could spawn an industry o f entrepreneurs who would ‘apply sunscreen to animals’”
(Darst 1987). In addition to showcasing the news media’s appetite for a good political row - one
with some humor to boot - the Hodel story spotlighted political infighting that could have
undermined the ozone regime, and it demonstrated the depth o f political will in Washington to
follow through on the process. Opponents to regulation persisted, and in a September 1995
hearing on Capitol Hill, lawmakers showcased skeptics to cast doubt on ozone science and lend
support a bill to delay phaseouts o f CFC and halons. Despite the evolved political and scientific
consensus on ozone, the hearing was described by the UPI as an exercise in “whose credentials
were more reputable, whose consensus was bigger, whose charts were skewed and who cared
more about taxpayer burdens” (Milius 1995).
In the younger, less-evolved climate change regime, political challenges were more the
rule than the exception. While Vice President Gore helped negotiate the Kyoto treaty, he and
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President Clinton were faced with overwhelming opposition in the Senate on the grounds that the
treaty was unfair and would harm the American economy. In 1998 Gore cited a NOAA report on
record temperatures as a “a reminder once again that global warming is real, and that unless we
act, we can expect more extreme weather in the years ahead.” UPI reported his comments were
to pressure Congress on $63 billion budget request for tax and research incentives to promote
energy efficient products and technology (Record warm intensified in early 1998). After the
Clinton administration’s failure to move the nation toward carbon cuts, the big story was the Bush
administration’s outright rejection o f the protocol in 2001 which has been followed by a growing
chorus within Congress and from individual states to do something about the climate change
problem. The big stories that have followed - on SUV mileage, the McCain Lieberman proposal,
the fights between California and Detroit, and the Northeastern states and Midwest power plants
lawsuit - reveal a similar zen for controversy on the media’s part. The base values are clear to see.
Politicians love the power and rectitude that comes with rulemaking. Wealth, in the form o f large
campaign contributions for elected leaders, is also a factor along with respect.
The discourses in the arguments o f U.S. government stakeholders tended to fall into two
camps. Proponents o f ozone regulation stressed the nature o f global limits and potential for
catastrophe found respectively in the Sustainability and Survivalism discourses while opponents
o f ozone and climate change treaties emphasized Promethean and Economic Rationalist themes.
True to their promotion role, politicians demonstrated a flair for the dramatic. For example, at a
hearing held to consider further regulation o f CFCs, Senator Dale Bumpers, a Democrats from
Arkasas, said of the ozone hole: “There is a time bomb ticking up there - and we can’t afford to
wait” (Lammi 1988). On Climate change, the UPI quoted from Gore’s book, Earth in the Balance,
where the vice president warned that “evidence o f an ecological ‘Kristallnacht’ is as clear as the
sound o f glass shattering in Berlin” (Anderson 2000). For their part, opponents o f ozone and
climate regulations evoked images o f economic threat and even ruin. California Governor Pete
Wilson warned that enforcing the Montreal Protocol ban on methyl bromide pesticides - which
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he called “vital products with no practical alternative” - would “devastate California's agriculture
industry and threaten thousands o f California jobs” (McKinley 1995). On climate change,
presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush often stressed Promethean
economic values alongside their environmental proposals. The following three excerpts from AP
news reports provide typical examples:

President Bush called Monday for balancing economic and environmental concerns when
dealing with global warming, prompting environmentalists to accuse him o f siding with
industry and avoiding a pressing world problem. Bush, speaking to an international
conference on the threat o f a world “greenhouse” effect, said “our policies must be consistent
with economic growth.” And he suggested that in some areas o f the debate “politics and
opinion have outpaced the science” (Hebert, 1990).

Clinton linked environmental regulations reducing hydrocarbon emissions by raising fuel
efficiency standards for cars and other tactics to fight pollution with the creation o f new,
high-paying jobs. “I believe if you have uniform national environmental standards it’s good
for the economy ... you can generate tens o f thousands o f high technology jobs,” he said
(Ghioto 1992).

The [G.W.] Bush administration, counting on more reliance on cleaner energy and new
technology, is aiming to cut greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent over the next 10 years.
But an expanding economy can mean overall emissions increase, even though intensity might
decrease (Backus 2003).

Economic themes also took precedence in news stories about the efforts o f Northeastern states
and California to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. While opponents in the power and automobile
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industry claimed the measures would hurt consumers, supporters countered that industry was only
out for itself. A story by the New York Times documents these issues and the shift of the climate
policy debate from the federal to state capitols.

Repeated defeats on Capitol Hill have made California an appealing alternative battleground
for frustrated environmental groups and politicians. Senators John McCain and John F. Kerry,
who led a failed Senate effort to raise fuel standards, sent a joint letter to California
legislators encouraging them to consider the bill. “Big money and the special interests went to
the mat to stop us,” Mr. Kerry said earlier this month. “I'm just glad to see they weren't able
to smother a real dialogue in California” (Hakim 2002).

Industry

The industry group encompassed the commercial interests represented in news reports
with a stake in the ozone and climate change issues. In the ozone case, this was primarily the
chemical industry and its customers, including agribusiness. In the climate case it was the energy,
manufacturing and automobile industries. Perspective and situations among these diverse
subgroups broke down along the lines o f those flat out opposed to the treaties and those willing to
work with or even profit from new regulations. Their perspectives often changed over time with
the advancement o f both ozone and climate change science. For example, in the ozone case, the
American chemical industry, led by DuPont, dropped its opposition to cuts in CFCs and
embarked on developing substitutes. These stories, including McDonald’s switch to CFC-free
hamburger containers, drew much attention. In the climate case, as Maisano noted, industry’s
approach shifted from challenging the science to fighting the Kyoto Protocol. In news articles,
industry arguments are most often juxtaposed with those o f environmentalists or politicians
supporting regulation. The following AP lead is typical: “Ford Motor Co., defending itself from
261

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attacks by environmental groups, says its hulking, nine-passenger Excursion sport utility vehicle
will be among the safest and cleanest-running SUVs on the market” (Akre 1999). In another
story Exxon Mobil spokesman Tom Cirigliano claimed Greenpeace protestors unfairly criticized
the company’s opposition to emission limits. “There is no company in the industry putting more
time, effort or money into new technologies that will provide real answers to greenhouse
emissions” (State and Regional 2003).
Industry officials were busiest performing a promotion function, be it lobbying against
regulation or in favor o f their products. Wealth is the central base value expressed in industry
arguments. Power to control resources and influence policy is also highlighted. To the degree
officials like Cirigliano seek to be understood, respect also plays a role. In terms o f strategies,
industry has adapted in both cases. The Maisano’s explanation o f the Global Climate Coalition’s
advertising and lobbying strategy against the Kyoto Protocol in Chapter IV provides an excellent
summation o f industry’s approach in the climate case.
Many news stories focused on industry’s role in developing and promoting “green”
practices and products from so-called “clean coal” burning to hybrid cars, hydrogen fuel cells and
wind power. The industry stakeholder group’s arguments were overwhelmingly economic in
nature and for the most part firmly in the Promethean and Economic Rationalist camps. Great
deference is given to the notions o f consumer demand and market forces —both which are shaped
by industry advertising. John Manzoni, a regional president for BP Amaco, discussed the role o f
policymaking from this perspective in a UPI story:

On renewable technology, Manzoni predicted that renewable energy would remain a tiny
fraction o f the mainstream power grid. BP Amoco, an oil company with annual revenues
estimated at $148 billion, believes that energy policy and environmental policy must be
linked, he said, but that connection must be made based on free market principles. “It’s been
proven time and time again that any other form o f intervention - you see it in gas prices here
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a few years ago, you see the result in California. Any other intervention such as price controls
makes the problem worse,” Manzoni said (Gambrell 2001).

Industry arguments promoting alternative energy technologies reside mostly in the realm
o f Ecological Modernization. In terms o f outcomes, industry found a way in the ozone case to
adapt to tough regulations on CFCs and halons. It’s resistance was short lived. In the climate case
however, industry has defeated U.S. involvement in the Kyoto Protocol and is moving now to
promote an alternative agreement based on technology transfer.

United Nations

The United Nations stakeholder group encompasses the many agencies that played a role in both
cases including the UNEP, IPCC and WMO. The work or words o f these officials - which
encompassed all aspects o f the decision process - played prominently in arguments related to
science reports and international negotiations but were seldom central to news stories in the
sample. In the ozone sample, UN arguments were often synonymous with the promotion efforts
o f UNEP head Mostafa Tolba, who worked tirelessly to cajole nations to the bargaining table
throughout the evolution o f the Montreal Protocol. He receives high praise for his efforts from
Bendick, who worked alongside him in the process. In the climate case, the intelligence gathering
work o f the IPPC reported over time in its three assessments drew the most attention from the
American press. In terms o f outcomes, the United Nations has presided over the prescription
process o f both treaties. Though its failure to date to draw the United States into Kyoto Protocol
leaves the treaty’s potential for success in doubt. Not surprisingly, themes o f Sustainable
development, social justice and the precautionary principle dominated UN-related arguments. To
the extent the UN is a consensus building body, it practices the principles o f democratic
pragmatism - stressing the need for cooperative problem solving in both cases. This was reflected
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in the comments o f Mostafa Tolba who as head o f the UNEP helped cajole and inspire officials
from many nations to develop, accept and carry out the Montreal Protocol. Reported the UPI:

The ozone issue has been unique in inspiring broad consensus among nations, and observers
believe a successful solution o f the problem could serve as a template for international
cooperation on the larger problem o f global warming. “No country, no region, no group will
ever be capable of solving any o f these problems,” Tolba said. “If failure is not an option,
success is an imperative.”

Watson, a former participant in both the climate and ozone regimes, reflected this outlook his
interview for this study: “In general issues such as ozone depletion and issues such as global
warming, climate change, whether w e’re in a globalized economy or not, the only way todeal
with these issues is collectively.”

Environmentalists

The Environmentalists represented most often in the press accounts were large
mainstream groups such as Doniger’s Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. While certainly not all alike, they were routinely placed
opposite in press accounts to their political and ideological opponents - industry. These groups
played many roles in the policy process among them chiefly lobbying, public advertising and
protesting. Greenpeace members were often quoted decrying slow progress at international
negotiations (and cheering breakthroughs) and made headlines with dramatic protests at ozone
conferences and actions including trespassing on BP Amoco’s Northstar oil project on Alaska’s
north slope (Badger 2000). Environmentalists did not gamer a large share o f stakeholder
arguments but they surely played a role in drawing press attention to the problems. In both cases,
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Earth Day served as an annual reminder o f the ozone hole and climate change problems.
Discourses within environmental stakeholder arguments are heavy on Survivalism in the ozone
hole case and sustainability and ecological modernization in climate case - reflecting fear about
the immediate dangers o f the former and hope about shifting to renewable energy in the latter.

Europeans

The European stakeholder category served to track arguments coming from across the
Atlantic as a group but was not intended to imply that European nations were on the same page.
In very general terms, the European Community was split on the development o f an ozone treaty
but eventually signed on to it. On climate change, European nations have haggled over details but
as a block stood against the United States in favor o f mandatory carbon emission cuts.
Discourses are varied but trend toward survivalism in the ozone case and sustainability in the
climate case. Two examples from AP articles reflect this familiar dichotomy:

“With a sky-is-falling urgency, European nations are rushing to ban ozone-eating chemicals
after a study said a vast hole may open over their continent this winter. The action followed
President Bush's Feb. 11 order for a U.S. ban on chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, by 1995."
Story notes that any industry objections in Europe have been overwhelmed the
"environmental fervor that has gripped the continent in the last month” (Fritz, 1992).

Prime Minister Thatcher urges action on climate change on grounds o f precautionary
principle to protect "this and future generations" Move was "aimed at giving momentum to
negotiations on global warming, due to start in February” (Czuczka 1990).
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The Public

The public stakeholder group - saved for last in this section - exists in the news media
coverage mostly to the extent it was defined by other stakeholders and the news reporters
themselves. The public is referred to in new coverage most often as a series o f collective bodies
(as opposed to individuals with varied ideas) defined by broad terms ranging from “Americans”
and “voters,” to poll respondents, consumers, cancer statistics and potential victims o f natural
disasters caused by climate change. The media has come for criticism from scholars for leaving
its climate change and ozone coverage devoid o f individual vocies from the public street (Zehr,
2000, Wilkins, 1993). But that is not to say public comments are completely absent from
coverage. The situations o f the public citizen flow from these roles and the arguments about them
are largely in favor o f both protocols. Public opinion was the topic o f a few stories in the sample
which portrayed the public as confused or uninformed about climate change, including one in
which farmers were asked to comment about a government report that global warming could help
their crops (Ritter 2002). One survey found respondents “are so discouraged by the difficulty of
solving Earth's environmental problems that they have begun losing interest” (Donn 1999). The
release o f the climate disaster movie The Day After Tomorrow, which depicted an instant ice age
driven by a shutdown o f the ocean conveyor, prompted a number o f stories about the potential
impact o f the movie on public opinion. One o f the more interesting themes related to the public
was the emergence o f support for the Kyoto Protocol from within a variety o f religious traditions
which led to some creative grassroots lobbying and consumer efforts to curb carbon emissions. In
one, reported The AP, “religious leaders met with top officials at GM, Ford and the United Auto
Workers, and introduced a “What Would Jesus Drive?” television campaign that encourages fuelsaving technologies” (Eggert, 2002). The public beyond U.S. borders was also a topic, including
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citizens o f Pacific island nations worried about sea level rise and, in the ozone case, residents o f
Punta Arenas a city of 120,000 people o f in Southern Chile within reach o f the ozone hole. In a
frightening story, the New York Times interviewed the region's only dermatologist who did not
have the resources to study the skin cancer risk. The story included disturbing anectdotes of
blinded sheep and rabbits that could be snatched by their ears by hunters (Nash 1991). In terms o f
outcomes, the role o f the public characterized in news media reports is perhaps best summed up
by Watson, who noted in his interview that the ozone case was perceived as a serious public
health threat by policymakers in the North, who were in a position to solve the problem. By
contrast, the climate change problem - which to hear it from the news media still has the public
scratching its head - is less of a concern to the developed world.
Polls taken within two months o f this dissertation’s publication reveal a combination o f
apathy, ambivalence and confusion among the public about addressing the climate change
problem. This echoes earlier poll results reported in Chapter I. Remarkably, a nationwide Gallup
survey conducted in March, 2006found that more Americans, and in growing numbers, are
worried about the ozone hole problem than climate change, despite the fact that the ozone
problem is well on its way to being solved. Between 2004 and 2006 the percent o f people
surveyed who worried “a fair amount” to “a great deal” about the ozone hole grew from 60
percent to 68 percent. In 2006, the response in these categories for climate change was 62 percent
(Revkin, 2006b). The survey found that among major issues o f the day - including the war in Iraq,
immigration and health care - environmental issues rated among the least important and that
among environmental issues, global warming ranked among the least important. Despite
apparent apathy toward climate change, 58 percent surveyed agreed that the effects o f global
warming “have already begun,” while an additional 15 percent agreed that it would happen within
a few years or at least their lifetime.
A Time/ABC News/Stanford University poll conducted in March, 2006 found that a
growing number o f Americans - 85 percent o f 1,002 surveyed - thought the earth’s temperature
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had warmed over the past century. Surprisingly, despite an apparent belief among the public in
the global warming phenomenon, nearly two out o f three surveyed were under the impression
that within the scientific community there was “a lot o f disagreement ” about the issue. Finally,
when asked about the role o f federal government in solving the problem, 68 percent o f the
Time/ABC/Stanford poll agreed the government “should do more” to “try to deal with global
warming” (Kluger, 2006, 41). Far smaller percentages agreed with taxing energy to limit its use:
19 percent supported taxing electricity, 31 percent taxing gasoline. In sum, most Americans do
not think global warming is important. They believe it is real but do not think that solving it is
worth economic sacrifice. They mistakenly believe the ozone hole is a more dire issue and that,
when it comes to climate change, there is widespread disagreement among scientists. These
findings are essential to the analysis to come and will be taken up in this chapter’s Critique and
Recommendations section.

Conclusions

Central Findings

This section revisits the study’s overall guiding research questions and channels some o f
the key points revealed in the more detailed accounts above into a handful o f broad findings that
collectively answer the questions. Recall that
Table 24 lists specific locations for more detailed summaries o f answers these questions
and their 15 sub questions.

Overall Research Question 1: How have the sources, structure and content o f arguments
carried by mainstream American print media about the ozone hole and climate change
evolved from 1980 to 2004?
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Overall Research Question 2: What do the trends in social and decision process emerging
from this analysis reveal about the relative success o f the Montreal Protocol in the United
States versus the failure o f the Kyoto Protocol?

Finding 1: The timing and structure o f arguments in American news coverage o f the
ozone hole has paralleled the policy success o f the Montreal Protocol in the United States over
the past quarter century.

In a landscape o f positive, well-timed arguments there is much agreement that the
Montreal Protocol as been a success and is now “yesterday’s news.” This sentiment was echoed
by all seven o f the key informants interviewed for this study. Coding data presented in Chapter III
showed that overall, arguments supported the protocol “veiy strongly.” Spikes in For/Natural,
For/Political and For/Social categories rose in years o f the protocol’s approval and subsequent
revisions - indicating arguments in articles accompanying these events were on the winning
political side. This is visible in Figure 16. Moreover, U.S. government arguments were strongest
in favor o f the protocol when it arguably counted most - in the year o f the Montreal Protocol’s
approval. In 2003, they dropped into negative territory in the “policy” and “support” categories
over the efforts o f U.S. agribusiness and its political supporters to void methyl bromide
restrictions. But as the NRDC’s Doniger noted, despite these efforts, the Montreal Protocol held.
“It hasn’t broken,” he said. Throughout the coverage o f the stratospheric ozone issue, a simple,
clear story carried the discourse o f Survivalism to victory over Promethean and economic
concerns raised by industry. As Flebert noted: “... people can understand that a chemical is going
into the air and is causing a chemical reaction that is causing this vapor or this cloud that’s in the
air o f protective ozone to thin out and that in turn is kind o f a hole. That’s a pretty simple,
straightforward thing.” Watson said the alarming threat o f cancer-causing UV radiation coursing
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through the hole in the sky provided ample motivation - what Ungar referred to as a “hot crisis”
(Ungar 2000) - for policymakers to successfully grapple with the problem.

Finding 2 : By contrast, the landscape o f arguments about climate change is still very
much a battleground - reflecting the mixed fortunes and current failure o f the Kyoto Protocol in
America.

The collective ambivalence o f the United States toward the Kyoto Protocol is clearly reflected on
the argument landscape over the past 25 years. The pool o f key informants was sharply divided
over whether the protocol would eventually succeed in the United States. Watson and Doniger
gave the treaty hope. Maisano and the Congress member did not. While the ozone hole case was
a story o f strong support for policy action and well-timed arguments, the climate case was one o f
tepid overall support and well-timed opposition. Overall, arguments supported the Kyoto protocol
only “moderately.” Climate economic and political arguments dropped precipitously in 2001
when the U.S. walked away from the protocol. From this the lack o f U.S. government support
was clear. With the exception o f small upticks in “For” territory in 1983 and 1997, the
government policy issue criteria landscape differential hovered close to zero until it dropped into
a deep, broad hole in 2001 across the “policy,” “support” and “feasibility” categories when the
Bush administration abruptly pulled away from the Kyoto Protocol process. This dramatic feature
is shown in Figure 29. In the news coverage o f climate change, Promethean concerns about the
potential economic damage o f the treaty and unfairness o f exempting developing nations trumped
a less defined narrative o f environmental opposition - one that emphasized sustainable
development ideals less than immediate life threatening concerns. The study’s key informants
reinforced this notion in their comments on the complexity o f the climate change narrative. So did
Ungar, who wrote: “Climate change, in contrast [to the ozone hole], is not readily tied to concrete
events capable of operating as a beacon or sustaining a hot crisis. Scientists customarily define
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global warming as a future-oriented problem, with effects predominantly predicted for the middle
or end o f the next century” (2000, 307).

Finding 3 : Over time, the climate change debate has shifted from one about the
legitimacy o f global warming science to one about what policy action should be taken. This is
underscored by state efforts to address climate change in absence o f federal action. Despite their
disagreement over the viability o f the Kyoto Protocol, each o f the key informants agrees that the
fundamental debate over climate change has moved beyond the issue o f whether it indeed exists
to what action should be taken to address it. This is underscored by the efforts chronicled in
many stories o f state governments - particularly California and New England - to begin
regulating greenhouse gas emissions in absence o f federal action, and a bi-partisan movement in
Congress to enact emissions cuts - albeit less stringent than the Kyoto Protocol. Businesses are
preparing for regulations. Reporter 2 noted:

I think that the reality is that as the science continues to build, as businesses who have
multinational portfolios are facing stricter rules abroad or stricter rules within the United
States and different areas, you’re going to see a progression toward more stringent
approaches to dealing with greenhouse gases.

Finding 4 : Uncertainty about the climate change phenomenon has been a hallmark o f
climate change news coverage in the 25-year sample and one that has buffered calls for policy
action. It seems to have derived from a cocktail o f deft lobbying by industry, reporters attempting
to “balance” coverage o f a confusing, controversial issue, and scientists unwilling or unable to
place their work in context. There are very recent signs that this uncertainty is waning and being
placed in tighter context.
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The examination o f articles in the climate sample bears out findings in other studies (Boykoff,
2004, Ungar, 2000, Zehr, 2000) that uncertainty is a dominant narrative in new reports on climate
change science. This often took the form o f a statement spelling out the theory o f climate change
immediately contradicted by one casting doubt on the idea. A paragraph tacked onto the end o f an
AP story is a good example o f a poorly written, borderline incorrect statement sowing
uncertainty: “Many scientists believe chemicals added to the atmosphere may be warming the
planet, affecting climates worldwide. But others point to regular cycles o f climate change and
note that accurate temperature records go back only about a century” (State and Regional 1998).
Potential causes o f this emphasis on uncertainty include reporters’ fixation on “balancing” all
stories, scientists lack o f communication skills, efforts on the part o f opponents o f greenhouse gas
regulation to cast doubt on the research and, o f course, the genuine incompleteness and
complexity o f the bigger scientific picture.

Reisinger predicted that uncertainty would persist (2002, 5}: “Uncertainty will remain a
feature o f climate change for decades to come, and therefore skepticism about required degree o f
action will remain even if the existence o f climate change becomes universal.” There are signs,
however, that the media’s long equivocation with climate science is ebbing or at least being
placed in a more focused context. Subsequent to this study, two major news outlets have come
forward with front-page declarations that the debate over global warming has been settled. In
June, 2005 USA Today declared in a banner front page headline: “The debate’s over: Globe is
warming.” The lead paragraph read:

Don’t look now, but the ground has shifted on global warming. After decades o f debate over
whether the planet is heating and, if so, whose fault it is, divergent groups are joining hands
with little fanfare to deal with a problem they say people can no longer avoid (Vergano 2005).
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An April, 2006 cover story in Time Magazine is the latest in a set o f recent stories that declares
that “The climate is crashing and global wanning is to blame.”

No one can say exactly wheat it looks like when a planet takes ill, but it probably looks a lot
like Earth. Never mind what you’ve heard about global warming as a slow-motion emergency
that would take decades to play out. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the crisis is upon us.
(Kluger, 2006).

New York Times climate reporter Andrew Revkin observed in an April 23, 2006 Week in
Review cover story that “Global Warming has the feel o f breaking news these days” and wrote
that “Between the poles o f real-time catastrophe and nonevent lines lies the prevailing scientific
view: without big changes in emissions rates, global warming from the buildup o f greenhouse
gases is likely to lead to substantial and largely irreversible, transformations o f climate,
ecosystems and coastlines later this century” (Revkin, 2006b). Taken together, these reports seem
to reflect a growing certainty among mainstream scientists and leading news outlets about the
likelihood o f dramatic effects from climate change in our lifetimes or at least those o f our
children.

On Policy Problems and Advocacy

The inescapable central feature o f this case comparison is the evidence in the argument
landscape o f support for the Montreal Protocol and opposition to the Kyoto Protocol. For
opponents o f the climate treaty in the United States this is not a problem, but a cause for
celebration. They, along with supporters o f the Kyoto treaty can see in this study’s findings
evidence that can help explain and provide context for the status in America o f both treaties. The
methodology outlined here to map the argument landscape, interview key stakeholders,
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characterize, sort and analyze their views is apolitical. The data it produces can be used to
develop policy - a wide range o f prescriptions and promotion strategies - that certainly not
everyone would agree on. Recall that the author noted earlier, in his opinion, climate change
requires a global political solution that includes immediate and extensive cuts in the use o f fossil
fuel in developed and developing nations and a serious commitment to renewable energy. What
follows under the subheading Challenges to Climate Policy is an assessment o f the challenges in
the argument landscape to this goal. The assessment is followed by a set o f Policy
Recommendations to counter those challenges. What is important for readers to see, regardless of
where they stand on the issue o f climate change, is how an analysis o f an argument landscape
generated by this study can be used in the policymaking process. The critique o f the challenges to
limiting emissions is as potentially useful to opponents o f emissions regulations as the
suggestions to overcome those challenges are to proponents. It is the author’s hope, and a
common theme that runs through the study’s recommendations, that this method be used to
increase mutual understanding and find common ground on difficult issues. At a minimum it can
aid in making transparent and well-informed ^ if not universally agreed upon - policy decisions.

Challenges to Climate Policy. Americans who wish to play a larger role in solving the
climate change problem cannot help but be daunted by the fact that while the United States
comprises only five percent o f the world’s population it is responsible for a quarter o f the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions (Kluger, 2006). In the April 26 article, Revkin added further glum
context: “Without a connection to current disasters, global warming is the kind o f problem people,
and democratic institutions, have proved singularly terrible at solving: a long-term threat that can
only be limited by acting promptly, before the harm is clear” (2006b). Global climate change has
become understood in the public arena as an unfolding “tragedy o f the commons” - the
archetype noted earlier in which common resources (in this case the atmosphere’s capacity to
absorb carbon at a rate that won’t disrupt climate) is exhausted by takers motivated by their
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individual wants and blind to the need for a communal solution to manage the fragile resource
(Senge 1990; Dryzek 1997). Revkin bemoans that “there is enough static in the air to
simultaneously confuse, alarm and paralyze the public.” This study has sampled the air and
confirmed that static. It is not surprising - knowing that news reporters both reflect and influence
public opinion - that the polling data reflect this paralysis: The American public knows it’s
walking on the railroad tracks and indeed sees the freight train coming but the potential collision
is very low on its priority list. While acknowledging it might be a good idea to change course, the
public thinks it is not worth significant effort to do so.
These poll results seem to reflect what psychologists call cognitive dissonance - a
situation in which “we become aware that our attitudes and actions don’t coincide” and thus “we
experience tension or cognitive dissonance” (Myers, 2007, 728). Writes Myers, who explains the
theory developed by Leon Festinger: “The less coerced and more responsible we feel for a
troubling act, the more dissonance we feel. The more dissonance we feel, the more motivated we
are to find consistency, such as changing our attitudes to justify the act.”
In the argument landscapes examined here, opponents o f U.S. involvement in the Kyoto
Protocol have taken advantage o f this principle by nourishing the need for consistency with
diverse and ample arguments to “to justify the act” o f continuing heavy use o f fossil fuels and
opposing regulation o f greenhouse gases. Among those arguments in this successful formula are:
1) There is little scientific consensus on climate change. Though this not true, the public polls
show the argument has stuck; 2) The United States should not commit to fossil fuel reductions
before India and China. This fairness argument has resounded with the public, the media and
Congress; 3) The Kyoto Protocol would harm your every day quality o f life and jeopardize the
nation’s economy. Unwilling yet to commit to expensive measures, the public seems to agree; 4)
Consumer choice and safety would be hampered by downsizing vehicles and gas mileage.
This and other studies note that similar arguments were made but overcome in the case o f
regulating CFCs to protect the stratospheric ozone layer (Benedick, 1998; Reisinger, 2002).
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Recall that among the trump cards on the side o f regulating CFCs were 1) A frightening and
easily understood problem: skin cancer from a damaged sky caused by man-made chemicals; 2)
Ready product substitutes that could allow the public to continue using spray cans, refrigerators
and air conditioners. The former was reflected in the differential time-series argument landscapes
(Figure 16) by high ridges o f For/Natural and For/Social arguments. The latter is reflected in the
relative lack of economic opposition in the landscape. As noted in Chapter I, the challenge to
proponents o f climate regulations is greater and more complex for many reasons: The climate
change threat works on a longer timescale than the ozone hole and has been perceived as a slowmoving problem for future generations to deal with. The notion o f a slowly warming planet with
uncertain consequences simply cannot compete against the metaphor o f a hole burned into the sky
by human hands inviting death by cancer. A realistic solution to climate change requires a more
discemable sacrifice from the public in terms o f lifestyle changes (cutting back on energy,
automobile use) and expense. The fight between the Promethean, Economic Rationalist discourse
o f interests opposed to regulation versus the primarily Sustainable Development discourse o f
proponents is “the static in the air” that has fed the public cognitive dissonance over climate
change.

Policy Recommendations. The above section described the features o f the argument
landscape that have worked against greenhouse gas regulation and renewable energy
development in the United States. This section notes where leverage can be found in the argument
landscape to empower a move toward emissions cuts and renewable energy. Four broad
suggestions below, collectively aim to shift the public’s reaction to the cognitive dissonance over
climate change from denial to constructive action.
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Set the record straight that mainstream scientific consensus is solid that climate change is a real
problem and growing threat.

Scientists and environmentalists who have been at this task for years attest that this is
easier said than done. One conundrum highlighted by this study is that while the great majority o f
arguments o f scientists in news reports are supportive o f Kyoto’s goals and principles, the
impression that has emerged from press reports is one o f uncertainty. Regular reporting that the
thousands o f scientists o f the IPCC are on the same broad page is apparently not enough to wipe
away the impression o f uncertainty left behind by scientists’ own boilerplate and culturally
endemic qualifications o f their findings along with persistent calls for further study o f the
problem. This is only amplified by skeptics who come across loud and clear in the same or
subsequent reports. As the scientific community speaks with greater unanimity about what it
does agree upon - and it agrees upon much - the window for skeptical voices in the mainstream
press should shrink in the argument landscape along with a key justification for policy inaction.
Note again the certitude on climate science in the latest Washington Post, USA Today and New
York Times reports referred to earlier (Eilperin, 2006; Vergano, 2005; Revkin, 2006). Separately,
proponents o f emissions cuts in the United States can take heart that the precautionary principle
was followed in the case o f CFC cuts before there was hard evidence that they were the primary
cause o f stratospheric ozone depletion (Benedick, 1998). Arguably, the evidence for human
induced climate change today builds a far stronger case. Scientists, environmentalists and
politicians who favor aggressive action against climate change need to find ways to confirm for
the public that they understand what the public says it already knows - that climate change is real.
Moreover, they need to find ways to simultaneously motivate and empower the public into action
- ways to demonstrate that climate change is not a problem o f the future, but o f the present. That
it is real and it has arrived. This is a first step to discouraging excuses for action. The next step is
to empower the public to work on the problem.
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Engage and empower the public to act in useful ways to address climate change.

Painting a crisis as unpreventable is a recipe for inaction. Recall the ASL argument
reported in Chapter III: “Americans are so discouraged by the difficulty o f solving Earth’s
environmental problems that they have begun losing interest, researchers say.” (Donn 1999).
Independently, psychologists and mass communications researchers studying the intersection o f
climate change and ecological sustainability within their disciplines, argue for including the
public in the solution. This study has confirmed that individual public voices are notably absent
from the debate - especially in discussions o f solving the climate change problem. Arguments
linked to the public stakeholder groups tend to focus on the public as a victim - o f heat waves,
floods, hurricanes on one hand, and potentially onerous costs o f the Kyoto treaty on the other.
These are important points and underscore the importance o f the public having a voice in the
process. But everyday citizens - beyond their role as victims, voters, poll respondents or drivers
o f SUVs - are seldom mentioned as part o f the climate solution.
In his study o f climate change coverage, Zehr reported that the press and their climate
change scientists sources has treated the public as a monoculture whose thinking about global
warming has been characterized by “apocalyptic thought, quickness to jump to conclusions, and
carelessness.” He argued that this is a false construction and that the public is far more tuned in
(Zehr, 2000,98): “[The public’s] attitudes toward global warming and other environmental
problems are well integrated with such values as parental responsibility, obligation to descendants,
traditional religious teaching and protecting nature for its own sake. These values, and the
‘cultural models’ that emerge with them incorporate concern about future effects o f global
warming and associated climate changes.” Zehr concludes: “Quite possibly, the limited role
given to the public in the press and delegitimation of their knowledge have contributed to this
inaction.”
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A set o f articles in the May 2000 issue o f American Psychologist, which outlined the role
psychology can play in promoting ecological sustainability, stressed the need to move the public
from concern about the environment to action. Wrote Winter: “Ecological awareness may feel
good, but sooner or later we must translate our feelings into behavioral change if we are going to
build a sustainable culture. Neither transcendent connection with the ecological self nor clever
technological advances will build a sustainable culture without behavioral change” (Winter, 2000,
518). Stem writes that “environmentally relevant behavior lies at the end o f a long causal chain
involving a variety o f personal and contextual factors” and that “several conditions must be
favorable for behavior to change in a pro-environmental direction, and the absence o f any one is
likely to prevent behavioral change” (Stem, 2000). Stem notes that these factors include
environmental concern, attitudes, information, beliefs, abilities and external conditions that
facilitate or impeded particular actions.
In sum, the public has thus far been cast in the media as victim and occasionally
perpetrator in the climate change problem that has been characterized as potentially insolvable.
Suggestions about what the public can do to help the problem and voices o f everyday individuals
about this process have been largely absent from the argument landscape. Proponents o f solving
the climate change problem would do well to change this, knowing that good intentions alone will
not solve the problem. The public needs a stake in the solution. It is beyond the scope o f this
discussion and expertise o f the author to outline a strategy to carry this out. However, it is fair to
say that the news media - in the interest o f telling a more complete story and providing a service
to its readers - has a role to play. This is discussed below. A wide range o f literature by
environmental scholars and advocates o f sustainable living addresses conceptual and practical
tools that can engage the public in playing a role in a climate solution (Sitars, 1993; Winter, 2000;
Oskamp, 2000; Daly, 1996; Balaton Group, 1996; Cobb, 1995; Costanza, 1997; Miller, 1996;
Robert, 1995; Stem, 2000). One powerful unifying approach that can pull individuals into the
discussion is the calculation o f one’s own “ecological footprint” which determines though an
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estimation of an individual’s daily material and energy use how many planet Earths would be
required to sustain a world full of people with the same needs (Wackemagel, 1994). This
engaging exercise personalizes the challenge and can enable individuals to set a concrete goal for
improvement.
Finally, the emergence o f state and local government action on the climate change issue
provides a valuable opportunity for public participation. The carbon-cutting initiatives noted in
California and Northeastern states have connected local constituencies with real solutions in the
face o f federal inaction. In a column on the topic, Boston Globe columnist Scott Lehigh noted:
“The states have long been the laboratories of democracy - and these days, those public policy
workshops are striving to fill a vacuum by the federal government... With the president basically
ignoring global warming - and administration operatives having been accused o f attempting to
muzzle government scientists who insist immediate measures are a must - a number o f states are
trying to reduce greenhouse gases themselves.”

Counter the most challenging aspect o f the argument terrain - domestic economic arguments with the cost-saving logic o f ecological economics.

One o f the central battlegrounds on the news media argument landscape is over the domestic cost
o f regulating carbon emissions. Industry and government officials opposed to the Kyoto Protocol
turned repeatedly to local economic arguments to make their case that it would be a bad deal for
Americans and the economic health o f the nation. In the Promethean, Economic Rationalist view
- captured by industry spokesman Frank Maisano - emissions are synonymous with economic
health. Said Maisano:

In the case o f carbon, you don’t really have a vehicle to reduce emissions other than
constraining the carbon, constraining supply o f energy ... [We found] that emissions go up or
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down depending on the state o f the economy. So, we can, w e’ve actually reduced emissions
in the United States between 2000 and 2003. Well, w e’ve done that because our economy
was not good. And clearly, that’s not the situation that we want to be in. The Europeans have
struggled to make emissions reductions and part o f that is because their economy is in the
tank. And what would happen with their emissions reductions that they can’t meet currently if
their economy started to grow some? You know, so there’s that link there that creates a false
scenario which many times, again, has said, OK, there’s got to be a better way for us to do
this then just try and decided to do it in this Kyoto process.

This logic is hard to argue with when one accepts the assumptions o f the dominant neoclassical
economic model followed by our government and financial institutions. But the reward o f costsavings is not a monopoly o f the neoclassical model.

Recall that many economic scholars argue that if the world is to successfully grapple with long
term ecological threats like climate change, it needs a more adaptable alternative to pure market
economics that takes into account the limited nature o f resources and the critical services
provided by nature that are excluded from current cost-benefit calculations and indicators o f well
being and discounted in investments in the future. The shift to a more ecological economic model
will not happen overnight but some scholars are working to demonstrate its necessity. Costanza
attempted to do so in a controversial paper that placed an estimate on the value o f “ecological
systems and the natural capital stocks ... critical to the functioning o f the Earth’s life support
systems” (1998, 4 ). He termed his annual estimate o f the biosphere’s average annual net worth U.S. $33 trillion - a “minimum.” While delivered in the vernacular o f market economics, the
message was a staunchly ecological: Costanza advocated in this and other papers a more inclusive
framework for valuing the natural systems on which humanity relies. He wrote (Costanza, 1997,
51):
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Ideally a framework for economic analysis should contain information about the full
implications (economic, social, and ecological) o f various alternative policy options relative
to existing policy. For every policy option, the various ecological-social-economic linkages
should be traced to determine the various consequences for human welfare associated with
that option, and where possible the various positive and negative impacts should be
quantified and valued.

Proponents o f carbon cuts and renewable energy would do well to take a page from Costanza in
clarifying the necessity and reward o f making consumer decisions along more ecological lines.
Costanza’s work fits naturally with the discourse o f Ecological Modernization which provides a
broad common ground for environmentalists and officials in the energy industry who can both
celebrate the virtues o f saving money and doing good for the environment. Indeed, industryenvironmental partnerships have grown from this common ground in both the climate and ozone
cases. While the Kyoto Protocol gave diverse and competitive industries a common enemy, rising
fuel costs and growing concern about climate change provide a context that can reward
companies and consumers for investment in renewable energy and other ecologically sound
practices. “Many forces are lining up to drive a change in energy policies,” Paul Epstein,
associate director o f the Center for Health and Global Environment and State Representative
Frank Smizik wrote in a Boston Globe column. “Oil and gas prices are climbing; conflicts in
supply regions are multiplying. Oil will run out at some point, and climate volatility is sending
shivers throughout insurance and investment communities.” The writers note that, among other
positive signs, venture capitalists are investing heavily in hybrids, solar, wind, tidal wave and
geothermal energy.
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On the Press

The preceding section was geared to demonstrate the relevance o f this analysis o f arguments in
news media to policymaking and advocacy. The following section is intended to show its use for
critiquing the performance o f the news media itself and generating some recommendations for
reporters, readers and sources. These recommendations are independent o f those above for
policymakers with one important exception - the call to play closer attention to the voices in the
lay public on global environmental issues. This specific idea serves the larger interest of
democracy - a value shared by many in both the news media and policy making circles.

Media Accuracy. Balance and Bias. As environmental news stories go, the ozone hole
and climate change problems were complicated on many levels. Unlike a toxic spill or a season o f
poor air quality, the causes and threats posed by both phenomenon were less easily understood
and more hotly disputed by experts. As noted by the news reporters in the interview chapter, the
press has had to sort its way through reams o f conflicting scientific reports and claims and
counter claims by representatives o f industry and environmental groups. The contusion presented
by the sources in this story cannot helped but be passed on to the readers. News reporters and
editors, who are often outstanding generalists but rarely experts on their beat, are left to do their
best to place conflicting arguments in a context that at a minimum conveys the state of
understanding among experts o f the issues. Recall the coping strategy outlined in Chapter IV by
Reporter 3 for tackling this “mountain” o f information:

The material, the data, is so incredibly complicated and I think it’s difficult for a lot o f
reporters to sort o f grapple with it and evaluate it. And so in the end you have to - most
reporters have to find sort o f reliable sources, scientists, analysts, public officials, bureaucrats
who have sort o f dealt with this issue over the years. You know, and some members of
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advocacy groups - some o f the environmental groups who cover this stuff, follow this stuff
intensely, you know, year round - and try to find some people you are comfortable with
whose opinion and evaluation you sort o f trust.

This approach, taken by a veteran environmental reporter, is a far cry from the cold calls
described by Watson in which reporters asked him to explain the nuts and bolts o f climate change
science. Though, in the event a news agency’s environmental writer is unavailable to cover a
breaking story about climate change or another big complicated issue, it is far better than not for
the uninformed substitute to ask “dumb questions” o f an expert - however embarrassing - to get
the most basic facts straight. A plea for patience from an exacerbated scientist is better than a
complaint from readers about a paragraph like this one in the New York Times which confuses
climate change with the ozone hole:

Eliminating energy subsidies would improve trade balances, shrink government budget
deficits and reduce wasteful energy consumption. But it would also cut emissions o f carbon,
the substance whose buildup, scientists fear, could eventually destroy the ozone layer,
resulting in higher average temperatures and harmful climate changes around the world
(Nasar, 1992).

Straightforward factual errors happen, be they from laziness, rushing, or an honest
misunderstanding, ft seems from this study’s review o f more than 1,000 ozone and climate
change articles that such mistakes were relatively rare exceptions. Separately, as noted earlier, the
news media has been criticized for following the journalistic norm o f “balance”- a charge that is
central to conclusions from a content analysis by Boykoff and Boycoff o f climate change reports
in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Wall Street Journal. The
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authors charge that “balanced reporting has allowed a small group o f global wanning skeptics to
have their views amplified” (Boycoff, 2004, 126) and conclude:

“In light o f the general agreement in the international scientific community that mandatory
and immediate action is needed to combat global wanning, US prestige-press coverage has
been seriously and systematically deficient... The failed discursive translation between the
scientific community and the and popular, mass mediatized discourse is not random; rather
the mis-translation is systematic and occurs for perfectly logical reasons rooted in journalistic
norms, and values” (Boycoff, 2004, 134).

This critique o f balance is fair to a point. In daily news reporting, balancing opposing
views equally is often used as a default when claims and counter claims are too complicated to
sort out on a deadline. But this study’s content analysis demonstrates that this is far from so in the
case o f scientific arguments about the ozone hole and climate change. Relative to the goals and
principles o f the ozone and climate change protocols - the vast proportion o f science-related
arguments carried in the mainstream press were strongly supportive o f the protocols. Furthermore,
there is more at play in the construction o f narratives in news reports than the norms o f the press
itself. The discourses and norms o f media sources —outlined in the seven stakeholder categories
above - also play a significant role in messages that get out. While beyond the scope o f their
study, the authors above offer no critique o f the way scientists communicate their findings to the
press and that is certainly part o f the equation. Pressed about the balance issue, the reporters
interviewed for this study said they have given far more credence to the consensus o f the IPCC
than skeptics on the climate change issue - a finding borne out by the data. Hebert said in his
interview that balance in an ongoing news story is something achieved over time. “Well, as
journalists, you can only - you can only report what you’re told,” he said. “And, you ask the
question, ‘Well, should I ignore the skeptic completely?’ No, because he may have something.
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But you have to kind o f try to put it in context by having other people at least respond to it.” It is
unrealistic to expect news accounts to eliminate all mention o f dissenting opinion - especially
political opinion - on such controversial issues. Writers and editors can, however, place them in a
realistic context with a long view o f the issue that serves the laudable ends o f both thorough and
fair reporting. A good example is found in a 1999 New York Times story under the headline
“Human Imprint on Climate Change Grows Clearer.”

The amount o f warming projected by the IPCC ... would create widespread climatic and
ecological changes, including a shift in climatic zones, an increase in heat waves, warmer
northern winters, increased precipitation when it rains but worse droughts when it does not,
and a rise in sea level that could inundate many small island nations and drive tens o f millions
o f people away from the coasts when storm surges develop. For a long time, the global
warming debate focused on how much warming a given increase in greenhouse gases - say,
a doubling o f atmospheric concentrations - would produce. Though skeptics say it would be
small, the dominant view for 20 years has been that a doubling would produce a warming o f
3 to 8 degrees, other things being equal. This is a measure o f the climate system’s sensitivity
to “forcing,” as experts call it, by external heating and cooling influences, and many
mainstream scientists say confidence that it is right has grown.

Recommendations for Reporters. Readers and Sources. What follows are some
recommendations grounded in the research above aimed at improving communication between
the media, their sources and the public about global environmental problems - particularly
stratospheric ozone destruction and climate change. They are delivered with humility and an
understanding that this task poses all parties with an enormous challenge. A general theme that
runs through the remarks is o f encouraging better communication among these groups and higher
expectations for one another. As Dryzek noted: “For Democracy, if it is about anything, is about
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authentic communication. Overcoming the impediments that distort such communication is
crucial” (Dryzek, 1997, 200)

Use this stu d y’s maps to better know thyself in the news coverage.

This study offers reporters, sources and readers forgive the cliche, “news they can use” a large map o f the arguments in a sample o f a quarter century o f ozone and climate reporting. The
maps, which describe the source, structure and proportion o f arguments in the news coverage, are
a reflection and a visual representation of how the story was told. For reporters, it can be
examined as a reflection o f their “news judgment” - a critical but amorphous value informed by
long experience and personal views. How big a role, they might ask themselves, did their news
judgment play in shaping the argument patterns that emerged? Such questions enable reporters
and editors to assess for themselves the shape and potency o f their own deadline decisions.
Sources - be they scientists, lobbyists or politicians - can gauge for themselves how their
arguments come across in the press. Does the slice o f the coverage and character and proportion
o f arguments linked to their stakeholder group match the effort they have put in to being heard or
would expect to be heard? What consequences might it have for your interests, or the interest o f
fair and accurate reporting from your point o f view? This is also valuable consumer information
for readers akin to a nutrition label or stock market figure showing performance over time.

Invest in education.

For the media, this is a message first to the elites that control the newsroom schedules
and financial resources. Reporters given responsibilities for specific news beats can learn a
tremendous amount very quickly on the job. Many environmental reporters do excellent work.
But they are entitled to some formal education beyond their on-the-job training, especially if they
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are to effectively cover the climate change problem and sort through conflicting and dubious
claims for the readership. Reporters should have the opportunity to learn, away from a crushing
deadline, about the most basic elements o f earth system science and the institutions and process
involved in making global environmental policy. Watson, Maisano and Doniger each lamented a
lack o f understanding among reporters on the climate issue. All three reporters interviewed
acknowledged this challenge. For their part, researchers who grumble about the press coverage
should be first in line to offer their teaching services - if only to shame the publishers into
supporting the effort. Media elites should encourage education about environmental science and
policy in the newsroom by devoting real time and resources to the task. In an era where climate
change is likely to worsen this investment will provide a critical public service that flows to the
readers and back to the bottom line.
Just as the media should invest in learning more about climate science and policy, so too
should media sources learn about working with the press - particularly scientists. Beyond a lack
o f understanding on the part o f reporters, poorly written descriptions o f scientific findings, are
symptomatic o f poor communication skills on both ends. Scientists should not be afraid o f
interpreting their efforts for reporters in lay terms. Many politicians and lobbyists, whose agendas
are often more transparent, are already skilled at this.

Encourage exchange o f content study results.

News reporters are generally aware that their work has an effect on public attitudes and
the making of public policy. Unlike researchers o f news media content - this author included daily news reporters have neither the time nor the resources to systematically examine their pros
beyond the occasional critique. That said, researchers o f the press who have pragmatic
conclusions and suggestions should consider reaching beyond their peer-reviewed publications to
share their findings directly with reporters. An approach to doing just that with this study is
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discussed briefly in this chapter’s final section. Disparate professional cultures, egos and busy
schedules preclude this from happening more regularly. It is understandable that a news reporter
working in the trenches - in the real world - would not want to be critiqued by someone in the
Ivory Tower. But both camps - academic researchers and press - can learn from one another.
They have common interests, above all, keeping the readers informed with accurate information.
The self-reflection o f the reporters interviewed for this study, among the best in their field,
demonstrates that potential.

Involve and provoke the reading public.

This recommendation applies to reporters, editorial writers, researchers, politicians,
lobbyists and the reading public itself. It means simply to make a greater effort to encourage
public participation grappling with climate change. For reporters that translates into recognizing
the value o f non-expert citizens’ voices to the debate. While interviews with Inuits watching their
hunting grounds melt away are compelling, discussions about climate change with drivers o f gas
guzzlers or hybrids also matters. Zehr and Wilkins make a good point when they called upon the
news media to broaden the diversity o f voices heard in its stories about the scientific and political
debate. “Different values need to be recognized, acknowledged, and finally, reported,” wrote
Wilkins. “Without such an effort, the story itself will remain incomplete, an inadequate response
from a profession facing the greenhouse century” (Wilkins, 1993, 82).
For members o f the reading public this is a recommendation to hold the sources o f
information that empower your political involvement to a higher standard. Good reporting - be it
from the news media, the government, a research institute or a neighbor —is needed to make
informed decisions. Recall again Watson’s remark: “If we live in a democracy, which I would
argue we do in the U.S., then public opinion is absolutely critical for policy formation by
government.” On this count, Wilkins and Zehr are in the comer of the average citizen. Reporters
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are, too. They are there day in and day out when it seems no one is paying attention. It is the
opinion of this author that the public needs to become more involved in global environmental
issues - especially climate change. Calling for stories and high standards from the local
newspaper is a start followed up by contacting lawmakers and expressing an opinion. The
proverbial media spotlight - ever critical in this important topic - shines brighter when public
interest and energy is behind it.

Closing Remarks

This section briefly reviews the journey o f this project from conception to final form,
noting some o f the pitfalls and successes encountered along the way. It concludes with some
potential uses for the study’s methodology and a hope for how its results might be used.

The Study’s Evolution

This dissertation arose from my general interest in comparing news coverage o f
controversial environmental problems. Specifically, I wondered whether there was a difference
between the type o f arguments in news coverage o f a successful environmental policy versus a
failed environmental policy, and whether differences between them could shed light on why the
former problem was solvable and the later problem not. Originally, I proposed examining news
coverage o f three cases - the ozone hole, climate change, and the Great Lakes pollution problem.
Being a visual and spatially-oriented person, I wanted to construct “maps” that could reveal how
the arguments developed in the press coverage over time - not unlike a streaming sonar image o f
ocean bottom. But the whole concept needed more focus and begged many questions, for
example: How would news coverage be examined? How would the study be bound in time and
space? What methodological tools and analytic frameworks would be applied? These answers
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were hashed out largely in the trial-and-error process o f developing the categorical content
analysis system detailed in Chapter II.
The first version of the system, assembled in early 2001, did not include policy issue
criteria. Instead, it comprised the 16 current direction and substance categories plus an additional
layer that sorted arguments by their emphasis on “short-term” versus “long-term” outcomes. This
made for a total of 32 nested direction and substance categories. This initial approach was tested
in a small pilot study o f news articles about the Clinton administration’s ill-fated BTU (British
Thermal Unit) tax proposal and was presented in a poster I drafted with Drs. Mimi Becker and
Dork Sahagian for a conference o f the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme in
Amsterdam, Netherlands. The poster, which included an early version o f the “landscape maps”
presented in this study, took first place in its category and was published by The Royal Swedish
Academy o f Sciences in the Global Change Newsletter. At this stage, I had proposed a research
design that could couple the results o f a content analysis o f news coverage o f my three cases with
a separate analysis o f stakeholders and their discourse preferences. The results would be
evaluated against an original definition o f globalization to discern what, if any, role globalization
played on the evolution o f the three cases.
The questions developed by the committee for my qualifying exam - taken in August,
2002 - covered a wide range o f material essential to tackling the topics ahead, including the
science o f climate change and ozone, systems thinking and systems dynamics, ecological and
neoclassical economic and the policy analytic framework. The following year, Professor Becker
and I won approval from the university’s Institutional Review Board for plans to have
undergraduate students test the coding scheme and also to interview key informants for the study.
Before the reliability test, I dropped the additional layer o f directional codes - which proved
confusing - and instead added the new policy issue criteria to directly link arguments in articles
to the policy process. The inter-coder reliability tests on 49 articles were encouraging,
demonstrating that the method could be successfully taught to and applied by students. As 1
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worked to write up he results o f the pilot study o f 90 stratospheric ozone articles (including the
original 49 tested), it became clear that my overall dissertation proposal was too large and I
would need to narrow the scope of my work. With my committee’s assent, I dropped the Great
Lakes case and later scaled back the ambitious globalization analysis. In fall o f 2 0 0 5 ,1 began
conducting the research interviews and worked with Drs. Becker and Prelli on the manuscript for
Policy Sciences. Several excellent reviews pushed me to ground the categorical system more
firmly in the communications literature and to distinguish it from existing content analysis
systems. That experience and the exercise o f writing these five chapters has underscored for me
the importance o f having a strong and consistent methodological framework. It is ultimately what
has made this analysis work.

What Next?

The rhetorical landscape maps, interviews, and general conclusions drawn from them in
this study add to the literature another layer o f understanding o f the news media’s handling of
these important environmental issues. But the conclusions and recommendations can do little
good if left on the shelf. Thus, an effort will be made to share them with the working press and
members o f the different stakeholder groups noted throughout who could evaluate and put them
into practice. Among other options, an online white paper and/or news release summarizing the
results with links to the paper could be drafted. This format is used to convey information to news
professionals by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication from
studies in Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly. In addition, the results can be shared
at presentations and posters at conferences geared for reporters and editors and members o f the
other stakeholder groups including climate scientists, industry representatives, environmentalists
and policy makers. Most importantly, and in line with a central theme o f advice in this chapter, an
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effort should be made to reach the general public with this research. Here again the Web site can
help along with talks open to the public, for example, on college campuses and in public libraries.
Meanwhile, the data set compiled for this case study can be mined more deeply and
augmented with subsequent years’ coverage to create a rich, growing longitudinal record o f both
cases. The existing record holds a good deal o f potential for more focused analyses o f argument
categories, stakeholder groups, and their relationship to the policy process. Also, the descriptive
accounts o f social process and discourse analysis aided by this system can add context to a variety
o f other studies, including agenda setting research that looks for causal links between messages
and outcomes in public opinion or policy. Separately, as noted in Chapter II, the coding system
could be used to examine other issues and other forms o f communication media - from television
accounts and political advertising to newsletters and scholarly journals. A number of topics
garnering volumes o f news coverage and deemed important by the public could be examined
including the war in the Middle East, the economy and jobs, terrorism and health care.
This dissertation and its methodology embodies a transparent and systematic effort, in the
words o f Schwandt, to accurately represent the social phenomena that it examines: the every-day
reporting in America o f humanity’s struggle to understand and address the ozone hole and climate
change problems. The characteristics o f arguments that appear in the press have profound
implications for public opinion and policy making on these critical environmental issues. It is
hoped that this study can help news reporters, their sources and their readers - all who shape the
first draft o f history - reflect on their own assumptions. With the help o f a common landscape
map o f the many arguments and perspectives that inhabit the ozone and climate debates, these
stakeholders can more accurately place their own views into context with others. No map can
assure anyone will walk in the same direction, but the odds are they can more easily find common
ground. And today, that is needed more than ever.
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